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Abstract
In the 1990s, at same time that the United States was bombing Baghdad, Medellin was the most
dangerous city in the world. Since 2003, the city has undergone an internationally renowned urban
transformation, part of a controversial nationwide peace process. Implemented under Sergio Fajardo's
term as Medellin mayor (2003-2007), the city, now perceived as a totally different place with a homicide
rate 10 times lower, is seen as an example of how to engage with conflict and violence as urban peace
process. The policies involved were physical and programmatic interventions in violent neighborhoods
through the planning and construction of new facilities. This thesis seeks to understand if these physical
and political policies and practices are directly related to the reduction of homicides in Medellin during
the same period. The main objective of this research project is to explore the real success or failure of
these policies, in a search to find successful strategies that can be implemented in other cities around
the world with similar manifestations of conflict and violence.
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Introduction
In the 1990s, at same time that the United States was bombing Baghdad,
Medellin was the most dangerous city in the world. Since 2003, the city has
undergone an internationally renowned urban transformation, part of a
controversial nationwide peace process. This transformation, implemented
under Sergio Fajardo's term as Medellin mayor (2003-2007) and continued
under his predecessor's term, includes spending 52% of the city budget on
education programs and facilities. Education here is understood in a broad way
(schools, library parks, transportation, social programs, museums, more
prepared teachers, roads and bridges, parks, public parks and buildings,
technology, nutrition, and micro-credit to name a few). More than 200
buildings, public parks, and public gardens have been built in the Medellin
neighborhoods that for up to forty years have been the city's most isolated from
infrastructural resources due to geography, violence, and poverty. At the end of
2007 the city had a homicide rate 10 times lower than when this urban
transformation began nearly five years earlier. Because of this, this kind of 13
urban transformation process is seen as an example of how urban projects can
successfully engage with conflict and violence. Even with recent academic and
media publications citing a rise in violence in some of these neighborhoods in
the past few months,' Medellin is still, I would argue, a model "best practice"
case study. In fact, this recent increase in violence also increases the need for
the kind of critical analysis I am doing in this project.
The question
This thesis seeks to understand if these policies and practices, which have both
political and physical implications in the urban context, influenced (or even
caused) the reduction of violence (number of homicides) in Medellin during the
same period. The main objective of this research project is to explore the real
success or failure of these policies implemented in the city of Medellin, in a
search to find successful strategies that can be implemented in other city,
regional, and national contexts around the world where there are similar
manifestations of socio political conflict and violence.
1Hugh, Bronstein. "Colombia's Medellin hit by new wave of drug violence I Reuters." Business &
Financial News, Breaking US & International News I Reuters.com.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN20434908 (accessed May 6, 2010).
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Methodology
This project evaluates the policies and projects that the Sergio Fajardo's
administration applied in Medellin during the 2003-2007 period with the
campaign mission they called "Medellin, la ciudad mas educada" (Medellin, the
most educated city). I have conducted 25 interviews with community members
and the politicians and planners who implemented the policies and practices.
Juxtaposing the perspectives among these two groups (politicians and
technocrats versus community members), sometimes in disagreement with
each other, makes it possible to decant which, if any of these implemented
policies, were effective.
Findings
One important dimension of the Medellin case is that its core project involves
both policy and physical planning. An important finding of my research involves
identifying the key elements that make these two strategies work together.
Here, it is important to understand the dynamics of conflict in Colombia and the
singularities of these dynamics in the context of the city of Medellin. My
research and interviews in Medellin have shown:
First, the dynamic of violence evidenced by the number of homicides has
followed different patterns than the ones seen in the rest of the country.
Medellin has seen a larger reduction of violence between 2003 and 2007 than
any city in the rest of the country. This grants a sense of credibility to the
efficacy of the local policies.
Second, Medellin's dynamic of violence is fueled by the national political
conflict, but at the city and neighborhood level this dynamic behaves in a
different way (than in the national context). I propose viewing the city of
Medellin's violent history as a continuum of violence. In Medellin, the
manifestations of violence are continuous and the actors are constantly
changing alliances with different violent groups. These two issues include:
1. The illegal armed actors enter and leave and change alliances within
the violent scene, and;
2. The environment that generated the conflict is still intact and will
reactivate the violence once the group in power has left. Similar to what
Collier calls "The Conflict Trap." 2
2 collier, Paul. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. Washington,
D.C.: World Bank.
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
These two conditions imply that there exists within the environment of these
usually informal settlements in Medellin that make their spaces prone to being
controlled by competing organizations that are state-like but not of the state
(Guerrilla, Paramilitary and Drug Cartels). The isolation from the beneficial
aspects of the state (such as security) and the lack of political, economical and
social recognition from the rest of the citywide community, fosters the
conditions for the multiplicity of organizations to contest the state's authority to
in turn act as providers of state-like services (such as security and taxation). This
sustains the cycle of illegal arms groups entering and controlling these areas.
Key Hypotheses
One large hypothesis that grows from this thesis is that the soldiers and the
fighters have always been youth (the filmography section brought glaring light
to this point) and that the 2003-2007 policies specifically targeted these youth.
The physical implications of the policies that have attacked the environment
where these youth move and interact (from public space to public buildings)
and the policies targeted to engage youth into productive legal activities (like ex
paramilitary helping in the building of the new transportation of the
neighborhood) have been the key reasons for the reduction of violence. The
interviews with community brought more light on this subject.3  15
The other important hypothesis is that the aesthetic value of the interventions
played an important role in the success of them. As stated by the then mayor of
Medellin (Fajardo), it is not only the opportunity to go to school but that the
school offered is the best designed school that the city can offer. This qualitative
aspect is one that cannot be measured by traditional statistical approaches, yet
fulfills a central role in the success of the intervention in Medellin. The
neighborhood interviews are important in confirming these claims.
This case study not only helps generate a deeper understanding of one example
of best practices for other contexts around the world; it also validate the value
3 This information was collected as part of an Historical Memory Project (in the Parques
Bibliotecas) that Latin Americanist Historian Tamera Marko and I conducted in 2008 to engage
community members under-represented in traditional histories of the city. We interviewed
people to tell their own life story before, during ,and after the main periods of violence and
demobilization. Some individuals recalled how members of the community "los muchachos"
(Paramilitary reinsertados or "resinserted") as part of the demobilization program worked for the
construction company to build the new metro cable line in their own neighborhood. This was the
case in the barrio Santo Domingo Savio (Comuna 1). This is not recorded in the official logs as a
concrete project and many companies that employ these demobilized youth do not publicize this
fact for fear of retaliation by the general public. This is proof of the complexities of the
demobilization and the need for a more public and transparent process.
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of physical planning along with political planning and ways that this dual
application can be an instrumental tool in the resolution of social and political
issues in urban areas of conflict.
I have divided this thesis into six chapters.
Chapter one "Context, Conflict and History of Urban Development in Medellin
(1930 to 2009)" explores ways that the city developed over the last century
generated the conditions that made it prone to the proliferation of violence and
susceptible to the contestation of its territories by armed illegal actors. This
contestation has occurred at the local and at the national scale since the early
years of the violence 1950s. Understanding the consequences of this
contestation helps to show the value of the projects and practices implemented
in Medellfn since 2003 as a way to combat violence in Medellin.
Chapter two "Medellfn Plan and Unplanned History and Consequences"
explores how city planning in Medellin developed since its foundation in 1675.
Here, I contest the idea that the city of Medellin has not been planned.4 I also
show that a specific time frame of the last 40 years generated the conditions
that made it prone to the proliferation of violence and susceptible to the
contestation of its territories by the armed illegal actors. Specifically, I explore
the conditions in which informal settlements in Medellin developed over the
last four decades in contrast to the previous three centuries of urban planning
in the city.
One important issue to understand about the informal city is that sections of
cities developed informally and they did so thanks to the absence of the state
(negligence) and it is this state negligence that allowed the informal city to
thrive. This absence of state is also the source of many of the entire city's
problems. It is this paradox that the communities who lived in these areas found
themselves. This phenomenon is not unique to Medellin. This is a global
phenomenon that is acquiring more relevance today because of the scale of
these kinds of new informal cities. Mike Davis in his book Planet of Slums (2006)
put the scale of the problem in perspective. "Residents of slums [what I prefer
to define as the informal city] constitute a staggering 78.2 percent of the urban
population of the least developed countries and fully a third of the global urban
population." These numbers reveal a necessity to discover new ways within the
planning profession to deal with the built environment. This search is part of the
large motivation of this study. We need to understand this sophisticated process
4 Irazibal, Clara. "Revisiting Urban Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean." UN-HABITAT.:.
Home. http://www.unhabitat.org/ (accessed May 6, 2010).
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of the informal cities' formation and subsistence to be able to make sustainable
and effective interventions.
Chapter three "Medellin, la Cuidad Mas Educada / Medellin, the most educated
city: the policy interventions" describes the main components of Fajardo's
policy, "Medellfn, la ciudad mas educada." This chapter does not cover all
aspects of the Mayor's administration, but instead analyzes the new policies
that led to physical practices put into action by his administration and how they
were instrumental in the transformation of social behavior in the urban sphere.
I focus specifically on those strategies that seem to have influenced the
decrease in levels of insecurity and violence in the city. I summarize the political
party ideology led by Sergio Fajardo during his campaign for Medellin Mayor
and after he had been elected (2002-2007). Then I outline Mayor Fajardo's
political policies that worked in tandem with the urban-planning as peace
process in Medellin from 2003-2007.
Chapter four outlines the physical projects built as part of the Fajardo regime
and explains in detail the most relevant projects undertaken during the years
2004-2007. All of these projects were planned and executed by the Empresa de
Desarrollo Urbano EDU (Urban Development Enterprise). EDU's most important
interventions were in the city's most marginalized areas. These interventions
are called Proyecto Urbano Integrado (PUI of Integrated Urban Projects). 17
Chapter five analyzes what people in Medellin, who have lived through this
urban planning as peace building process, say and think about it. What, if
anything, do they find successful? What, if anything, do they regret? Would
they do it again? What strategies do people think would work in other contexts?
I conducted all 25 of these interviews-in person-in Medellin in January 2010. I
interviewed two groups of people. The first group I interviewed is planners and
politicians who have been involved in this urban planning project before, during,
and now after it is well underway. The second group I interviewed is community
members who have lived in Comuna 13, 1 and 2, the three neighborhoods most
impacted by these urban interventions because they were identified as one of
the most underserved by state services and were among the city's most violent
before 2003. All of these community members have lived in these
neighborhoods before, during, and after the policies and physical projects were
implemented.
Chapter six explores the possibility of applying the case of Medellin as a best
practice to other similar contexts of cities in conflict. In particular, I believe that
it is possible to apply the Medellin case in cities where there are longtime
informal settlements (10 years to 60 years) that have lacked a consistent state
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presence, an issues which has permitted other non-state organizations to
challenge the state authority over the territory.
The "Best Practice" then is a way to reclaim the sovereignty of the state over
the territory while respecting the urban and cultural systems put in place by the
residents who built these communities in the first place. This "Best Practice"
does so by modifying the physical conditions of the space and connecting its
territory and their inhabitants to the benefits of the formal productive structure
of the city.
Chapter 1
Context Conflict and History of Urban
Development in Medellin (1930 to 2009)
This chapter explores how the way in which the city developed over the last
century generated the conditions that made it prone to the proliferation of
violence and susceptible to the contestation of its territories by armed illegal 19
actors. This contestation has occurred at the local and at the national scale since
the early years of violence in the 1950s. Understanding the consequences of
these contestations helps to show the value of the projects and practices
implemented in Medellin since 2003 in terms of being a way to combat violence
in Medellin.
I have divided this chapter into two sections:
* Colombian Violence explains the temporality and multiplicity of actors
engaged in the Colombian violence throughout the last 60 years of internal
armed conflict. I discuss the effects of this national violence on the
development of the city of Medellin.
* Medellin in the context of Colombia analyzes my compilation of homicide
rates in five Colombian cities, including Medellin, over the span of 2002-
2008. This surveys ways the city of Medellin experienced a drastic drop in
violence (homicide rate) as compared to the other four largest cities (in
terms of population) in the nation. During these six years, the policies and
projects of the administration of Fajardo were implemented in Medellin.
This suggests a correlation between the Fajardo regime's policies and
practices (in the context of Colombian President Uribe's national defense
policies) and a dramatic drop in violence in the city.
Chapter 1
Colombian Violence. "La Violencia" mythologies
of armed conflict in Colombia and their
consequences on urban space in the city of
Medellin
This section is an overview of the roots of political conflict in Colombia and
surveys ways that these lines of conflict affected the territory of the city of
Medellin. It is impossible to understand why the Fajardo policies and projects
were effective without a basic understanding of the multiplicity of actors
engaged in this conflict. This section is not a complete survey of Colombian
history. This is a compilation of important inflexion points that I consider crucial
background for understanding why and how the Fajardo projects and policies
were effective. Many important dates and references have been omitted in this
story in my effort to provide a clear and effective way to communicate the
complex historical process of a country and city that as longtime historian of
Colombia David Bushnell writes in his 1996 book Colombia: A Nation In Spite of
Itself, Colombia does not have an official national history.'
I have divided this section into six chronological timeframes (1850-2003). Some
of these periodizations I have created based on this research and others parallel
periodizations (with which I agree) of other scholars:
* 1850-1950 Two political parties in the new nation were formed in the early
1850s and rivalry between the two political parties in Colombia resulted in
bloodshed ever since. These bloody rivalries finally lead to the period called
"La Violencia," or "The Violence."
* 1948-1958 La Violencia, which erupted in this period nationwide, marks the
end of the period call the "Liberal Republic" (Bushnell, 1996). This decade
is generally known as the age of "The Violence," coinciding with an increase
in homicide rates related to an irregular war between liberals and
conservatives that worsened after the killing of the liberal then Presidential
Candidate Jorge Eli6cer Gaitan in 1948. (Guzm n Campos et al., 1962)3 This
period marks the beginning of an undeclared civil war with consequences
up to the present day.
Bushnell, David. 1993. The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself. Berkeley: Univ.
of California Press.
2 lbid.181
Guzman, German. 1962. La violencia en Colombia; estudio de un proceso social. Colombia.
Universidad, Bogot6. Facultad de Sociologia. Monografias sociologicas, no. 12. Bogot6: Universidad
Nacional.
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* 1959 The Revolutionary Left in Colombia is born from guerrilla groups that
were not able to participate in national politics. The guerrillas appeared
because the National Front, which was founded in 1959 and was created in
the name of peaceful inclusion, did not allow much room for another
political agenda or party beyond the Liberals and the Conservatives.
Furthermore, the Liberal and the Conservative parties were led, by and
large, by elite members of Colombian society. The National Front was an
agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties to alternate
government leadership every term (no matter which party was actually
elected by popular vote).
* 1970s Narcotraffic + the new armed actors in Colombia from 1979 to 1991
spawned the greatest peak of homicide rates recorded in the nation in that
century. This peak coincides with an increasingly complex political-military
conflict that involved an armed confrontation between extreme left-wing
guerrilla groups and the government, which in turn led to the mass killings
of civilians (massacres) by extreme right-wing paramilitary organizations
often supported by parts of the government's military and illegal drug
traffickers. (Franco, 2003)4 This period also includes the first Colombian
government peace agreement with a guerrilla group, the M-19. This
resulted in the M-19 guerrilla group and the official national government co-
writing and co-signing a new national constitution. 21
* 1999-2002 Peace Process was a failure. It intensified the conflict at the
national level and created the conditions for a further escalation in violence
with the national government initiating a massive military offensive.
* 2002-2010 Plan Colombia and President Alvaro Uribe both implemented
security policies that were supported financially by the U.S government
through the Plan Colombia. Plan Colombia financed a major increase in
military operations in the Medellin territory and the government-run
Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process with the
rightwing paramilitary group the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).
This all occurred just months before Sergio Fajardo became Mayor of
Medellin.
4 Franco, S. 2003. "A Social-Medical Approach to Violence in Colombia". AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
PUBLIC HEALTH. 93: 2032-2036.
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1850-1950 Two political parties in the new nation
Liberals/Conservatives
The territory that is now known as Colombia won independence from Spain in
1819.5 Conflict between Colombia's two political parties, the Liberals and the
Conservatives, has existed since these Wars of Independence. Colombia, since
its foundation as a nation in 1848, has been a 2-party system (until recently) in
formal politics.6
Conservatives are traditionally allied with the spiritual, economic and political
power of the Catholic Church and traditional wealthy commercial enterprises.
The Liberals are traditionally against the Catholic Church (they expelled the
Jesuits more than once from Colombia) and, like the Conservatives, are allied
with and part of the merchant class. These distinctions between these two
parties, however, are so blurred you cannot really make a clear dividing line
based on these categories. When the parties began, the Conservatives may have
been a little bit wealthier in terms of commerce than the Liberals. But actually
there was more division in terms of regional issues. In both Liberal and
Conservative families there were merchants, professors, lawyers, priests and
nuns. Conservatives and Liberals are actually not as different as one might think,
given their history of fighting. Many families, in fact, include both Liberals and
Conservatives. My own family, for example, is a case in point. My father's
mother was a Conservative and his father was a Liberal. My father remembers
standing on his roof with his own father catching Molotov cocktails (glass
bottles filled with gasoline) being thrown by the police, controlled by the
Conservative party. My own mother is from a Liberal family that is deeply tied to
the church; two her of her siblings are a Catholic Priest and a Nun. This is not an
uncommon political family history throughout Colombia.
1948-1958 La Violencia
The conservative party maintained power until the beginnings of the 20th
century when presidential power was obtained by the liberals under a
democratic process Bushnell (1996) explains that these long periods of power
and the arbitrary and later retaliations from the party in power against the
other party generated revolts and generalized violence over the entire
s The period between 1819 (Independence) and 1848 (Foundation of the nation) is known as "La
Patria boba." This literally translates as "the stupid nation." This term refers to the period in which
Colombia gained independence but then lost its independence as Spain re-conquered Colombia.
See Bushnell, 1993.
6 1848 Liberal Party is created
I thank Tamera Marko, an historian of Latin American family and childhood power as nation
building, for pointing this out to me.
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
Colombian territory. This violence was suppressed by the military order of the
party in power. At the beginning of the 1940s, the Conservative party received
the presidency in the elections and this started a new process of retaliations and
persecution. Many cite as the defining moment of this latest wave of violence as
being when the liberal candidate for the next session of (Liberal) presidential
elections Jorge Eli6cer Gaiten was assassinated in Bogota on April 9, 1948.
Gaitan was a type of populist president candidate with a social agenda in the
sense that he supported union workers and peasant rights. News of his
assassination by a Conservative caused an eruption of a generalized rebellion
and series of riots in cities and countryside throughout Colombia. It began in
Bogota and that is why it is called El Bogotazo. The nonstop rioting lasted a
couple of days. The destruction of property during the riot included destruction
of all public transportation systems of the major cities. This included the trolley
lines and other transportation systems internal to Colombia. This day marks the
death of train public transportation between Colombian cities.
23
Figure 1 Bogotazo riot. Picture of a trolley destroyed during the riots in the front of the Colombian National
Congress. This was the same day that international representatives were meeting in this congress building
to establish the Organization of the American States in 1948.
The bogotazo started a period simply call "La Violencia". Many authors tie the
beginning of "the violence period" to earlier dates but what is clear is that after
the "bogotazo," the nation was involved in a massive national conflict that
involved these two parties. This undeclared civil war generated massive
casualties from both sides "between 1948 and 1966 that claimed nearly
300,000" lives8 and massive migrations from the feared countryside to the
relative secure urban centers. The number of people who migrated, known as
8
Gutierrez, Pedro Ruz . "Bullets, Bloodshed And Ballots; For Generations, Violence Has Defined
Colombia's Turbulent Political History." Orlando Sentinel (Florida), October 31, 1999.
. ...........................  P ...... .. . ... ...... ..
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desplazados or displaced peoples, is estimated in the millions. To put these
numbers in context, by 1950 the population of Colombia was estimated to
include 11 million9 inhabitants.
The Revolutionary Left
The conservatives maintained power until a military coup led by the liberal-
aligned Dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957). Rojas Pinilla had a major
socialist agenda. In 1957 industrialists organized a national strike in which all
workers stopped working for several days throughout the country, mainly in the
big cities. Rojas Pinilla stepped down from power to end the strike and this is
when an alliance between the liberals and conservatives finally ends the
"progressive dictatorship" of Pinilla. This alliance is call the National Front /
Frente Nacional 1958-1974, which in basic terms means that the two main
parties would share and alternate power. At that moment, any other political
alliance outside the liberals and conservatives lost their footing within this
National Front political system. This gave birth to the Guerrilla movements in
Colombia.
In the 1964, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia FARC (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and the National Liberation Army ELN
(Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional) are founded. In the same year 1964, the 19th
of April Movement known as the M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril) is born. The
M-19 was inspired by the Cuban Revolution of Fidel Castro, whose regime
supported this Colombian guerrilla group with training and materials.10
The M-19 did not have its roots in a peasant movement, unlike the FARC and
the ELN, which were both a more common Latin American model of left wing
guerrilla terrorist activity. In the M-19, combatants were mostly middle class
youth in their 20s and 30s. The Movimiento de 19 Abril took its name from the
date of the 1970 elections in which Rojas Pinilla, then a presidential candidate
supporting a social agenda, "lost" the presidency. Some groups thought the
election had been stolen and thought it showed that it was impossible to bring
changes to Colombia except by violent revolutionary action. The M-19, as
Bushnell puts it, cultivated a Robin Hood image with actions that included
stealing food and milk and distributing it among the poor. They staged attacks
against strongholds of the Colombian government and its allies. The M-19
strategically geared their attacks toward attracting mass media coverage, such
9 "COLOMBIA: population growth of the whole country." Population statistics: historical
demography. http://www.populstat.info/Americas/colombic.htm (accessed April 30, 2010).
1 Startts - Colombia: An ageless war, http://www.startts.org.au/default.aspx?id=257 (accessed
April 5, 2010).
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Figure 2 Army taking control
of the Palace of Justice in
Bogota (Colombia) held by
the April 19 Movement
members " (M-19)."
November 6, 1985. Source:
Manuel Cepeda Atarraya
as their kidnapping of officials of the U.S. embassy, bank robberies, and
assassinations of key political figures.
In 1985, an M-19 detachment seized the Palacio de Justicia, the Supreme Court
building located one block away from the presidential palace and the congress
building in Bogota, within hours leading to a controversial escalation of the
conflict when army tanks and soldiers took back the palace by explosive force.
The Supreme Court had been in session inside; all its members were held
hostage for this day-long conflict. By the end of this conflict, one-half of the
members of the Supreme Court were killed.
25
Figure 3 Siege of the Palaclo de Justicia by the M-19 in 1985. Source: El Mundo
The FARC, the ELN and the M-19 succeeded in establishing a series of large and
isolated rural zones in Colombia, zones in which guerrilla organizations
controlled or at least prevented the state from establishing authority. People
living in these zones of conflict became enmeshed in a network of guerrilla
power supported through kidnapping, extortion, or forced recruitment.
Businesses and landowners in revolutionary zones had to pay a revolutionary
tax to guerrilla groups or risk being kidnapped or worse.
Outside the zones within which these guerrilla groups were based and operated,
their actions both greatly impacted everyday life of Colombians throughout the
country while at the same time did not put into effect a total state of war. While
economically, people throughout the country felt the impact of guerrilla
presence, it was an indirect impact due to international businesses pulling out of
the country for fear of violence and instability. Businesses within the country
I ---------- . ................  .
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were targets of violence as well. This caused there to be fewer options for
employment. This did not cause, however, the kinds of moments of escalating
inflation rates that have occurred in many other countries in Latin America. So
in the cities, people adapted their everyday lives to living and working in this
state of non-declared war. This alone reveals a strong socio-economic culture of
resilience. This resilience is even more evident when considering the ways
people negotiated the emotional impact of living everyday life in an undeclared
state of war. Seemingly every family member, including my own, in Colombia
has a story about a relative or loved one being kidnapped, killed or disappeared
during this time." Yet, families continued to celebrate births, birthdays,
marriages, Catholic rites of passage, and school graduations.
These economic strains of the late 1970s, including the lack of growth in coffee
prices and the effects of globalization on the Colombian protectionist economy,
combined with the general instability of the country, further crippled the
Colombian state's ability to control the urban areas and rural countrysides. This
created the perfect space for the beginning of the Colombian drug bonanza.
Colombia has never been a major grower of coca, the leaf from which cocaine is
made. Colombia, however, became a central location for the processing of the
coca leaf into cocaine. Colombians became the link between coca growers,
production of coca and criminal networks in the United States. Massachusetts
native George Jung is responsible for organizing the import of more than 80% of
all processed cocaine from Colombia into the United States in the 1970s and
1980s. Jung, known as "Boston George," made his first Colombian drug contacts
while in jail with a Colombian immigrant Carlos Enrique Lehder Rivas. People
such as Lehder Rivas had become involved in gang networks in the United States
and then, upon returning to Colombia, became cocaine industry processors and
distributors.
Narcotraffic + The New Armed Actors
Pablo Escobar was born in 1949 in Medellin. He was born into a poor family and
his entire childhood was during La Violencia. He studied political science but
dropped out of school early. In 1975, he started developing a cocaine operation.
At some point, he accumulated so much wealth that he offered to pay off the
Colombian U.S. debt." (The U.S. declined this offer). In 1989, Forbes magazine
My colleague Tamera Marko emphasizes these family stories of violence in her work on the
emotional culture of violence and resilience in Medellin.
12 Bowden, Mark. 2001. Killing Pablo: the hunt for the world's greatest outlaw. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press. Narration of the negotiation between the Colombian government and the Drug
Cartel : "it was a generous offered, even if didn't include (as was erroneously reported later) a
pledge to pay off Colombia's $10 billion national debt" (47).
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estimated Escobar to be the seventh-richest man in the world with a personal
wealth of close to $25 billion.'3 He was involved in politics and was elected as a
deputy alternative representative to the Chamber of Representatives of
Colombia's Congress, as part of the Colombian Liberal Party.'4 When news
about his criminal record came to scandalous public light, he was expelled from
the Congress. As retaliation for this expulsion, Escobar ordered the assassination
of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, the Colombian Minister of Justice. A few weeks later,
the Minister was assassinated on April 30, 1984."5 This event fomented the
Colombian national government to formally declare an alliance with the U.S.
War Against Drugs, in this case specifically against the Colombian drugs cartels.
This war, fought mainly in Colombia's urban areas, cost thousands of deaths.
Escobar founded gangs comprised of poor youths, called sicarios, who received
a reward for killing police officers. More than 600 officers died in this way.' 6
The three cities most affected by this war were Bogota, Medellin and Cali. In
1993, Pablo Escobar was killed in Medellin in what was the end of a long and
costly man hunt. Escobar's death represented the end of the old Cartels in
Colombia. Over the course of the next few years, many narco-trafficers were
killed, imprisoned or extradited to the United States. The demise of the
powerful cartels left the drug trafficking open to be appropriated by the
guerrilla groups and the newly formed paramilitary groups.
The New Colombian Constitution of 1991 was the result of a national peace 27
process with the M-19 in which this guerrilla group renounced their armed
struggle and become a political party in return for the opportunity to participate
democratically in the rewriting of the constitution. To do this people, including
M-19 leaders had to be democratically elected to participate in the forum that
rewrote and signed the new constitution. This is the same year that the
confrontation between the Colombian government and the drug cartels reaches
its peak as measured by the death toll. One of the peace treaty's themes of
negotiation involved the extradition of Colombian drug traffickers to the United
States, a fate greatly feared by leaders of armed drug cartels. The Extraditables,
or in English roughly translated as "Alliance of Cartels," published their motto in
flyers distributed to the public and in letters to the media and government
representatives: "Death in Colombia is better than jail in the United States."
Ibid. Bowden 2001
Guillen, Gonzalo. "As! conoci a Pablo Escobar." Articulo Impreso Archivado. Semana.com,
An~lisis de actualidad. http://www.semana.com/wflnfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=103338 (accessed
May 3, 2010).
1s His killing (Rodrigo Lara Bonilla) created a powerful backlash against the Medellin cartel, one
that now erupted into open warfare" Bowden, Mark. 2001. Killing Pablo: the huntfor the world's
greatest outlaw. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 44.
1 Karl Penhaul (05-09-2003). "Drug kingpin's killer seeks Colombia office". Boston Globe.
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At the same time, drug lords and landowners, seeking to protect their interests,
founded private security forces that by the end of the 1990s, would form
paramilitary groups. These paramilitary groups included the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC). Between 1997 and 2006, the AUC, a far-right
paramilitary group reached an estimated 20,000 militants. The AUC was led by
Carlos Castaho Gil, son of a wealthy agricultural family in Antioquia whose
father was killed by FARC. The AUC supports itself by income from narco-traffic
and donations from its sponsors which includes large landowners and
industrialists. There are many allegations that the national government
supported the AUC, even if it was by looking the other way. The U.S.
government was also involved-one of its most controversial involvements is
the lawsuit against the Chiquita Banana Corporation for paying "security taxes"
to the AUC. The AUC led a massacre of workers on these Colombian banana
plantations who were, in the AUC view, connected to left-wing groups. This
accusation was based on the workers demands for higher wages, a larger
receipt of the profits of the banana sales, and better working conditions. In
2007, the U.S. government was ordered to pay 25 million dollars in reparation
to this group of workers. 17
1999-2002 Peace Process
In the Colombian presidential elections of 1998, two items were prominent on
the ballot. One was the Presidency itself. The other one was the "Mandato
Ciudadano por la Paz, la Vida y la Libertad" or the "Citizen Mandate for Peace,
Life and Liberty." 18 This Mandate was a call to the future elected president and
the nation to find a peaceful solution to the Colombian conflict. The Mandate
itself was not more detailed than a general call for peace but it was a binding
contract that the new President had to abide by in terms of finding a peaceful
end to bloody conflict in Colombia. This Mandate was, to no surprise,
overwhelmingly well received by the public and passed by a great majority of
votes. The alternative, of course, would seem to be that individuals would vote
for the continuation of the path of violence and destruction. This Mandate
became law for the elected Colombian President Andres Pastrana.
17 Larson, Erik. "Chiquita Must Face U.S. Suit Over Colombian Terrorist Murders -
Bloomberg.com." Bloomberg.com.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601086&sid=a6MYnLaN7PFs (accessed May 17,
2010).
18 El Tiempo. "Ciudadanos Proponen Mandato Por La Paz." El Tiempo.com Archivo.
www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-554724 (accessed May 3, 2010).
Figure 4 Map of Colombia with
the "Zona de Distencion"
highlighted. Source: Oficina del
Alto Comisionado para la Paz
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As part of this political environment, on November 7, 1998, President Pastrana
granted FARC a 42,000 kilometers2 (16,200 square miles) of land in the San
Vicente del Cagudn, located in the tropical rural area located in the northern
internal part of Colombia (see Figure 3). In addition, the Colombian military by
order of the President, was not allowed to enter this safe haven. In addition, the
Colombian military throughout the rest of the country lessened its attacks
against the FARC.
Figure 5 plots yearly kidnappings and guerrilla attacks per capita (in the y axis) and over time (in x axis) from
1990 to 2002. Source: Sanches et al. (2003), based on data from the national police, the ministry of defense, 29
and Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica DANE.
The FARC-dedicated land was a safe haven that was meant to build trust among
the FARC with the national government so they could continue peace
negotiations. In general, this peace process failed to build such trust as
measured by increased levels of FARC-led insecurity and violence in the entire
national territory. The FARC, it seems, became stronger and fiercer with this
grant of land. Colombia became the country with the highest kidnapping rate
(led by the FARC and other leftwing guerrilla groups) in the world. The failure of
the peace process produced the opposite reaction in the next elections.
Presidential candidate Ingrid Betancour, as part of her campaign, flew to a town
in this FARC-dedicated area. The Colombian authorities had warned Betancour
that the FARC would kidnap her if she met with the FARC in their territory. This,
in fact, is what happened. Betancour was one of the FARC's "emeralds" or most
powerful hostages in their bargaining chips with the government. In the
summer of 2008, Betancour, along with 14 other hostages, including three U.S.
military contractors, were rescued from the FARC strongholds.'9
19 Johnson, Reed. "Betancourt, U..S. hostages rescued from Colombian rebels I La Plaza I Los
Angeles Times." http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaza/2008/07/betancourt-us-h.html
(accessed May 3, 2010).
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In the 2002 election succeeding Pastrano's regime, Alvaro Uribe- a member of
the highest ranks of the Colombia elite class whose father was killed by the
FARC-was elected president. His election campaign was based on clear,
unwavering rightwing armed confrontation with all illegal armed groups,
including the FARC.
2002- 2010 Plan Colombia and Alvaro Uribe
The policies selected by Uribie's regime and the national government intended
to achieve a series of objectives. Among the two most predominant of these
objectives were "demobilizing illegal groups and increasing defense spending."20
This new policy of active defense spending was supported by millions of dollars
of funding provided by the United States through the Plan Colombia.2 ' This
makes Colombia the third largest recipient of U.S. aid (Israel and Egypt are the
first two). Plan Colombia actively modified the characteristics of the conflict in
Colombia. First, armed conflict by all groups intensified migration from rural
areas within Colombia to major cities throughout the country like Medellin.
Second, the intensification of the armed conflict took the war from the rural
areas to the interior of cities. This was most visible in Medellin. By 2002,
22Comuna 13 , one of the groups of neighborhoods in the city, was an extreme
example of places where conflict (waged among paramilitaries and guerrilla
urban groups) that usually had been situated outside of the city was now
actively fighting inside of it. In 2002 the national army initiated Operaci6n
Orion23 during which military and police forces swarmed the neighborhoods of
Comuna 13 by helicopter, tank, and troops. For four days, the neighborhoods of
20 Embassy of Colombia, Washington, D.C.. "Democratic Security and Defense Policy."
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/visitabush/documentos/security.pdf.
www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/visitabush/documentos/security.pdf (accessed February 4, 2010).
21This aid initiative was originally proposed by Colombian President Andres Pastrana Arango,
included U.S. military/counter-narcotics aid, but was not limited to it. The plan was conceived
between 1998 and 1999 by the administration of President Andres Pastrana with the goals of
ending the Colombian armed conflict and creating an anti-cocaine strategy.
22 Comuna is a territorial distribution of the urban areas of the city of Medellin. Each comuna is
comprised of a number of neighborhoods (5 to 10). Contrary to many news records, comuna is
not a synonymous of poor neighborhood of informal settlement as the case of "favela" or "slum"
(though in popular use among middle class and elites who do not live there it has developed this
connotation in popular understanding). The wealthiest sector of the city, is also a Comuna but is
rarely referred to it that way and instead is just called "El Poblado." The city of Medellin has 15
comunas. The comuna territorial divisions are similar to the French term arrondissement a
territorial distribution of the city of Paris. Each comuna has his own Junta Administradora Local
(local administrative group) JAL that represent the territory to the municipality.
23 Rozema, Ralph. 2007. "Paramilitares y violencia urbana en Medellin, Colombia". Foro
Internacional. (189): 535.
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Comuna 13 became a battleground.24 In this single space of the city, you were
able to find three different armed groups, each fighting the other to take
control of the country.
The other policy involved demobilization of illegal armed groups. The first part
of this process involved 850 paramilitary members of the AUC paramilitary
group known as Bloque Cacique Nutibara (BCN) giving up their weapons in a
publicized ceremony in 2003.25
31
Figure 6 plots yearly homicides per 100,000 people in Colombia (in the y axis) over time (in the x axis) from
1946 to 2002. The figure identifies two high-violence periods: the first one before 1962, and the second one
after 1984. Sanches et al. 2003
Concluding thoughts
By 2003, most of the illegal armed paramilitary groups had become unified
under the umbrella paramilitary group of the AUC. These groups in 2003
demobilized. This process started in Medellin. These nearly six decades of
violence and attempts at peace negotiations, on a national and citywide scale, is
the historical context in which the administration of Sergio Fajardo began his
term of mayor in Medellin.
24 This kind of army presence was not seen before, even in the mist of 1990's Bloque de busqueda
operations (the search for Pablo Escobar).25 Amnesty International Colombia, "The Paramilitaries in Medellin: Demobilization or
Legalization?" "On 25 November 2003 television viewers in Colombia watched as over 860
paramilitaries belonging to Medellin's Cacique Nutibara Bloc (Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN), laid
down their arms in a highly-staged ceremony in front of Colombian and foreign dignitaries. The
apparent neutralization of the BCN appeared to vindicate the government's decision to officially
begin talks with the Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC),
to which most paramilitary groups belong, including the BCN, following the announcement of the
AUC's unilateral ceasefire in December 2002."
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Medellin, in the context of Colombia:
A positive change
This section focuses on how Medellin experienced a larger reduction in violence
than experienced in urban areas throughout the rest of the country between
2003 and 2007. This suggests that the policies the new mayoral regime
implemented in the territory made positive effects in the reduction of violence
in Medellin.
These conclusions echo those of Gutie rrez et al. 2009.26 They arrive to similar
conclusions after studying the relationship between the political campaigns and
security (lower homicide rates) during the same time periods in three major
cities: Medellin, Bogota, and Cali. They conclude that the moments when
security in the city improved coincides with moments when the city had "clean"
(noncorrupt) taxation economies and that these taxation economies were
linked to individual mayors and not to the traditional political parties. Sergio
Fajardo, it is important to point out here, was not part of the Liberal or
Conservative parties, but leader of an Independent party.
I have divided this section into four sections:
* National Armed conflict in Medellin shows that the characteristics of
violence in Medellin was higher than those in the rest of the country and
that this was the result of a series of political and armed actors that had
specific impacts on the city.
* Medellin Versus Four Other Colombian Cities (Bogota, Cali, Cartagena y
Barranquilla) tests the claims of the Fajardo-led mayor's office in Medellin
that their policies led to the reduction of violence in that city and compares
homicide rate trends, the DDR process, and city spending on education in
these other four cities. In general, I conclude that it is in Medellin where
there is a greater reduction in violence as compared to the other four cities.
This suggests that the Fajardo policies could be, in part, responsible that
reduction.
Sani n, Francisco Gutie rrez 2009. Politics and security in three Colombian cities.
London: [London school of economics and political science] (LSE). Development studies
institute (DESTIN). Crisis states research centre (CSRC)].
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" The continuum of violence explains the complex exchanges of diverging
armed groups fighting over Medellin's impoverished neighborhoods. There
are different armed groups that enter and leave the neighborhoods; these
groups are responsible for perpetuating the violence. Further complicating
the situation, these actors often switch sides of the conflicts. This reveals a
gap between the ideological political roots of the conflict and the people
who actually fight in the conflict.
This implies that there is an environmental condition in the neighborhoods
that make them prone to conflict and thus, the violence will reactivate once
the group in power has left and been replaced by a new illegal actor. This
environmental condition is that they are totally separated from the state.
This is similar to what Collier calls "The Conflict Trap." 27
* This urban context then is an accomplice of the continuum of violence.
Informal settlements are, by formal definition, illegal. When everyone who
lives in a neighborhood or territory is illegal, then they are cut off from
receiving the benefits of the state. Furthermore, all who live in these
informal settlements are labeled (by law and middle class and elite moral
code) as criminals. I conclude that this explains why focusing on providing 33
resources to areas of the city that have been informally settled and have
been prone to the worst of violence can have positive effects on the overall
security of the neighborhood and city.
National Armed Conflict in Medellin
Since the mid 1980s Medellin has been an extraordinarily violent city in the
context of Colombia. In the last wave of violence between 1989 and 1994,
Medellin experienced 25 percent 28 of all public order problems in the entire
country. This represents that in a country with a history of violence and an
internal civil war, Medellin was the territory were those consequences were
among the most visible. See Figure 7. The narcotraffic network based in
Collier, Paul. 2003. Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy. A World Bank
policy research report. Washington, DC: World Bank.
"With 7% of the national population, the city reported 25% of public order problems in the
country in 2001" Betancur, John J.. "Approaches to the Regularization of Informal Settlements:
the Case of PRIMED in Medellin, Colombia." Global Urban Development Magazine, November
2007. http://www.globalurban.org/GUDMag07Vol3lssl/Betancur%20PDF.pdf (accessed February
2, 2010).
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Medellin played and important factor in this increase of violence, an increase
that peaked in 1991.
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Figure 7 Death rate in Colombia VS. Medellin since 1975 to 2002 Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina
Legal y ciencias Forenses, Regional Noroccidente. Boletin de prensa 2002
The fact that violence in Medellin is higher than in the rest of the country, is in
my opinion, the spillover effects of a series of local and national conflicts
occurring in the larger national sphere.
Mayor Sergio Fajardo as part of the publicity regarding the implementation of
"Medellin, the most educated city," presented a chart that shows the drop in
homicide rates in Medellin from 1991 when the city was known as the "most
dangerous city in the world)" to the year 2007, the end of his term.
I have added to his time line photographs of a series of key figures who play an
important role in shifting homicide rates in Medellin and in the overall
phenomenology of violence. These key figures are:
1. Pablo Escobar, dies in
December 1993
2. Andres Pastrana President
of Colombia 1998-2002
3. Alvaro Uribe, President of
14W Colombia 2002-Present
4. Paramilitar DDR in Medellin
3502003
311 5. Sergio Fajardo, Mayor of
Medellin 2004-2007
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Figure 8 Homicide rate per year in Medellin from 1991 to 2007 and relevant actors. Homicide rate per 100.000
Based on data from the Alcaldia de Medellin.
. .......... . ... .. . ------ .......
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1. Pablo Escobar, dies in December 1993 (homicide rate 381-311). The war against
narcotraffic peaks in violence in 1991 in Medellin. The death of Escobar in 1993
was part of a national offensive against the known leaders of narcotraffic. In
Medellin, Escobar armies were absorbed by other organizations, including urban
guerrillas or organized crime. These groups also took control of Escobar's
territories.
2. Andres Pastrana President of Colombia 1998-2002 (homicide rate 154-184)
spearheaded the failed peace process, which in turn intensified the amount of
kidnapping and the escalation of the confrontation between right wing paramilitary
groups and the guerrillas. This caused the increase of the urban conflict. Colombia
became the world's capital of kidnapping.
3. Alvaro Uribe, President of Colombia 2002-2010 (homicide rate 184-98) enacted
two policies of security: one increased military action at the national level and the
second one was the DDR with the AUC. In Medellin, the first was the Operacion
Orion in 2002, which exterminated left-wing guerrilla urban groups in Comuna 13
and those living in the Medellin territory under the power of the AUC. The second,
the DDR process, started in Medellin with the demobilization of the Bloque Cacique
Nutibara in 2003.
4. Sergio Fajardo, Mayor of Medellin 2004-2007 (homicide rate 98-26) marks the
period during in which "Medellin, the most educated city" was enacted.
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All of these events happening at the national level in Colombia impacted the
way violence manifested in the city of Medellin. This also shows that the
reduction in violence between 2004 and 2007 coincides with the Sergio Fajardo
administration. It is important to see this in the national context to understand
if, and at what level, this is influenced by the national and/or by the local
conflicts.
Medellin Versus 4 Colombian Cities (Bogota, Cali, Cartagena y
Barranquilla)
This section tests the claims of the Fajardo-led mayor's office in Medellin that
their policies led to the reduction of violence in that city and compares homicide
rate trends, the DDR process, and city spending on education in these other four
cities. In general, I conclude that it is in Medellin where there is a greater
reduction in violence as compared to the other four cities. This suggests that the
Fajardo policies could be, in part, responsible that reduction.
Chapter 1
Figure 9 Death rate in 5 major cities of Colombia 2000 to 2007. Source: data provided by the Instituto
Nacional de Forencis
I found that there is a relationship between the high spending on education in
Medellin and the reduced homicides in the city. These reductions are different
to what other similar cities in Colombia are experiencing. I also found that my
prediction that cities with the largest numbers of demobilized individuals would
also have fewer homicides. However, I found that this was not true. I conclude
that this variable of the demobilization policies is not sufficient. We need a new
variable.
The relationship between homicide rates and investment in education is
expressed in the follow equation I created. I applied this formula for five cities in
Colombia: Bogota, Cali, Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Medellin.
HRate ~ RPEdu + citie
When education spending (RPEdu) and homicide rate (HRate) are equated to
each other for these five cities, I found that there was a moderate good R-
Squared. When plotted on a matrix, Medellin appears as an outlier because it is
at the extreme of both the homicide rate levels and education spending in the
other four cities. It is clear that the higher spending on education is followed by
a seemingly proportional reduction on homicide rate in Medellin.
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max
-57.277 -18.393 -9.686 18.989 56.711
Coefficients:
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(> t|)
---------......... .......... .... .. . ........ ...............
(Intercept) 4.942e+01 4.831e+00 10.231 2.45e-12 ***
.~ - i . ....... --- - - -------------- . -. -....... .. 
citie 1.095e+0 2  1.430e+01 7.653 3.89e-09 ***
RPEdu -4.336e-04 7.206e-05 -6.017 5.96e-07 *
Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 '' 1
Residual standard error: 27.13 on 37 degrees of freedom
Multiple R-squared: 0.6193, Adjusted R-squared: 0.5987
F-statistic: 30.1 on 2 and 37 DF, p-value: 1.740e-08
There is reason, perhaps, to believe that there is a relationship between the
higher reduction of homicide rate and the increase in the educational budget in 37
the years 2004 to 2007 in Medellin. But what is clear is that Medellin spent
more on what the city called infrastructural education (buildings and other
infrastructure related to education) than in any other city in Colombia.
The expectation that the national policies of pacification could explain some of
the discrepancies between cities was not confirmed by this same data. The
number of demobilized groups did not correlate with a reduction in homicide
rates. On the contrary, my matrix reveals that in some cities during the same
time period there is a large number of demobilizations and an escalation of
homicide rates.
This seems to confirm Spagat's (2007) analysis of the DDR process and outcome
in two different regions in Colombia. In Antioquia, Spagat found that the
violence decreased after the DDR process there while in Nariio he finds that
violence escalated after the DDR process there. He concludes that: "They
(paramilitaries) have drawn down their arsenal substantially over the last year,
handing in almost 17,000 high-quality (often factory fresh) weapons through the
DDR process, but almost certainly retain a significant stockpile. For the
foreseeable future we must assume that many demobilized paramilitaries are,
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or can become on short notice, well armed and dangerous." 29 He concludes that
this population is volatile and this could explain why we could see totally
different homicide rates change in both regions (Nariio and Antioquia). I would
add to this that Antioquia and specifically the capital city of Medellin added
support to the national DDR programs (that did not occur in the Narino region)
and that this extra funding and policy could explain some of those diverging
outcomes.
This survey, while not conclusive, initiates an important discussion regarding the
relationship between the application of those policies implemented in the
"Medellin, the most educated city" campaign and the reduction of violence
Medellin. The following section explores the urban contexts in which these
policies are implemented in historically marginalized communities. It explores
the idea that there is a relationship between their marginalization and the
manifestation of violence in Medellin. This, in turn, also implies that the policies
and projects implemented in these areas can be responsible for the reductions
of homicides rates there.
The Continuum of Violence
This section focuses the complex exchanges of diverging armed groups fighting
for control in Medellin's impoverished neighborhoods. There are different
armed groups that enter and leave the neighborhoods. These groups are
responsible for perpetuating the violence. Further complicating the situation,
these actors often switch sides of the conflicts. This fluctuation of a conflict
group's presence in a neighborhood, as well as changing conflict group
affiliation, reveals a gap between the ideological political roots of the conflict
and the people who actually fight in the conflict.
This implies that there is an environmental condition in the neighborhoods that
make them prone to conflict and thus, the violence will reactivate once the
group in power has left and been replaced by a new illegal actor. This
environmental condition is that they are totally separated from the state. This is
similar to what Collier calls "The Conflict Trap." 30
I propose viewing the city of Medellin's violent history as a continuum of
violence. In Medellin, the manifestations of violence are continuous but the
2 Michael Spagat; Colombia's Paramilitary DDR: Quiet and Tentative Success; Department of
Economics Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC. 2007
30 Collier, Paul. 2003. Breaking the conflict trap: civil war and development policy. A World Bank
policy research report. Washington, DC: World Bank.
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actors are constantly changing. Moser (2004)31 concludes that in the Medellin
case it is the direct relationship of crime as a political action and the fact that
security is not run by the state, but instead by the private sphere, which fuels
the conflict. She builds on the work of Gutierrez and Jaramillo32 to explain the
continuous presence of armed political groupings in Medellin, Colombia, over
the past 20 years. Gutierrez and Jaramillo argue "While social exclusion is a
strong indirect catalyst of urban violence; it is the conjuncture of the
politicization of crime and the privatization of security that is the predominant
causal factor." 33
Gutierrez and Jaramillo conclude that with continuous intervention from the
municipal and national government authorities to broker peace accords "with
all their positive aspects, the peace accords have only reshuffled the security
personnel that proliferate in the city." 34
Ralph Rozema (2007)3s supported this idea of "reshuffled" private security
forces in the city. He writes that when the paramilitary group Bloque Cacique
Nutibara (BCN) 36 expelled the other paramilitary group Bloque Metro from
Medellin, the BCN incorporated some of the Bloque Metro fighters into its own
group. This reshuffling of security personal as the only way of the individual
fighters' (and their family's) economical subsistence is also reinforced by Suarez
et al 2002." They explained that from 1999 to 2002, "what marks this period is
39the political decision of the guerrilla to urbanize the war and the transfer of the
actions of the autodefensas [right wing paramilitaries] to the city. The guerrilla
groups use the different militia groups, and the autodefensas used the
neighborhood gangs." Angarita 200238 confirms that "by 2000, the paramilitary
groups had absorbed or/and control of most of the larger armed illegal gangs
and had important battles with different armed factions of the insurgency
[guerrilla]."
3 Moser, Caroline 0 N. 2004. "Editor's Introduction: Urban violence and insecurity: An
introductory roadmap". Environment and Urbanization. 16 (2): 3.
3 Gutierrez Sanin, Francisco, and Ana Maria Jaramillo. 2004. "Crime, (counter-)insurgency and the
privatization of security -- The case of Medellin, Colombia". Environment and Urbanization. 16 (2):
17.
3 Ibid. 6
3 Ibid.
3s Ralph Rozema, "Medellin in Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested
Spaces in Latin America." In Kees Koonings, Dirk Kruijt, eds., Zed Books, 2007:58.
3 The Cacique Nutivara Bloc (in Spanish, Bloque Cacique Nutibara, or BCN) was a Colombian
paramilitary bloc founded by Diego Murillo Bejarano, affiliated with the United Self-Defense
Forces of Colombia (AUC) paramilitary umbrella group.
3 Suirez Rodriguez, Clara; Giraldo Giraldo, Carlos; Garcia Garcia, Hector; L6pez L6pez, Maria;
Cardona Acevedo, Marleny; Corcho Mejia, Carolina; Posada Rend6n, Carlos. "Medellin entre la
muerte y la vida. Escenarios de homicidios, 1990-2002." En publicacion: Estudios Politicos, No. 26.
Instituto de Estudios Politicos: Colombia. Enero - Junio. 2005 01215167.
38 Pablo Angarita. 2002 "Conflictos violentos en Medellin: reflexiones". Las Ciudades entrefuegos
y exclusiones. Memorias del Seminario.
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Medellin has been the site of these factions' fighting with each other for control
over territory since the 1990s. Francisco Gutierrez and Ana Maria Jaramillo,
made a "reconfiguration of the city's security map" by means of what I am
calling a continuum that ranges from gangs and hit killers (sicarios), through left-
wing militia to right-wing paramilitary."
One element that helps to understand this fluctuation of affiliation between
groups, mainly among the youth, is Moser's 2004 analysis39 of Rubio's argument
that in Colombia:
Perverse social capital refers to networks and the legal and reward
systems that encourage rent-seeking behavior and criminal activity.
... Rubio alludes to the fact that criminal activities may have
sophisticated organizational structures that provide more viable
alternatives to legitimate or productive activities, particularly for
youth.
There is a lack of political, economic, and social structure in specific
neighborhoods of Medellin; barrios that come from a tradition of informal
settlements that have not been reached by the political social and cultural
infrastructure of the city.40 It is this predominant spatial scale that permits the
necessary isolation for the proliferation of a multiplicity of armed violent
groups.
A key idea I am exploring in this thesis and elsewhere is that to understand
conflict and peace process it is crucial to understand that the actors who feed
the lines of conflicting groups also exchange sides, which permits a separation
between the historical political ideological roots of the conflict from the
motivations of the soldiers who perform the acts of violence in the
neighborhoods. The documentary La Sierra is a good example of the ways that
paramilitary groups become absorbed into other groups and also how members
switch sides of the conflict. For example, a leftwing urban guerrilla soldier can
later become part of a rightwing paramilitary group or a member of a criminal
organization.
39 Moser, Caroline 0 N. 2004. "Editor's Introduction: Urban violence and insecurity: An
introductory roadmap". Environment and Urbanization. 16 (2): 3. Page 4.
401s interesting understand that in Medellin this barrios had been reach by basic infrastructure of
water energy and sewer that is different to many other cities in Colombia and Latino America
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
I think this concept of violence as a continuum where actors get inserted, leave
and re-insert is the most striking difference to any other conflict city. This also
could explain why some of the policies targeted to improving the living
conditions of areas that feed the armed lines of the conflict can be effective. If
people are dedicated to armed groups not as an ideological motive, but rather a
purely economic one, than it makes sense that bringing education and
infrastructure to communities, which in turn lead to employment, might actually
further peace process. The transformation of the physical environment is also
important because there are elements of the physical environment that are part
of the continuum of violence. For example, the metrocable (or cable metro, a
gondola-like structure that carries people up and down the neighborhoods as
far as 2,000 feet up the Andes mountains surrounding Medellin) which linked
certain neighborhoods directly to the metro system that runs from one end of
the city to the other, removed the isolation of that neighborhood from the rest
of the city.
The Urban Context: Accomplice of the Violence Continuum
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Figure 10 Death rate per comuna 1994 - 2009 Source: Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y ciencias
Forenses
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Informal settlements are by formal definition, illegal. When everyone who lives
in a neighborhood or territory is illegal, then they are cut off from receiving the
benefits of the state. Furthermore, all who live in these informal settlements are
labeled (by law and middle class and elite moral code) as criminals. I conclude
that this explains why focusing on providing resources to areas of the city that
have been informally settled and have been prone to the worst of violence can
have positive effects on the overall security of the neighborhood and city.
Cardona et al. (2005) explains that the "Characteristics of homicides in Medellin
have remained unchanged since the 1980s, when the most violent period in the
city's history began. The most heavily affected groups are young males who live
and die in poor neighborhoods, and the murders are individual acts that leave
no wounded behind." 4' This places the acts of violence geographically and in
terms of class, gender and age. To confirm Carmona's statement I have plotted
homicide rates per Comuna from 1994 to 2009 to provide a more detailed
picture of criminality over the territory. I chose to begin with 1994 because
when I requested this information from the department in Bogota that gathers
all the homicide rate information throughout Colombia, they informed me that
for Medellin, they only have this information at the Comuna level starting in this
year. At the comuna scale the historical evolution of the phenomenology of
violence shows a similar tendency toward the deaths of young males in poor
neighborhoods of Medellin that Cardona et al. 2005 concludes. Furthermore,
the poorest comunas presented higher levels of homicides than in wealthier
comunas.
The only exception to this is El Centro (Candelaria), downtown, (comuna 10
candelaria) that presents higher levels of violence. This challenges the
hypothesis that the poorest comunas are the only ones with higher levels of
homicides. Perhaps, this violence in downtown Medellin could be explained for
two reasons. One is because downtown is a shared space between all armed
actors and the police and the forces of the state which makes it a powerful
space of confrontation. The second one is because the downtown area has the
largest concentrations of informal economies in the city. Betancur (2007)
presents a picture of how the illegality of basic informal economies (street
vendors) creates spaces for further criminalization. We have to be careful not to
apply Betancur's idea of criminalization as a blanket statement applied to all
informal economies and the actors who participate within it. However, this idea
deserves consideration in this case.
41 Cardona, Marleny, Hector Ivan Garcia, Carlos Alberto Giraldo, Maria Victoria Lopez, Clara
Mercedes Suarez, Diana Carolina Corcho, Carlos Hernan Posada, and Maria Nubia Florez. 2005.
Homicidios en Medellin, Colombia, entre 1990 y 2002: actores, moviles y circunstancias. Cadernos
De Sa6 de POblica 21 (3): 840-851.
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Figure 11. Map of informal settlements in Medellin at 2009 over areas of risk of death and areas with larger
number of homicides. Sources: Informal settlements: the author/ risk of death and areas: Cardona 2005.
At the neighborhood scale, this survey shows that most of the areas considered
high risk (in terms of high numbers of homicides) intersect with areas of higher
concentrations of informal settlements in Medellin. This suggests the informal
developments are spaces that provide the conditions that make it more prone
to its criminalization.
Informal settlement areas are usually populated by new migrants who settle in
the only spaces available for individuals without resources in the city- the
Andes mountain hillside edges and in the high-risk areas next to the flood plains
of the rivers. These populations do not get absorbed by the job market and
become part of the growing informal employment market.
It is important to clarify, however, that this does not mean that new migrants
bring with them the violence. In fact, these migrants are usually escaping from
violence in rural areas and many of them have fled their land with a moment's
notice, leaving them no time to pack and carry with them their documents,
money, and other possessions. They arrive to the city without resources in a
search not only for a safer space in the urban centers; they arrive in an attempt
to survive. What this implies is that the social, political and economic conditions
43
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in which these arriving populations settle and raise their families in these poor
neighborhoods permit their victimization and criminalization.
This survey suggests a connection between the spatial conditions of the
informal settlements in Medellin and the phenomenology of violence in the city.
It is important then to understand the historical planning development
conditions that produced those informal settlements in the city of Medellin, to
in turn, find what is or if there is a connection between the policies and projects
of the Sergio Fajardo administration and the reduction of homicides in Medellin.
It is also important to understand whether these projects and policies have had
real success in the reducing or eliminating the continuum of violence.
Chapter 2
Medellin Plan and Unplanned History and
Consequences
This chapter explores how city planning in Medellin developed since its
foundation in 1675. Here, I contest the idea that the city of Medellin has not
been planned.' I also show that a specific time frame of the last 40 years 4s
generated the conditions that made it prone to the proliferation of violence and
susceptible to the contestation of its territories by the armed illegal actors.
Specifically, I explore the conditions in which informal settlements in Medellin
developed in the last four decades in contrast to the previous three centuries of
urban planning in the city.
I have divided this chapter into two sections:
e History of planning in Medellin tracks the evolution of planning ideas and
practices in Medellin that lead to the final form of the city. I also show how
the city planning strategies were consistent with its growth, until the last 30
years of the 20th century, when exponential informal growth and economic
crisis are responsible for what is today perceived as an unplanned city.
* Non-Planning in Medellin history and consequences explains the process of
informal settlements in the territory of the city, a consequence of the
national armed conflict and the inability of the city to cope with its growth
during the economic crisis of its city's industry.
Iraz bal, Clara. "Revisiting Urban Planning in Latin America and the Caribbean." UN-HABITAT.:.
Home. http://www.unhabitat.org/ (accessed May 6, 2010).
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History of Planning in Medellin
Books and articles published about the history of urban development in
Medellin each focus on a piece of a complicated puzzle of social, economic,
political and urban planning in Medellin. These sources, between 1675 and
2007, range from themes of conquest, the foundation of colonies during the
colonization of Antioquia and the growth of the city after independence, to the
industrialized city. 2 Each study includes a section of the overall scope of how the
city of Medellin developed into its present urban form, and how that
development created the marginalized areas that is the focus of this study.
Botero (1996) has an interesting study about the relationship between the
private sector and the state in the shaping Medellin's contemporary urban form.
His point about private enterprise using planning as a strategy to control real
estate and private economical interest is illuminating in terms of showing how
engaged the private interests were in shaping the future of the city. They were
interested in shaping the future city not only as a way to accommodate
(economic) needs in (what was then) their present, but to also think about the
future. Patricia Schnitter (2007) explores Wiener and Sert's pilot plan for
Medellin in 1950. This study confirms this continuation of the by the then
modern city leaders' attempt to cope with its growth through the creation of a
comprehensive development plan for the city. This is also the moment that the
modernist ideals are imprinted onto the urban form of the city. It is also
interesting that this the last time that the city engages in a general re-
conception of its physical form and that this happens at the moment of its
largest demographic explosion. This helps to understand why the city was not
prepared to cope with the gigantic population growth that happened over the
next 20 years. Schinitter explains that it was difficult to implement the goals of
the pilot plan under the political turmoil that the country was in that decade.
Betancur John J.'s case study about informality reveals a remarkable point. He
maps the relationship that existed between the NGO's and the State in the
interventions in the marginalized areas of Medellin. These marginalized areas by
law and/or neglect impeded the local governments from operating in the areas
of invasion by newly arrive poor people. Instead, the creation of alliances
2 This section is compiled from the following sources: Fernando Botero Herrera (1996)
and Beatriz Jaramillo (2005) and Roberto L. Jaramillo and Veronica Perfetti (1993) and
Victor Alvarez (1996) to name a few.
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between NGOs and local government created the bases of the governmental
and NGO partnerships, like the Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios
Informales PRIMED that serve also as a base for the today practices under the
"Medellin la mas educada,"the Sergio Fajardo mayor case study.
However, it is crucial to view all the historical snapshots of the city of Botero,
Jaramillo, Alvarez, Schinitter, and Betancur together because they give a clear
idea of the relationship between the planning development of Medellin and
some of its consequences for the social and urban form of the city today. Here,
I put these pieces together in one narrative compiled from several sources.3
The city of Medellin is a case which also contradicts some general themes that
appear in the planning history of Latin America. Contrary to what many scholars
believe, Latin- American cities do not lack a planning history, at least not in the
broad sense, and Medellin is definitely not the exception. Medellin, a city
founded in a valley inhabited for at least 15 centuries before the arrival of the of
Spaniards, is a city founded following the precepts of the "Leyes de Indias" (The
Law of the Indies) a city that since its foundation followed a path of
continuously evolving planning processes. The success or failure of each one of
these evolutions of planning strategies is open for discussion. But what is clear
here is that the political elite have always been critical forces engaged in the
physical transformation of the city. Then the question arises: why does a city 47
with a long history of planning or at least of forward thinking about the city's
physical form, allow those giant pockets of informal city (squatters) to appear in
its periphery, a periphery that the topography makes so visible? (The limits of
the city are visible from any point in the valley).
Patricia Schnitter. 2007. Construccid n fragmentarig caracteristica del crecimiento metropolitano
de la ciudad de Medelfir; Colombia. Lectura cartogrd fica de tres momentos significativos
Castellanos, Patricia Schnitter. 2002. Jos6 Luis Se-t y Colombia: de la carta de Atenas a una carta
del Hd bitat Barcelona: Escola Td cnica Superior dArquitectura de Barcelona, Universidad
Polite cnica de Catalunya
Jaramillo, Roberto Luis, and Ver6 nica Perfetti 1993. Cartografia urbana de Medellin 1790-1950.
Medelii n: el Concejo.
Alvarez, V., 1996. "Poblamiento y poblaci6n en el valle de Aburra y Medellin, 15411951." Historia
de Medellin, J. 0. Melo, Editor. Compaffia Suramericana de Seguros. Medellin. pp. 5784.
Gonzi lez Escoba; Luis Fernando. 2007. Medellr los ofilgenes y la transici6n a la modernidad
crecimiento y modelos urbanos 1775 - 1932. Investigaciones, 27. Medeli n: Univ. Nacional de
Colombia, Escuela del H6 bitat-CEHAP.
Jaramillo, Beatriz A. 2005. Medellin, construcci6n de una ciudad. Medellin: Editorial Marin Sierra.
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This section explores those evolutionary physical planning processes and
generates perspectives about why the city appears in its current form. This
section is divided into eight historical planning eras that I have compiled.
1. The Foundation of the small town in the Aburra Valley during the Spanish
colonization.
2. The Republic is the transition from a small town to a city under the newly
liberated republic.
3. The Industrial City marks the transition from an agrarian center of the state
of Antioquia to an industrial capital of the country.
4. The Medellin Futuro Plan supports the private interests in the planning
process of the city.
5. The Plan Piloto embodies modernist ideals and becomes incorporated into
the city's master plan.
6. The decadence 4 of violence-caused migration and globalization effects to
derail all planning projects.
7. The Metropolitan City is the regional city and the reintroduction of mass
transportation.
8. The constitutional city marks the era of a new national constitution which
generates changes in the administration of the city, the election of mayors
and the POT (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial) as an instrument of
planning.
1. Foundation
Medellin is the capital of the department of Antioquia in the Republic of
Colombia. The city is located at the center of the Department, in the Aburra
valley, formed by the central Andes mountain range. The city is crossed by the
Medellin River and is situated at an altitude of 1539 meters above sea level.
With a territory that measures 376 km2, the city of Medellin has a population
today that ranges from two million to four million inhabitants (including the
metropolitan area).
There is a debate among scholars as to when Medellin was founded. Many
scholars mark the beginning of the city of Medellin as being in 1675 with the
foundation of the colonial villa. Others link the city's founding to the period of
Spanish conquest during the 1541 "Spanish discovery of the valley" and the
4 Betancur, describes the period between 1970s to late 1980 as the "decadence" of the industrial
city. Betancur, i.J. 2007. Urban Challenges in Latin American Cities: Medellin and the Limits of
Governance.
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formal foundation of La Villa de Nuestra Senora de la Candelaria. It is important
to note that "based on archeological research, the valley had been populated at
least fifteen centuries before the arrival of the Europeans." 5
Jorge Robledo is the first Spanish explorer on record to visit the valley and was
preceded by his captain Jeronimo Luis Tejelo who he had sent to explore the
land before the arrival of Robledo. This initial expedition ended in a large battle
in which up to 3,000 indigenous people fought against a small group of armed
Spaniards. The battle for the valley ended swiftly in a massacre of indigenous
people.
Robledo's expedition did not make any new settlement and the Valley of Aburra
was not officially populated until 1675. Medellin's late foundation is linked with
its lack of gold, which was a principal industry in the times of conquest.
Furthermore, Medellin was not the capital of the state. The capital was Santa Fe
de Antioquia, a city more strategically connected to the large Cauca River and to
gold mines.
In 1616, by order of the Viceroy Fransico Herrera Campuzano, a resguardo (a
type of indigenous reservation) called San Lorenzo de Aburra is founded. In
1675 the street grid of the Villa de Nuestra Senoria de la Canderia was set by
Maestro Alarife Agustin Patino6  along with the first census of the villa. This
street grid was patterned after the new towns and cities of the Spaniard called
the "Leyes de Indias."7 The Laws of the Indies are the entire body of laws issued
5 Alvarez M, Victoror M, Poblamiento y Poblacion en el Valle de Aburra y Medellin, 1541-1951
Compan ia Suramericana de Seguros(Medelli n), Jorge Orlando Melo, Patricia Londoi q Nora
Hincapie, Nora Helena Jim6 nez and Oscar Torres. 1996. Historia de Medelfin Santaf6 de Bogota
Compa6 fa Suramericana de Seguros
6 Jose Atonio Benitez. El Cojo Camera de Medellin, Ediciones de Autores Antioquenios volumen 40,
1988. Pag 30
The Laws of the Indies (Leyes de Indias in Spanish) are the entire body of laws issued by the
Spanish Crown for its American and Philippine possessions of its empire. They regulated social,
political and economic life in these areas.
Recopilaci6n de las Leyes de los Reynos de Indias, Mandadas a Imprimir y Publicar por la
Magestad Cat6lica del Rey Don C rlos 1l. Madrid, 179. Libro 11l, Titulo 7. De la poblaci6n de las
ciudades, villas, y pueblos. Lviiij. Que el sitio, tamaijo y disposicion de la plaza sea como se
ordena. Ordenanza 112,113,114 y 115. Below is an excerpt from the Laws of the Indies for how
the colony should be planned, starting with the main Plaza.
"La Plaza mayor donde se ha de comenzar ia poblacion, siendo en Costa de Mar, se debe hacer al
desembarcadero del puerto, y sifuere lugar mediterranea, en media de la poblacion: Su forma en
quadro prolongada, que por lo menos tenga de largo una vez y media de su ancho, por que sea
mas a proposito para las fiestas de 6 caballo, y otras: Su grandeza proporcional al numero de
vecinos, y teniendo consideracion a que la gente pueda ir en aumento, no sea menos, que de
doscientos pies en ancho, y trecientos de largo, ni mayor 6 ochocientos pies de largo y quinientos
treinta y dos de ancho, y quedar6 de mediana y buena proporcion, sifuere de seis cientos pies de
largo, y quatro cientos de ancho: De la Plaza salgan quatro calles principales, unapor medio de
coda costado; y demos de estas dos par cada esquina: las quatro esquinas miren a los quatro
vientos principales por que saliendo asi los calles de la Plaza no estar6n expuestas 6 los quatro
vientos que ser6 de mucho inconveniente: toda en contorno, y las quatro calles principales, que de
ella han de solir, tengan portales para comodidad de los tratantes, que suelen concurrir; y las ocho
$Figure 1 Map of Medellin 1700 Source: The Author
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calles que saldrdn por las quatro esquinas, salgan libres, sin encontrarse en los portales, de forma
que hagan la acera derecha con la plaza y la calle."
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by the Spanish Crown for its American and Philippine imperial possessions.
These laws regulated social, political and economic life in these areas. They also
regulated the physical shape of the new cities the disposition of the public
spaces and the streets and important public and religious buildings.
Figure 3 Mapa de la Villa de Medellin, Jose Maria Giraldo, 1790
Count Pedro Portocarrero y Luna, President of the "Consejo de Indias," the si
Indies Council, asked the Monarchy to name his town, Medellin of Extremadura.
His request was accepted in modified form on November 22, 1674 when Regent
Mariana of Austria proclaimed it be given the name the "Villa de Nuestra Seniora
de Medellin." The official proclamation was given by the Governor Miguel
Aguinaga y Mendiogoitia on November 2, 1675.
By 1775 Mon y Velarde ordered the survey of the villa to obtain data for the
future planning of the city in the form of general padrones8 or censuses. These
censuses measured the number of inhabitants, who owned what land and the
quality and use of this land. The goal here was to produce a territorial plan.9 By
1788, a new police code was written to control the construction of new
buildings and a moratorium of improvement of any structure outside of the
urban area with the goal of concentrating the population. Aside from the Leyes
de Indias, this constitutes the first specific codes and planning ideals (other than
a villa) of the city.
8Census
SGonzb lez E scobas Luis Ferna ndo. 2007. Medeflir; los ori genes y la transici6n a la modernidad
crecimiento y mode/os urbanos 1775 - 1932. Investigaciones, 27. Mede||1 n: univ. Nacional de
Colombia, Escuela del Ha bitatCEHAP. Pag 21
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Figure 4 Map of Medellin in 1800. Source: the autor 1800
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The Republic
By the time Colombia became a Republic independent from Spain in 1885, the
city of Medellin had achieved the level of political importance that it has today.
It became the capital of the State and one of the most important cities of the
country after Bogota. Since its foundation in the 16th century until the end of
the 18th century, Medellin was more of a small populated town and a place to
stop in travels between the interior of the country and the coast. As a result of
the independence campaigns in 1813, Medellin by decree became a city and by
1826 had become the capital of the state. Between 1780 and 1851, Medellin
transformed from a small villa to the fourth largest city in the country. Also
during this time, the state of Antioquia grew from representing 3.8 percent to
13.5 percent of the national population.' 0
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Figure 5 Piano topografico de Medellin _1875_Fransisco H. Parra, Manuel J. Escobar, Manuel hoyos y
Fabriciano Botero. Students of civil engineering at the Universidad de Antioquia in 1875.
Between 1826 and 1868, Medellin became the center of state power including
serving as the central political, economic and religions administration of the
state. Medellin became the Episcopal chair of the Catholic Council of the state
of Antioquia in 1868. Medellin also had the largest concentration of all higher
education in the state of Antioquia.
1 Gonza lez Escobae Luis Fernando. 2007. Medelfin, los ofigenes y la transicidn a la modernidad
crecimiento y modelos urbanos 1775 - 1932. Investigaciones, 27. Medelfl n: Univ. Nacional de
Colombia, Escuela del H6 bitatCEHAP.
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Figure 6 Map of Medellin in 1847. Source: the author
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Figure 7 Demography Medellin 1900 to present Source: DANE 1847
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The Industrial City
The city moved from being the capital of an agrarian district to becoming the
most important industrial center of the country. Thanks to the capital
accumulated by the initial agrarian burgess, the city captured the nascent
national industry. This production-oriented change has had important
repercussions on the form of the city.
The mule-drawn tramway began operation in Medellin on January 23, 1887."
Correa 2003 mapped the introduction of public transportation by tram in
Medellin by the elites in the first decades of the 20th century and links this
project as supporting industrialization and the construction of the working-class
neighborhoods in the periphery. "The elite's progressive perspective combined
advancing their private interests with a concern for public welfare and the
needs of a growing urban area." 12
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Some of those institutions and important changes occurred in 1895, including
the "Compania Antioquenia de Instalaciones Electrica," the state electric
company founded in 1897 and with which the first public illumination was
inaugurated in 1915. The phone service was inaugurated in 1919. By 1955, the
"Empresas Municipales," Municipal Company of Services created under the
supervision of the Consejo de Medellin" became autonomous from the Consejo
Correa, Juan Santiago. "Urban development and urban transport: the Medellin tramway, 1919-
1950." COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL 3739 (2003): 96.
12 Ibid Correa 2003.
2Madellin. lata aaemI.
Figure 9 View of the city of Medellin by 1904 Source: Fhor, Pirce & co-published by the Alcaldia de Medellin
Figure 10 Map of Medellin in 1889. Source: the author
1889
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de Medellin with the name of Empresas Publicas de Medellin." This is
important because this system- administration of public services in which it is
autonomous from the state and regulates itself but whose assets are owned by
the city-remains intact until the present. As I will discuss later, this challenges
the idea that privatization of public services is the only way to develop a city. In
1875 bids began to build the Ferrocarril de Antioquia, the railroad which was
built in 1914.
The Medellin Future Plan
H EDELLIN TUTURO
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Figure 11 Piano Medellin Futuro (Map Future Medellin) by Jorge Rodriguez la Linde. Source: Jaramillo and
Perfetti , 1993
In 1899 the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas (Society of Public Improvement)14
was born. The goal of this philanthropic organization was "as these
organizations were in the civilized centers of the world, to create a group that
3 Jaramillo, Beatriz A. Medellin, construccidn de una ciudad. Medellin: Editorial Marin
Sierra, 2005. Page 67
1 Jaramillo, Roberto Luis, and Ver6 nica Perfetti 1993. Cartografia urbana de Medellin 1790-1950.
Medelfi n: el Concejo. Page 19
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Figure 12 Piano de la Ciudad de Medellin 1908. Source: Spearson & Son Limited (London)
1909
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oversaw the ornamentation and beautification of the city."15  This private
partnership served as a parallel entity with the municipality, with whom it
shared similar goals. Sometimes this Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas served as
lobby group for new ideas and other times members of this lobby group would
become part of the city council or the mayors or even the President of the
country. Members of the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas were formed by leaders
of the Medellin economic elite and they ensured that the transformation from
small town to city was in accordance with their private economic interests.
Medellin by 1905 had a population of 40,000. 16
This new entity established a private link between the private interests and the
municipality. A pivotal moment for the foundation of the city involved the
competition called "Medellin Futuro." This was an effort to control what by that
point were considered the big problems of the physical form of the city. This
competition was an effort to acquire a coherent master plan, inspired by the
master plans of the city of Washington D.C. which were observed by member of
the Sociedade de Mejore Publicas Ricardo Olanda during his trip to the Library
of the Congress in the United States. Upon his return from the United States in
1908, Olanda organized a competition, funded by the Sociedad de Mejoras
Publicas and the Consejo de Medellin, for the best map of a "Medellin Futuro"
or Future Medellin. This open competition, intended to show how the city
should grow, was won by the engineer Jorge Rodriguez Lalinde. Based on this s9
winning plan, the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas began creating a succession of
other plans, incorporating other competitors' ideas that would be recorded in
the final plan. This plan, in the end, was a compilation of several political and
private groups' visions for the city. The final plan was approved in 1913.'1 Most
of the goals of this plan were achieved by the 1930s. By 1917, the city was
already the most important industrial center of the country. By 1923, the
president of the Republic Carlos E. Restrepo who also had been the founder of
the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas mentioned in one of his presidential speeches
that "all the transformations in the last 20 years of the city of Medellin... are
directly or indirectly being influenced"' by the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas.
1s Restrepo Uribe, Jorge, and Luz Posada de Greiff. 1981. Medellirt su origen, progreso y
desarrollo. Medelfin- ServigrS ficas, page 184 trasniation of the autor "el de que a aunando los
esfuerzos y concentrando las voluntades se organizase una junta encargada de velar por el ornato
y embellecimiento de la ciudad"
16 Ibid Jaramillo and Perfetti 1003.
17 Acuerdo 56 de 1913, Municipio de Medellin.
1 Restrepo Uribe, Jorge, and Luz Posada de Greiff. 1981. Medeig su origen, progreso y
desarrollo. Medelli n: Servigr6 ficas
1928* Population 120,044
MEDELLINl932
Figure 13 Plan of Future Urban Development dated 1932. Source:
Guillermo Palacios. Published by the Alcaldia de Medellin 1932
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Figure 14 The October 1940 edition of National Geographic Magazine contained an article entitled "Hail
Colombia!" which included the color photograph below. The trolley, known as Birney 37, was climbing the
hill on Calle 55. Source: Luis Marden.
Some of the important goals achieved by the Sociedad de Mejoras Publicas
included: 61
The channelization of the Medellin River that opened large plots of land on the
flooded valley plains, the botanical gardens, the routes connecting Medellin
with the National Capital of Bogot6, and the Medellin Futuro Plan.
The Plan Piloto / Medellin Master Plan
By the 1940s, Medellin needed an update of the 1913 city plan and so the
society of Mejoras Publicas invited famous architect Karl Brunner to create a
new plan for the city, but the city was never able to hire him. In 1948 architects
Paul Lester Weiner and Jos6 Luis Sert accepted the invitation from Medellin's
Mayor to create the "Plano Regulador" or Regulator Plan. This project which
these architects created in Boston and New York, was known as the Plan Piloto
or in English the Medellin Master Plan (MMP), was done in collaboration with
the then newly created office of the regulator plan directed by Nel Rodriguez, a
prominent Colombian architect of the city.
J.j
1951* Population 358,189
Figure 15 9 Map of Medellin in 1950. Source: the author 1950
IAIO
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Figure 16 El Plan Piloto 1950 Wiener y Sert. Source: ClAM 81
63
The Medellin Master Plan (MMP) of the city that focuses on all the
municipalities in the vicinity of Medellin and in this sense was the first planning
study of the entire Aburra Valley. This led to the creation of the first
metropolitan area in Colombia. The main features of the MMP included the
channelization of the Medellin River, restricting new settlements up to a certain
point of the Valley slopes, the creation of an industrial zone in the Guayabal
District, the construction of a main sport facilities zone with the city stadium,
and the relocation of the historic administrative center to the site of the old
railroad in La Alpujarra. 20 All of these features were intended to imprint on the
city the new modern planning ideals at the time. Medellin, in fact, was a
showcase of these modern ideals at the 8th International Congress for Modern
Architecture (CIAM) in 1951.
By 1951 the city had 358,189 inhabitants and only 20 years later in 1973, the
population had almost tripled to include 1,071,252 inhabitants. The Master Plan
had only anticipated the city to grow to a population of 500,000. This
demographic explosion had several consequences for the MMP: the urban limits
19 International Congress for Modern Architecture. 1951. CIAM 8. 8th International Congress for
Modern Architecture. "The core."
20 Restrepo Uribe, Jorge, and Luz Posada de Greiff. 1981. Medellira su origen, progreso y
desarrollo. Medelfi n: Servigra ficas
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1964* Population 772,887
Figure 17 Stadium and Neigborhood areas as it is today and how it was planned in the MMP
Source: Patricia Schnitter 1955
now
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of the city grew to areas that had not been included in the MMP. The city
expanded all the way to borders with other cities such as Envigado, Bello and
Itagoi among others. The new Medellin settlers were poor families without
credit to buy their housing, therefore they formed their own squatter
settlements beyond the geographic boundary envisioned by the MMP." Patricia
Schniter adds that in addition to unexpected population growth, it was very
difficult to execute the MMP because this was a time of "political turmoil" in
throughout the country, the decade known as La Violencia. Rodrigues, the
architect, left his post as director of the Regulator Plan, saying that it was
impossible to do anything in this political environment. A legacy of this MMP
was the "Plano Regulador" and the partially executed "Plan Director." Another
legacy of this plan is that in 1960 the office of the Plan Regulador became the
Department of Planning (Departamento de Planeacion) with a direct
relationship to the office of the Mayor. This is the same structure still in place
today.
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Figure 18 Alpujarra administration center as it is today and how it was planned in the MMP Source: Jota
Samper and the CIAM 8
The Decadence 22
Betancur (2005) provides a critical historical perspective of how the city has
struggled with the consequences of massive migrations of (mostly rural) poor
individuals and families to Medellin in the 5 decades (1960s-1990s) of violence
and the economic crisis of the industrial sector. He clearly establishes that at the
moment when the industry is collapsing in Colombia via effects of globalization
21 Ibid. Restrepo Uribe and Posada de Greiff. 1981.
22 Betancur, describes the period between 1970s to late 1980 as the "decadence" of the industrial
city. Betancur, JJ. 2007. "Urban Challenges in Latin American Cities: Medellin and the Limits of
Governance".
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1985** Population 1,468,089
Figure 19 9 Map of Medellin in 1985. Source: the author 1985
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on traditionally protected markets, the socio political instability of the rural
areas is also displacing large amounts of the country's population, who left
without any other resources, flee to the urban centers, including Medellin.
So by 1970s the "harmonious" contract between state and elites in the
construction of the future of the city is lost due to the collapse of the industries.
All planning efforts at this stage are dwarfed by the state's inability to cope with
the unexpected exponential acceleration in population growth and the
economic stagnation of the city's industries. At this point all arriving population
found most sources of formal employment in crisis.
Also during this time the state via the (Instituto de Credito Territorial) ICT,
experimented with successful low income housing projects that did reach some
poor populations, but not those populations who were newly arrived to the city
and living in extreme poverty. The scarcity of affordable housing units for
everyone made it even more difficult for residents in the city's poorest
communities to access it. In the 1980s, the state suspended this affordable
housing effort. Instead of building houses, the state continued facilitating loans
to buy homes. The planning department also focused on road infrastructure.
These projects were what might be termed as politically more accessible parts
of the regulator plan. This trend of focusing on transportation and infrastructure
instead of other planning aspects (such as housing) had continued until Fajardo. 67
The Metropolitan City
Medellin expansion and connection to the other municipalities of the Aburra
Valley, generated the necessity to think of the city in terms of a region. The city
in 1980 created the Metropolitan Area (Area Metropolitana ). Based on the
initial idea of the Plan Piloto, this type of regional institutional body was the first
of its kind in the country. This changed the mentality of the city leaders from
thinking about Medellin as an isolated town to understanding the Valley as an
entire Metropolitan Area. One of the infrastructural changes that most reflects
this town-municipality shift in mentality was the Metro de Medellin. In 1984,
Metro de Medellin began construction of a rapid transit railway, which after
construction stagnated due to political battle between the national government
and the local municipalities about the release of funds, was finally inaugurated
on November 21, 1995.23
This new piece of infrastructure connected most municipalities in the valley and
transformed the traditional central structure of the city into a linear one that
23 Morrison, Allen. "THE TRAMWAYS OF COLOMBIA." ELECTRIC TRANSPORT IN LATIN AMERICA.
http://www.tramz.com/co/me/me.html (accessed May 3, 2010).
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follows the logic of the topography and hydrology of the valley. One of the most
important achievements of this new transportation system is that it opened
transportation opportunities to the entire region and more importantly to the
poor neighborhoods and cities of the north.
Figure 21 Exchange station line A and B in downtown Medellin. Source: Metro de Medellin
The Constitutional City 69
The 1991 new national constitution removed the requirement that city mayors
be selected by the state governor or by the country's president. Under the new
constitution, mayors had the opportunity to be elected by popular vote. Popular
elected mayors need to respond to their constituencies and not only to their
political affiliations. This has modified the ways in which the mayor's office
operated and in turn has modified the relationship of the mayor office with its
citizens. The overall power structure and image has shifted from an
authoritarian approach to a more citizen-oriented policy. This new democratic
route to Mayor has allowed members of Independent parties, such as Mocus in
Bogota and Fajardo in Medellin, to become city mayors. This opened the
possibility of experimenting with new ways to understand and modify the
territory as explain by Gutie rrez et al 2009.24
The constitution created a new law called "Ley Territorial" or Territorial Law. 25
This law is the first time that public participation is included in the planning
process in the sense that they need to be included in the planning process via
24 Sarin, Francisco Guti6 rrez 2009. Politics and security in three Colombian cities. London: crisis States
Research Centre.
25 Ley de Desarrollo territorial, Ley 388 de 1997 el 18 de Julio
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communication and input. The Territorial Law has a planning instrument called
the Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial POT of 1999 or the Plan of Territorial
Order.
The Sergio Fajardo administration projects built on the legacy of the POT. Before
Fajardo, none of the previous mayors had engaged with the conclusions of the
POT.
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
Non-Planning in Medellin History and
Consequences
This section explores the consequences of the development of informal
settlements in the city of Medellin and highlights the relationship between the
state (municipality and national government staff) and the inhabitants of these
informal territories.
Here I explore the informal settlements in three sections
* The informal city (informal settlements) provides a global framework for
the process and practices of informal settlement formation.
* The informal city in Medellin explores the informalization of Medellin after
the 1970 post-globalization effects on the Colombian industry.
* The Case of Villa del Socorro explores the development of an experimental
housing project in the 1960s in Medellin as the first step in the development
of the large informal settlement of Comunas 1 and 2 in Medellin, the
regions of study for this thesis.
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The informal city (informal settlements)
Informal settlement can be defined as an area which has developed without
legal claims to the land and/or permission from the authority; as a result of their
illegal status, housing provision infrastructure and services are usually
inadequate.
One important issue to understand about the informal city is that sections of
cities developed informally did so thanks to the absence of the state
(negligence) and it is this state negligence that allowed the informal city to
thrive. This absence of state is also the source of many of the entire city's
problems. It is this paradox that the communities who lived in these areas found
themselves. This phenomenon is not unique to Medellin. This is a global
phenomenon that is acquiring more relevance today because of the scale of
these kinds of new informal cities. Mike Davis in his book Planet of Slums (2006)
Srinivas, Hari. "Defining Squatter Settlements." GDRC | The Global Development
Research Center. N.p., n.d. Web. 6 May 2010. <http://www.gdrc.org/uem/define-
squatter.html>.
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puts the scale of the problem in perspective. "Residents of slums [what I prefer
to define as the informal city] constitute a staggering 78.2 percent of the urban
population of the least developed countries and fully a third of the global urban
population."2 These numbers reveal a necessity to discover new ways within
the planning profession to deal with the built environment. This search is one of
my main motivations for this study. We need to learn to understand the
sophisticated process or formation to subsistence that residents of informal
communities enact to make sustainable and effective interventions.
Development of all informal settlements in the world follows some similar
appropriation techniques and consolidation processes. They vary by culture and
political system and construction techniques, but some generalizations about
this informal city process can be made. The urbanization by informal city
residents use the minimal resources available (political and economic) to
accomplish the largest manmade objects-cities. This is a social enterprise
because individuals alone do not have the necessary power or resources. The
state is also complicit in this informal city process-by pointed acknowledgment
that they should have a role in informal cities, or due to the fact that the state
actually does not have the resources to address informal housing problems,
such as sudden mass migrations of people to the city. Informal cities also reveal
the incompetence of the state to maintain control over the territory and the
incapacity of the formal economic system to include all members of society into
the productive system. (Betancur 2007) "Constructed through land partitions,
invasions, and self-help, these squatters became a living testimony of to the
absence and indifference of the state and society."2
Figure 23 Process of creating an informal city. Source: Jota Samper at estudio teddy cruz.
First, a pirate urbanizer finds land available for invasion and then leads an
invasion with others to this land. The invasion happens over the course of one
day. The territory is claimed with precarious material that is brought by the
invaders. There is a series of stages in which layer by layer, as budget or
27 Davis, Mike. 2006. Planet of slums. London: Verso.
28 Betancur.
...... ..  .....  .
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construction techniques allow, the people transform a precarious shelter into a
house.
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Figure 24 Mankurd North. Mumbal, India. Squatter development from 2000 to 2009 Source: The Author
aerial images Google
I see the development of squatters, slums or informal cities more as complex
development strategies to build a city without the necessary resources. My
research explores these complex strategies.
Betancur (2007) acknowledges the benefits that other authors see in informality
as a way for underdeveloped societies to cope with the consequences of
globalization, but he also cites the dangers in the intrinsic separation between
the state and the individual. "One of the economic benefits of informality is
.... ... ...................
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flexibility, but it represents a deep social dilemma. Operating outside or in
violation of the rule of law severs ties with the material and social basis of
citizenship, legitimacy, and recognition."2 9 Furthermore, Betancur sees informal
citizens, through their status as informal, as likely to become criminals. 3 0 I would
argue that the fact that informality is illegal is what makes the line between
legal and illegal very difficult to locate. Being a resident of an informal
settlement or city automatically deprives you of your rights to citizenship to the
formal state. A similar argument between legal and illegal, informal and formal
citizen are employed against illegal immigration in the United States. We have
to be careful when we make a connection between a citizen being informal and
being a criminal.
The absence of the state in the area of informal settlements makes these areas
perfect environments to be appropriated by groups who are contesting the
authority of the state. In Colombia, we have a complex situation. On one hand,
as much as 64 percent3' of the population lives below the poverty line and a
large percentage of this population lives in informal settlements. On the other
hand, in Colombia and in Medellin, there is a long list of illegal armed groups
who operate outside of the state (paramilitaries, guerrillas, narcotraffic groups,
and other crime organizations). These informal spaces are necessary for the
survival of these armed groups. Informal neighborhoods become contested
territories among these warring armed groups.
The Informal City in Medellin
"Most low-income immigrants to Colombian cities availed themselves of
housing through land invasion or acquisition of illegal land partitions and self-
settlement in the urban periphery. Thus, illegal forms of tenure, precarious
dwellings, and violations of established regulations and codes characterized
most of their settlements. Local governments could not intervene because they
2 cite page number.
30 cite the Betancur example of informal vendor in downtown area switching from legal
goods to illegal drugs.
31 United Nations Development Programme, Population living below national poverty line (%),
most recent year available during 2000-2007. Human and income poverty: developing countries /
Population living below $1.25 a day (%), Human Development Report 2009, UNDP, accessed on
December 19, 2009.
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would be violating private land property rights or their own rules. Hence,
improvements depended largely on settlers. Eventually, government developed
a mechanism of intervention based on the distribution of construction
materials and the loan of heavy equipment to settlers who then carried out the
work. Meanwhile, government policies addressing the housing needs of the
poor evolved from direct development of public housing to the provision of
subsidies."
Betancourt 2007
Both comuna 1-2 and 13 have large pockets of informal development. These
two areas, which represent 15% of the Medellin urban territory, have housing
and infrastructure that have been developed informally. These structures were
built by the residents. The government later followed up by consolidating public
services like water, energy, sewer, telephone and paving of main roads as well
as governmental institutions such as schools, sports facilities and police stations.
But all these interventions are afterthoughts and not part of coordinated
planning strategy of the planning department. The comprehensive Plan or Plan
Piloto of the 1950s considered most of these areas unbuildable and did not
incorporate them into the urban perimeter of the city.
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Figure 25 comuna 1 and 2 from 1950 and 1990 showing current locations of MetroCable. Source: PUI
Nororiental EDU.
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It is important to understand this relationship between the state and the
32communities that occupy these territories. In the case of the PRIMED,
Betancur (2005) explores this relationship in the Integrated Slum Upgrading
Program of Medellin (Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios
Subnormales en Medellin or PRIMED). First, he brings to light the legal
impediments that the nation and local state had imposed on itself that prevents
it from engaging with the large illegal settlements in the city. Betancur also
maps a succession of institutions through which the state, formally or
informally, intervenes in the informal city. He also examines a succession of
entities that begin independent of the state, such as the Casitas de la
Providencia, the NGO that build the first neighborhood of the comuna 1 called
"Villa del Socorro." This NGO evolved into more complex public private
partnerships like the Corvide 3 that later would lead the PRIMED project. This
PRIMED project then served as the EDU base from which the PUI operated
during the Fajardo Administration.
This process also shows how the legalization of property tenure (granting of
titles) allowed the state to be more engaged in improving the conditions of
these neighborhoods. This process also reveals that this long (more than 40
years) evolution of partnership provided experiential knowledge of how (and
how not) to work in and with these communities. This process is ongoing and in
2002 the CORVIDE became an integral part of the municipality. By 2004 the city
create the FOVIMED, Fondo Municipal de Vivienda de Interes Social during the
the Fajardo Administration and in 2008 this institution was transformed into the
ISVIMED,3 an autonomous decentralized institution with its own budget. have
The ISVIMED has the same institutional structure of a company in which the
initial funding comes from the municipality but after this company begins to
produce its own profits, it runs own funds and budget and produces money for
the municipality and itself. This is similar to other successful "municipal
companies" in Medellin such as the EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellin), which
manages water, energy, and phones and cable television and internet.
For decades, the neighborhoods where these policies were applied in the city of
Medellin were isolated from the city's general population and in some cases
even from the police or army. Today, after the application of the projects during
the Fajardo's regime, these same areas are being advertised as tourist
attractions of the city. This corroborates the Mayor's office idea that there is a
relationship between the policies and projects they implemented and the
32 Integrated Program for Improvement of Subnormal Barrios in Medellin.
3 CORVIDE substituted Casitas de la Providencia (1975) Betancur 2007
34 Instituto de Vivienda y H6bitat de Medellin, ISVIMED.. Viviendas con Coraz6n." Viviendas con
Coraz6n. http://www.viviendasmedellin.gov.co (accessed May 3, 2010).
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reduction of violence. While not enough time has passed to know if this
reduction in violence is temporary or permanent, it still is significant.
The Case of Villa del Socorro
I have concluded that the areas of this study comprise a large portion of the
city's territory, and territory that has not had significant intervention of the
state. Other institutions besides the state engaged in the construction of the
environment. This is the case of Villa del Socorro, one of the neighborhoods that
form Comuna 1. Today, the inhabitants development of their housing units
make it look like the rest of the neighborhoods in the Comuna, but in reality it is
part of one of the first experiments in the world in core housing,35 a prototype
that is based on the informal citizens' strategy to build their homes and
environment through incremental development.
This concept was born in 1960 as a solution to the improbability of supplying an
entire unit, given the economical restrictions of their occupants. This
experimental housing complex provided 397 core units to initiate a process of
construction, through which over time they would build a more complete 77
house. Today, after more than 40 years since this core housing project began,
the goal has been achieved. The houses in Villa del Socorro have developed
beyond their core to more complete units, and most of them have even added
second and third levels to the units. These interventions also created a winding
road path that negotiated the steep topography (winding because the straight
roads in the Andes mountain neighborhood were so steep they could not be
climbed by car). This path also left open spaces for the future placement of
service and cultural infrastructure, infrastructure which later was provided by
the state. Many of the inhabitants of these units came from other informal
communities located close to the center of the city. This project took the
problem of informality that existed in the downtown of Medellin and
transferred it to the periphery of the city. Because the government did not
follow up with infrastructural services, this initiated a process in which this area
of the periphery was vulnerable to being informal. This then created a type of
economic, social, and physical segregation of its inhabitants and environment
from the rest of the city.
3s Caminos, Horacio, John F. C. Turner, and John A. Steffian. 1969. Urban dwelling
environments; an elementary survey of settlements for the study of design determinants.
Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press.
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This example is interesting for two reasons. First because it shows that, in a way,
it actually was the state that initiated the process of urbanization of this steep
and isolated portion of geography, and it did so in a way that generated a path
to follow-an economically, geographically and culturally segregated path.
Second, this first attempt was not followed by others in the private state-
oriented projects that either corrected or continued this path. No substantial
interventions happened, for nearly 35 years, until the PUI in 2004. The entire
infrastructure in place at this moment in 1969 became the formal structure of
the entire community that we see today.
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Figure 27 Villa de Socorro in 1969. Source: Urban Dwelling Environments
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Figure 28 Villa de Socorro Before (as a plan ) and today Comuna 1. Source: Urban Dwelling Environments
and Area Google Earth 2010
The limits of the infrastructure of this project became the limits (borders) with
the city. From this border, all material to develop new housing, churches, steps
and roads, were carried up the hills to the invasion territories.
Luz Marina Saldarriagam, in my interviews with her, narrated the process in
which she, her family and other families invaded the territory. She also talked
about purchasing the illegal title to the land (from an urbanizer pirate) and the
fights to keep from being evicted from the state authorities. In a narrative that
could be a chapter in a Gabriel Garcia Marquez story she said, "at that time [in
the 1970s] the mayor had ordered for this land to reclaimed [by the state] and
sent the military to expel us from here...the Captain [of the Fourth Brigade]
ordered their soldiers to not evict any family that had the Colombian flag
raised... and we knew about that... the next day we made flags out of our
clothing and that was the way that we were able to stay here.""
This contestation of the tenure of the territory, the constant threat of eviction
by the authorities marked the initial and continued relationship of this
community with the state. This contestation and open knowledge of illegality,
are, in my consideration, important elements that facilitated the birth, conquest
and contestation of authority of this territory. The state acknowledges the
existence of this community and their illegal appropriation of the territory, but
at the same time the state also lacks the power or will to deal politically with the
consequence of evicting people from their homes. This delaying of resolution
36 Luz Marina Saldarriga, interview in "Proyecto Hist6rico de Memoria" la Violencia no es toda la
Historia, 2008 DukeEngage Medellin, Tamera Marko and Jota Samper, 2008.
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stops further improvements of the territory, and the ones that are made are to
address problems that have already spiraled out of control such as the
proliferation of violent groups and storm-induced landslides that cause dozens
of homes and lives lost. Nongovernmental actors in this case have replaced the
state. Priests like.Padre Gabriel Diaz, 7 organized the convites, meetings in which
community members assemble to do projects for the larger community, like
building latrines or making a street. At these convites, members of the Santo
Domingo community built roads, bathrooms and other infrastructure. These
actions fulfilled the mission of the first leaders of the community and around
figures like him the communal physical projects were done. These kinds of
actions are also followed by further community projects by NGO's and
institutions alike. NGOs, like the Servicio Paz y Justicia en Am6rica Latina SERPAJ
directed by Hildegard Goss-Mayr (Pax Christi USA Pope Paul VI Teacher of Peace
Award in 1986 )and founded by Adolfo Perez Esquivel (Nobel Peace Prize 1980)
held their first meeting in this territory in 1974.38 As this case shows,
international (nongovernmental) groups were working in these territories even
when the Colombian state was not.
Figure 29 Santo Domingo Savio. Neighborhood Source: Album Padre Gabriel Diaz courtesy of the Sala Mi
Barrio
3 Interviews "Proyecto Hist6rico de Memoria" la Violencia no es toda la Historia, 2009
DukeEngage Medellin, Tamera Marko and Jota Samper, 2009.
38 Hildegard Goss-Mayr, Hildegard. "WORLD-WIDE ASIAN-EURASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS FORUM."
September,16th, 2006.http://word.world-citizenship.org/wp-archive/715 (accessed 2010 april).
"Her companion Adolfo P6rez Esquivel was at the time the coordinator of the nonviolent Christian
organization Service for Peace and Justice (Servicio Paz y Justicia, SERPAJ). This human rights
organization, which worked under the most difficult of conditions, was founded in 1974 in the
colombian city of Medellfin during a meeting organized by Hildegard and Jean Goss. In 1976, as
Perez Esquivel was collecting documents for an international campaign against human rights
violations in Latin America."
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In my interviews, people narrate ways that these conditions of extreme poverty
and the state's lack of accountability catapulted the first waves of what might
be called "regular crimes"-home robberies, vandalism, pick pocketing. These
crimes quickly escalated to organized crime waged by different criminal gangs
that by the 1980s become formalized as the Sicarios (assassins) who worked
directly with drug lords. These Sicarios would come to terrify the city
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. After the main narcotraffic networks
in the city of Medellin were dismantled in the early 1990s, these criminal groups
were absorbed by other illegal groups that challenged the authority of the state.
In a series of essays based on a compilation of stories told by members of the
neighborhoods of the northeastern section of the city, "Somos Historia Comuna
Nororiental," 1991 where the comuna 1 and 2 are located, narrates part of this
process. They talk about how urban guerrillas used the opportunity to take over
the comunas territories after the gangs of sicarios had lost their leadership. A
member of the then new MP (milicias populares) talks about this process of
absorption: "We executed many of the bosses and members of the gangs of the
Sicarios. We did not have any alternative- they were rotten people and we
knew that they would never rehabilitate.39 These executions were sufficient to
make an example of the other small groups, to make them understand that we
were talking seriously."40 To the presence of a new armed groups in these 81
neighborhoods, the General Pardo from the Cuarta Brigada, a battalion located
in Medellin's National Army responds, "These new organizations had their
umbilical cord attached to the Coordinadora Gerrillera (guerrillas), that has
taken advantage of the social decompositon in the comunas to collect the
harvest in a field fertilized by violence and narcotraffic."4 ' Similarly violent and
non-violent process of absorption will follow to the contestation of the territory
by the paramilitary groups in the late 1990s.
40 Estrada C., William, and Adriana G6 mez V 1992. Somos historia: Comuna Nororiental. Medelfli n,
Colombia: this an extract from the revista Semana, abril 9,1991
41 lbid Estrada. 1992. page 172
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Figure 30 Comuna 1 and 2 in 2006 Source: EDU
What this section is trying to reveal is the connection between the formation
and consolidation of the physical territory with the manifestations of violence
and social and economic segregation. This helps understand why any
intervention on the physical space can help bring closure to that limbo
relationship of state and community that the condition of informality had
created. Changing these spaces in these ways could also be a way to condition
and modify social behaviors. It is clear that a direct relationship between the
modification of the physical space and the change in violent behavior cannot be
expected, but that the first (intervention that makes the area a less isolated
physical environment) is an important condition to make the second (less
violence social behavior) happen is clear.
This shows the evolution of the physical space (community self-constructed
public and private space) along with the political implications and consequences
of that evolution (the recognized condition of illegality imposed on an entire
community and the inability or neglect of the state to legally intervene in the
resolution of physical and social issues)- all in an environment of extreme
poverty. This is a recipe for the incubation of criminal activities and further
escalations of violence in a country like Colombia where multiple illegal groups
contest the power of the state.
By declaring the occupation of the territory illegal, the state removed the
citizenship of the community members. Every day that this illegal condition is
maintained, further distances the citizens from their participation in society at
large and further creates the aura that each inhabitant is, by de facto, a
..................... ...... .. -
.... . . . .. ...... . .... .  . ......
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criminal. This criminalization of the existence of the community is not removed
once the state concedes the titles of property to those who live there. The
physical atrophy that the neighborhood has suffered through decades of neglect
corroborates this idea of the inhabitant as a third-class citizen.
The next chapter explores the policies and projects implemented in Medellin
from 2003 by the Sergio Fajardo administration. This intervention targeted
many areas of the city, but focused specially on traditionally marginalized areas
in Medellin. This is a strategy that seeks to address the disparity between the
formal and the informal city, through not only policies but also and primary
through the modification of the physical space of the informal settlements that
make them prone to violence and insecurity.
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"Medellin, la Cuidad Mas Educada" Medellin
the most educated: the policy interventions
Background
The city of Medellin has gone through a major social and physical
transformation during the last 7 years (2003-2010). To understand the nature of
this transformation, we must consider that since the late 1940s, Colombia has
experienced extreme levels of violence caused by a complex web of armed
groups. Various simultaneous conflicts occurred among guerrilla, paramilitary,
and military groups, further complicated by police forces and gangs. Traffic of
narcotics, especially since the 1970s, provided the funding that perpetuated
these conflicts. However, between 2003-2007, the levels of conflict have
decreased drastically-by 50 percent-throughout the city. This change has a
close relationship with changes that have happened at the national scale. An
especially important change was the 2001 presidential election. Contrary to the
previous policy of focusing on diplomacy (through dialogue with various warring
groups), the new president Alvaro Uribe 2002-2010 implemented an armed
solution to the conflict. The new national government policies were driven by
two predominant objectives: "demobilizing illegal groups and increasing
defense spending."'
This policy of active defense spending modified the characteristics of the
conflict in Colombia. First, greater levels of security in the urban areas
encouraged more migration from rural areas within Colombia to major cities like
Medellin. Second, the intensification of armed conflict took the war from the
1Democratic security or Democratic security policy refers to a Colombian security policy
implemented during the administration of President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010). It was unveiled in
June 2003. Colombia unveils security plan". BBC.com. 30 June 2003. McDermott, Jeremy." BBC
NEWS I Americas I Colombia unveils security plan." BBC NEWS I News Front Page.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3030768.stm (accessed May 18, 2010).
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rural areas to the interior of cities. This was most visible in Medellin. By 2001,
Comuna 13 was an extreme example of places that had become battlegrounds
among paramilitaries, guerrilla urban groups and gangs groups. In 2002, the
national army's campaign, Operaci6n Orion, took over the neighborhood
Comuna 13.2 The operation lasted 4 days. In this military operation officials
reportedly confiscated arms (including 50 kilos of explosives, 1 machineguns, 4
rocket launchers and 4 rifles, as well as a bus with explosives that they
deactivated). At least 243 people were arrested, 23 convicted as head of the
militias (urban guerrilla), and 72 kidnapped individuals by the guerrilla were also
liberated. In the military operation, 4 soldiers from the national army, one
civilian and 4 insurgent (guerrilla) died.3 More than 20 individuals were injured
based on official reports.4 Other sources reported up to 70 disappeared
individuals at the hands of the paramilitary groups that used the opportunity to
establish control over the comuna 13.5 Some sources report extrajudicial
executions by the national armed forces, deaths that official reports claimed as
friendly fire.6 This complex event shows how, in this particular place in the city,
three different armed groups were trying to obtain control over the territory.
Each one of these groups fighting the other were the same groups that were
fighting at the national scale, largely in rural areas, trying to take control of the
country. This type of urban manifestation of the national conflict is what makes
Medellin an important place to study.
Another policy initiated by the new national government involved
demobilization of illegal armed groups. This involved a two-pronged strategy.
On one hand, individuals were given amnesty if they deserted guerrilla groups.
On the other hand, the government engaged in a peace process with the right-
wing paramilitary groups, including the larger Autodefensas Unidad de Colombia
AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). The first success of this process
involved 850 paramilitary members giving up their weapons in a publicized
2 This kind of army presence was not seen before in Colombia, even in the midst of the 1990's
Bloque de busqueda operations (the search for Pablo Escobar).
3 Emisora del Ejercito Nacional. "Ex alcalde de Medellin habl6 sobre la Operaci6n Ori6n - Colombia
Estereo." Emisora del Ejercito Nacional - Colombia Estereo.
http://www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=582 (accessed May 18, 2010).
4 BBC. " BBC Mundo I AMRICA LATINA I Medellin: tercer dia de enfrentamientos." BBC NEWS |
News Front Page. http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latinamerica/newsid_2339000/2339065.stm
(accessed May 20, 2010).
s Ibid
6 El Tiempo. "Ciudadanos Proponen Mandato Por La Paz." El Tiempo.com Archivo.
www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-554724 (accessed May 3, 2010).
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ceremony in 2003.7 This larger demobilization process was in full swing when a
new city administration took power in 2004 led by Mayor Sergio Fajardo's party
compromiso ciudadano. This was a new political party and one that had no
affiliation with the two traditional parties (Liberal and Conservative) that had for
decades fought for power, a fight that can be tracked to the beginning of the
nation and to the non declared civil war of the 1950s, known as (La Violencia)
that give birth to the contemporary guerrilla. Fajardo's new plan of action was
called "Medellin, la ciudad mas educada" (Medellin: The Most Educated City).
This plan of action focused on developing soft and hard infrastructure
throughout the city and doing so mostly through education. In Sergio Fajardo's
words this campaign engaged with the concept of "education in the biggest
sense of the word," schools, health clinics, museums, parks, libraries, and
recreation centers. It is important to understand that in Medellin, basic
infrastructure (water, energy, transportation) was for the most part not affected
by the conflict. In general, however, these educational infrastructural projects
were overdue long before this latest wave of conflict.
I have divided the Mayor's initiatives into two categories: policies and physical
transformations. This division separates the policies that do not have apparent
physical representation in the territory to more clearly highlight and better
understand those policies directly tied to physical interventions. This chapter 87
does not cover all aspects of the Mayor's administration, but instead analyzes
the new policies put into action by his administration and how they were
instrumental in the transformation of social behavior in the urban sphere. I
focus specifically on those strategies that apparently have influenced the
decrease in levels of insecurity and violence in the city.
Sergio Fajardo and his political discourse
71"On November 25, 2003 television viewers in Colombia watched as over 860 paramilitaries
belonging to Medellin's Cacique Nutibara Block (Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN), laid down their
arms in a highly-staged ceremony in front of Colombian and foreign dignitaries. The apparent
neutralization of the BCN appeared to vindicate the government's decision to officially begin talks
with the Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC), to which most
paramilitary groups belong, including the BCN, following the announcement of the AUC's
unilateral ceasefire in December 2002." Amnesty International. "Colombia: The Paramilitaries in
Medellin: Demobilization or Legalization? I Amnesty International." Amnesty International I
Working to Protect Human Rights. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005
(accessed May 18, 2010).
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Sergio Fajardo, a mathematician with a doctorate from the University of
Michigan, founded his own political party in 2003 called Compromiso
Ciudadano. This group originally was comprised of a mix of academics,
members of NGOs, and leaders drawn from the private sector. Their goal was in
Fajardo's own words to solve two basic problems of the city, which they
identified as: (1) Social inequality, which created a "social debt" between the
rich and the poor, and (2) violence, which had deep roots in many areas of
society. Sergio Fajardo explained the character and effects of violence in his
public lectures. "The combination of social inequality, historical social debt, and
violence in Colombia is unique." Fajardo explained, "The violence encloses, the
violence divides us into atoms, breaks all links between citizens. Because we
start to move in restricted circles of our city, we only relate with people who are
similar to us. Fear is part of society. We become survivors but not participants of
society." The solution to this isolation problem, he concluded, was to create
spaces where individuals feel safe. "So we need to encounter each other,"
Fajardo said, "and the place for this has to be public space."
Figure 1 Sergio Fajardo at the Santo Domingo Neighborhood in 2006. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
From the beginning of his mayoral campaign, the solutions to the city's social
problems were identified as problems with the city's physical structure. The
8 Fajardo, Sergio. "Medellin, Del Miedo a la Esperanza." Keynote speech, XXIX Reunion Anual de
Consejeros from Tecnologico de Monterrey, Monterrey, Mexico, January 15, 2009.
.... .  .. ....
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Figure 2 Medellin, la cuidad mas
educada (Medellin, the most
educated city) logo. Source:
Alcaldia de Medellin
solutions, therefore, were to target that structure. "So in places where before
there was violence and destruction ... we arrive with the best physical buildings
of the city. All the problems that we are solving are inequality and violence,"
argued Fajardo. In this way physical infrastructure and architecture became the
tools for transforming the city and bridging the gap between inequalities. All
new infrastructure and architectural interventions are seen as educational
projects.9 As a result of this thinking, the city of Medellin invested 52% of its
2004-2007 investment budget 0 into programs affiliated with education,
including physical development, a total of 1.8 Billion Colombian pesos,
$936,582,657.70 U.S. dollars. Sergio Fajardo said in a lecture about the Medellin
campaign at a lecture in Monterrey, Mexico in 2008 that
"[a]rchitecture plays an esthetical role, the most beautiful for
the most humble. This sends a message of hope against the
inequality. We created spaces never dreamed of in the most
humble neighborhoods of the city. And all new spaces have a
program related with education and knowledge in a larger
sense... Quality in education has to start with the quality of the
space. So the poorest kid of the city has to go to a school as
good as the one of the richest kid of the city."
The political discourse of Sergio Fajardo in the media, official mayoral office
reports, and dozens of conference presentations around the world, is filled with
references to how improvement of the aesthetic conditions of physical space
will provide the necessary dignity to bridge Medellin's the social gap. This
discourse, even as inclusive as it tries to be, is basically unidirectional. The
venues of community participation in the planning process were defined with a
strong top-down approach. "Education" becomes a way to provide larger
opportunities and the way to pay for the social debt that the city owes to its
poorest communities. This approach was not part of a community consensus-
Mayor Fajardo did not ask the community their input on this. Sergio Fajardo
explained,
9 Regarding this strategy implemented in Medellin, Dennis Frenchman pointed out that a "similar
strategy of linking education and physical renewal was used in Lowell, Massuchessets in the last
decade as a way to overcome disinvestment."
10 Investment Budget is the portion of the budget left over after overhead and other recurrent
payments.
I lbid (Sergio fajardo in a conference at the Tecnol6gico de Monterrey Mexico 2009)
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We bomb Medellin, but in a different way-with opportunities
and hope. This is a project of transformation of social debt. It is
not an issue of settling scores. The entire community is proud of
the new infrastructure put in place. So that way we all win.' 2
This new wave of "bombs" 13 "exploded" in Medellin from 2003 to the present
(2010), constituted one of the most radical urban transformations in the city's
history. It can be compared to the scale and impact of the introduction of the
elevated metro de Medellin that transverses the entire city, a planning and
building process which spanned more than fifteen years. The Ciudad Mas
Educada campaign, in three years, included renovating existing city parks,
adding a new interactive museum, building ten Colegios de Calidad (new quality
schools) and renovating another 122 schools, adding 64 Ludotecas (public-run
free day care), increasing the capacity of city universities by 200% and building
nine new free computer centers, nine CEDEZOs (small entrepreneurial centers in
low-income neighborhoods) and a new performing arts center, redevelopment
of large areas in three urban neighborhoods Proyecto Urbanos Integrales (PUI),
(Integral Urban Projects) a new Center for Justice and 20 CAI (neighborhood
small police centers), five new parks, five new street improvements a new line
cable car line connected to the metro along with additional system of Metro
Plus lines for all the city (the BRT of Medellin not yet operational). This also
included five Parques Bibliotecas, new library parks or community centers that
are multi-level, architecturally internationally award-winning spaces where
community members, free of charge, can read, use the internet, watch movies,
take workshops, play, and just be. These physical interventions were executed,
along with a number of diverse education oriented policies such as increasing
the student capacity of public education facilities, educational subsidies for the
tuition of low income students, food subsidies for students enrolled in
educational facilities run by the city, student transportation subsidies, health
services and programs oriented to populations at risk, scholarships for college
and a series of events aimed at making the students in all schools more
12 Ibid. (Sergio fajardo in a conference at the Tecnol6gico de Monterrey M xico 2009)
1 During the end of the 1980,s and the beginning of the 1990s, Medellin suffered a large
wave of terrorist attacks as part of the war against narcotraffic in the nation. This period
of terrorist attacks, that many times accounted for more than 1 bomb explosion per
day, are part of an entire chapter in Buda's Wagon: A Brief History of the Car Bomb.
Davis, Mike. 2007. London: Verso.
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competitive. It also included policies to support the national Disarmament and
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process.
So many physical and policy initiatives and projects were generated in this
period that they are difficult to accurately quantify and track. The city has not
kept consistent records of the process in a single place, and different
departments of the city tell different accounts of the same process that all came
to be called "the transformation of Medellin."
I have selected from among hundreds of projects and policies that intersect with
the territory of this study (located in Comuna 13, 1 and 2). I also chose to
highlight these projects and policies because they represent the type of
interventions that were innovative and have the best possibility for future
application to other contexts. I have divided these strategies into two groups-
policies and physical transformations-but it is the intertwining of both
approaches, in my opinion, that makes these strategies successful.
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Policies underlying the "transformation of
Medellin"
"I never imagined in my life that I would think that we need more police."
Sergio Fajardo, Mayor of Medellin (2004-2007)
The purpose of this section is to review the policies that were created during the
administration of Medellin mayor Sergio Fajardo. Understanding the scope of
the policies is important for the evaluation of (see chapter 5). Of all the policies
implemented during the mayor's administration from 2004-2007, I have
selected the six that I consider most relevant for this study based on fact that
the mayor's office application of them directly influenced this study's research
area. These policies are:
* Process of Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration (DDR), a
national Peace Process policy supported by the municipality that had
important repercussions on the Medellin territory and in the neighborhoods
of this study.
* Presupuesto Participativo PP, Participative Budget PP, a planning and
decision making process that shared the municipal budget and
responsibilities with the community.
* Banco de los Pobres (Bank of the Poor), a new finance banking structure
from the municipality that provided micro credits in marginalized areas of
the city and promoted entrepreneurial projects.
* Selection of the interventions: Indice de Desarrollo Humano (IDH) Indice de
Calidad de Vida (ICV) (the quality of life survey), the measuring tools that
help justify and evaluate the location of the investment of the territory of
the city.
* Urbanismo Social (Social Urbanism) is the philosophical framework that
explains social implications of the physical interventions that the city was
making in the poorest neighborhoods.
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
* EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellin (Enterprise Of Urban
Development -EDU), is the institutional framework that permitted the city
to execute the projects and negotiate diverse state entities and public and
private partnerships.
SEGURIDAD Y CONVIVENCIA (Peaceful Coexistence and
Citizen Security) Process of Demobilization, Disarmament and
Re-integration (DDR)
At the end of the Fajardo mayoral era in 2007, Medellin had reduced the
homicide rate below that of the level in Colombia nationwide. This had not
happened in more than 20 years. Furthermore, it was lower than that of many
cities in Latin America. The percentages of other felonies also were reduced as
incidences of burglary, extortion, and personal injuries declined. The process of
Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration with ex members of illegal
armed groups (with the AUC) was at this moment the model being put in force
in Colombia. The city had absorbed and complemented the national policy of
reintegration. By 2007 in the city of Medellin the DDR process had resulted in 93
4,164 demobilized members of the AUC from which 2,782 were in educational
programs and 3,532 were under psychological treatment and 1,825 had been
assigned job placement.1 As part of a new policy of security, an increase of
national police was put in place and also 20 new small police stations were
created and distributed throughout the city. The city signed 24 pactos
ciudadanos (citizen pacts) as part of the strategic projects of the city. These
pacts created partnerships of community groups, youths and the municipality
that permitted the construction or executions of projects in the territories
where these communities lived and also their sustainability in the future.
The background of the DDR process begins on June 15, 2003, when the Alto
Comisionado para la paz, members of the exploratory commission, and
delegates from the Catholic Church met with representatives of the right wing
paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The result of that
meeting was the initiation of a national DDR process with the AUC that would
be put into official practice five months later on November 25 with 850
1 Informe de calidad de vida 2004 - 2007, Medellin C6mo Vamos (2007,c)
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paramilitary members of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN, (a branch of the
AUC) "giving up their weapons in a publicized ceremony."15 The then outgoing
mayor of Medellin Luis Perez Gutierrez (2001-2003) and the national
government made an agreement for the city to be a partner in the peace
process. The continuation of the process would then be assumed by the next
municipal administration (Fajardo) that entered office three months later on
January 1, 2004.
Medellin, by the end of the DDR process in 2007, had 13% of the total national
demobilized personnel. See table 1. The new administration made a
commitment to reinforce the national DDR process. This reinforcement came in
the shape of educational and medical assistance. Education was intended as a
tool to incorporate this population into productive activities, since many of the
demobilized members lacked even a minimal education necessary to enter the
job market. See table 2. Medellin over the next three years became the model
of the DDR process for the rest of the country. In the end, with contested and
controversial results, Medellin suffereded fewer (negative) side effects than
other regions that also participated in large-scale demobilizations. For example,
the state of Narino saw increases in violence allegedly caused by demobilized
members. (Sapat, 2009). The overall program of DDR in Colombia has become a
controversial and politicized project that is far from a complete success story.
Illegal, armed, and paramilitary groups are not a new phenomenon in the
conflict history of Colombia. (Bushnell, 1993)16 Bushnell describes continuous
periods of resurgent paramilitary groups back to the years of "La Violencia."
These contemporary paramilitary groups originated with territorial fights
between guerrilla groups in Colombia and the new narcotraffic leadership in the
late 1980s. This territorial fight between narcotraffic networks and what
became known as paramilitary groups is also supported by Bowden (2001) in his
narration of the hunt of Pablo Escobar by CIA and Colombian authorities. 7
Bowden links some of the AUC Leadership (Carlos Casta5o) as being associated
in the beginning with members of the cartel organizations in Colombia.
"s ''On November 25, 2003, television viewers in Colombia watched as over 860 paramilitaries
belonging to Medellin's Cacique Nutibara Bloc (Bloque Cacique Nutibara, BCN), laid down their
arms in a highly-staged ceremony in front of Colombian and foreign dignitaries." Amnesty
International. "Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellin: Demobilization or Legalization? |
Amnesty International." Amnesty International I Working to Protect Human Rights.
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005 (accessed May 18, 2010).
16 Bushnell, David. 1993. The making of modern Colombia: a nation in spite of itself. Berkeley:
Univ. of California Press.
1 Bowden, Mark. 2001. Killing Pablo: the hunt for the world's greatest outlaw. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press.
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To understand the nature of the paramilitary conflict in the city of Medellin it is
important to understand that the paramilitary group Bloque Cacique Nutibara
BCN entered into the DDR process as the result of an amalgamation of a
multiplicity of actors and groups. (Alonso and Valencia 2007)1" They define this
process as a complex process of annihilation, negotiation, absorption,
domination and contracts between the four lines of the war in Medellin: the
auto defensas, the narcotraffic, the bandas (gangs) and the militia-linked
guerrillas.
These illegal armed groups that were and are part of the national conflict had
historically used the social capital of youth (youth gangs) in poor neighborhoods
in Medellin as a way to supply their armies and control their territories. In 2000
it was estimated that there were around 8,000 youths linked to criminal gangs
in Medellin.19 The total population of Medellin in 2000 was short of 2 million.
That is one gang member per 250 inhabitants.
This population of youth gang members would change affiliation from the
organized sicarios (hitmen or hityouth) of Pablo Escobar (1989-1993) to the
Oficina of Envigado (1991-present) to the militias of the FARC (1994-2002) to
the multiplicity of paramilitary groups that colonized Medellin (1999-2003).
National and local armed organizations derived their soldiers from the same
source: gang youth in Medellin. Amnesty International (2005) denounced this 95
process of recruiting gangs as operatives of larger political armed groups.20 This
also exposes the fragility of the AUC power structure and explains some of the
failure of the DDR process in maintaining demobilized members' commitment
to the DDR goals.
The use of youth in poor neighborhoods as capital for armed organizations has
been documented by many others. This phenomenon of the fragmentation of
the illegal arm groups is what Alonso (2008) calls competencia armada 21 and
helps to explain some of the failures of AUC-DDR process and also the lack of
political control over the nature of the violence in Colombia and in particular in
18 Manuel Alberto Alonso Espinal , Germ6n Dario Valencia Agudelo Balance del proceso de
Desmovilizaci6n, Desarme y Reinserci6n (DDR) de los bloques Cacique Nutibara y Heroes de
Granada en la ciudad de Medellin. Universidad de Antioquia. Instituto de Estudios Poli ticos ISSN
0121-5167 No 33, Medellin, July December 2008, 11-34.
19 Juan Carlos Velez Rinc6n, "Conflicto y Guerra: la lucha por el orden en Medellin," Estudios
Politicos, January-June 2001.
20 Amnesty International. "Colombia: The Paramilitaries in Medellin: Demobilization or
Legalization? I Amnesty International." Amnesty International I Working to Protect Human
Rights. http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR23/019/2005 (accessed May 18, 2010).
21 Romero, Mauricio, and Le6 n Valencia 2007. Paraporl tica /a ruta de la expansi6 n paramilitar y
los acuerdos poiticos Bogota, D.C., Colombia: Intermedio.
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Medellin. The single negotiation process missed the roots of the conflict; it did
not deal with the fact that individuals aligned with these organizations are
prone to change affiliations because their alliances are more economical than
political. Their alliances are based on individuals seeing illegal organizations as a
way to provide a means of subsistence through the "rent seeking"22 approaches
of the political armed organizations. This explains in part why in Medellin
members of the AUC continue some of the same -rent seeking practices but with
new apolitical affiliations. One important element that allowed this fluctuation
of new armed organizations within the urban sphere is the lack of state
presence and control over the territories where these youth live. This state
isolation of these areas from the state facilitated control by repressive means of
new groups explained in chapter 2.
Beyond the multiple critiques of the DDR process in Colombia, and the
confirmed irregularities of the process, Spagat (2006) concluded that "One key
result of this work is that the average demobilization, of which there have been
37 so far, lowers the homicide rate by (a statistically significant) 13% in the area
of operation of the demobilized group. A further calculation indicates that
between 1400 and 2800 homicides have been averted so far due to the
cumulative effect of all completed demobilizations. Thus, paramilitary DDR has
paid dividends for Colombia."
Conclusion
In general the DDR process in Medellin was not an isolated event in history. The
continuous existence of gangs that affiliate or are absorbed by prevalent illegal
armed groups make these areas prone to eruptions of violence in the present
and in the future. What is clear is that the majority of the demobilized members
inhabit the neighborhoods where the policies and projects were implemented
(Comuna 1 ended with 527 demobilized members with 527) See table 4. Thus,
these policies and projects are an important factor in the lowering levels of
conflict. The pacts that were agreed upon in the beginning of the Fajardo
administration resulted in a reduction of conflicts, permitting the development
of strategic municipal projects. The reinforcement program that followed the
22 Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others without
making any contribution to productivity, such as by gaining control of land and other pre-existing
natural resources, or by imposing burdensome regulations or other government decisions that
may affect consumers or businesses.
23 Spagat, Michael. "COLOMBIA'S PARAMILITARY DDR: QUIET AND TENTATIVE SUCCESS." CERAC
Centro de Recursos para el Analisis de Conflictos. 2006.
www.cerac.org.co/pdf/UNDPDDRV1.pdf (accessed January 13, 2010).
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individuals in the DDR process had mixed results, but compared with other
areas of the country it appears to have significantly reduced the negative
aspects associated with the DDR process in Colombia.
DDR and Amnesty (De-mobilization in Colombia)
AUC % FARK, ELN, others %
Colombia 31.637 16.238
Antioquia 8.727 28%
Medellin 4.320 13% 851 5%
Table 1 National policy on reinsertion. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin.24
Level of Education Achieved
Not finished Primaria
Primaria
Not finished High school
High school
Technical school
College
14
25
44
14
2
1
Table 2 Level of education of the participants in the DDR process. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin.
Modelo de intervenci6n: Regreso a La Legalidad
Intervention Model: Return to Legality
24 Resumen General Marzo de 2009 Secretaria De Gobierno: Programa Paz Y Reconciliaci6n, Modelo de
Intervenci6n "Regreso a La Legalidad," Reintegraci6n Social Y Econ6mica. J6venes En Alto Riesgo Poblaci6n
Corcelaria y Pospenados. Jorge Gaviria V6|ez
25 Ibid Jorge Gaviria Velez
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DDR AUC paramilitares
Ex AUC Total
Ex AUC active in program
Detain
Expelled
Dead
4316
3723
189
86
258
Other Process of de-militarization
Desmovilizados (Guerrilla)
J6venes en Alto Riesgo
Poblacidn carcelaria (Internas)
Poblaci6n carcelaria (Internos)
Poblaci6n Excarcelada y Pospenados
Table 3 Medellin: location of demobilized population as of December 2007
Comuna
Comuna 1
Comuna 13
Comuna 8
Comuna 3
Comuna 5
Comuna 6
Comuna 7
Bloque
Cacique
Nutibara
176
21
99
97
8
46
0
Bloque
Heroes de
Granada
245
Others Total
106 527
68 90 179
117 108 324
275 118 490
36 168 212
51 151 248
Table 4 Distribution of Demobilized and Amnesty Individuals per Comuna. Source: Alcaldia de
Medellin, 2007.
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86.3
4.4
2.0
6.0
851
1178
387
5639
359
12
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
Planning and Decision Making Process for Public Projects:
Presupuesto Participativo PP, (Participative Budget PB)
A second set of policies important to the implementation of the Medellin
transformation was the policy of public budgeting, Fajardo's administration
publicized its work as collaboration between the citizens and the administration.
The Participative Budget PB was one of the two tools that the administration
used to achieve this goal.
The strategies of the PB were first implemented in Brazil in the municipality of
Porto Alegre in 1986. This project was widely publicized as a best practice and
became popular in many European and Latin American cities. The first PB
experience in Medellin was implemented from 1997 to 2000 but some failures
of the procedure did not permit their sustainability. In 2004 it was re introduced
in Medellin. In the context of Colombia, the PB strategy had been introduced
in different scales since 1986. At the moment these strategies were
implemented in Medellin, the PB had already been implemented in cities like
27 99Pasto, Bogota, Caramanta, Risaralda, Tolima and others. 2 The introduction of a
participative budget in Medellin has had mixed results.
The PB tried to accomplish the goals of the new development plan of the city:
Legality and self regulation of the state, administration transparency and fight
against corruption, efficacy and sustainability, social inclusion, integration of the
community with the city and democratic governability. The PB is seen as a way
to strengthen local democratic organizations such as the Junta de Accion
Comuna JAC, Enviromentalist groups, NGOs.
26 The PB is an "instrument of annual planning, to help prioritize the demands of the city,
providing in theory universal access by the population to the decisions of the city. It is a space of
"co-gesti6n," a term which means the community and the municipality together decide a portion
of the investments. PROGRAMA DE PLANEACION Y PRESUPUESTO PARTICIPATIVO 2004-2007.
Alcaldia de Medellin
27 G6 mez Hern ndez Esperanza. 2007. El presupuesto participativo entre democracia, pobreza y
desarrollo. 15: 0121-3261.
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Methodology
The PB is implemented in 5 different phases over the period of one year in each
comuna. Not all comunas participated in the PB, but rather only those that
already had an organizational system like the JAC, such as Comuna 1, 2 and 13.
Phase 1 Participation of the community in the City
Development Plan and institution of the PP team
Phase 2 Systematization of the diagnostic of the territory
Phase 3 Analysis and diagnostic of the territory (Comunas Creation of the Consejos
and Corregimientos). Creation of organizational Consultivos Comunales y
support Corregimentales (CCC-C)
Phase 4 Prioritization and approval of the operational Democratic elections of
budget for the next year delegates.
Phase 5 Evaluation and systematization
Table 5 Phases of PB Source. Alcaldia de Medellin.
Operational structure
All local organizations (NGOs, churches, minority racial groups, sport teams, etc)
that operate in the territory of the Comuna or Corregimienton were invited to
participate in the PB as part of the Consultive Council CCC-C. This served as a
democratic process that prioritized and distributed the funds allowed per year
to their comuna or corregimiento. The CCC-C submit their decision to the
Municipal council of the participative budget that authorizes the relinquishing of
funds through contracts to the organizations that fill the contractual
requirements established by law and that are approved by each CCC-C. The
budget of the PB was 7% of the city budget. Carolina G6mez (2007) evaluated
the process of the PB in Medellin and made conclusions at three levels
operational, methodological and political.
28 Corregimiento: is another territorial distribution of the city similar to the comuna. It is a
designation on an area outside of the urban areas of the city.
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Operational Level
Gomez highlights that in the planning process of the PB the communities could
have direct contact with the mayor and that there were a series of
methodologies of communication that enabled participation. Gomez (2007)
concludes that the most critical aspect was the executions of contracts, because
the process necessary to use the funds of the state required the companies to
execute the projects with a level of expertise that only benefited companies like
NGO's and universities. And also, there were not efficient ways to measure the
relative success. 29
Methodology
Gomez concludes that the policies created to implement the PB were written by
experts and required special technocratic knowledge to understand them. This
condition made it possible for the technocrats of the municipal administration
to maintain all control over the participative process. My interviews in January
2010 reveal that organizations actively participating in the PB have long-term
visions and that many PBs had opted to use funds to generate local plans that
were guided toward a long-term interventions in the territory.3" This then
contradicts Gomez's findings.
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Political Level
The PB created a consultative space where the community prioritized their
needs. This space is different from the ones previously allowed by the state. In
general, 32 there is a significant correlation between what was agreed in the
CCCC with the priorities of their respective comunas. Although Gomez is
cautioning that the needs identified in the PBs are quite general like housing,
health, education, etc.
29 Success of the projects cannot be measure because the initial conditions were not appropriated
measured. The only way to officially measure was through the evaluations of results of the
participations of the type of proposals and the distribution of resources of the 7% of the municipal
budget of 60.000 millions in 2005 increased to 62.000 in 2006.
30 Gomez concludes that the PB reactivated the Consejo Consultivo de Comunas y Corregimientos
(CCC-C) like the efforts of the CEAP, but that the year-long methodology undermined long-term
planning. This in turn weakened these institutions.
3 Also, even as the influx of budget came in year-long time limits, the allocation of funds seemed
also to be recurrent to specific local projects. This undermines Gomez conclusions about the lack
of a long term vision.
32 The community interviews conducted by Gomez's showed that 43% of the community
investments meet satisfactorily priorities established by the PB.
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The Comuna 1 for example used $570 million pesos of their PB on 110
scholarships for college education. All scholarships are condonable (they are not
paid if the student obtains his/her degree) and students have to commit to do
120 hours of community service each semester. 33 Gomez critiques this approach
in two ways. One critique is that the technocratic development of the strategies
sometimes directs these initiatives to fulfill goals established by the state34
rather than neighborhood goals. (Garcia, Veedurla de Medellin, 2005)"' The
second critique is that the PP is fulfilling functions that should be covered by the
state, like paying for community planning where 80% of the investment went.
Conclusions
The PB was instrumental in the process of transformation of the city in 3 ways:
The planning instrument of the PB helped to empower those organizations that
were working in the community or the political order like JAC, or traditional
neighborhood NGOs. Individuals associated with these groups often expressed
satisfaction with the PB process, because provide support for the continuation
of their organizational goals. These organizations required the economical
support of the PB, however, interviewees did not feel this was a major factor in
their support for the program. Rather, they support the program because it
"has had a lot of influence in the way leaders of the neighborhood interact with
each other, leaders and groups that did not like each other now have to work
together and this has changed the mentality of the leaders from the closed
circle of their action to think in terms of comuna. We know and acknowledge
each other."36 This in my opinion is the most important goal achieved by the
3 CVN Centro Virtual de noticias. "CVN - Gracias al presupuesto participativo, 110
j6venes de la comuna # 1 podran financiar sus estudios de educaci6n superior." Untitled
Document. http://www.mineducacion.gov.co/cvn/1665/article-88220.html (accessed
May 18, 2010).
34 This goals of the state are in return ways to comply with the goals imposed by international
organizations like the World Bank and others,
3s Veeduria de Medellin. (2005). Entrevista a Orlando Garcia. En: Programa radial OJO a Nuestra
Ciudad. Julio 8. Medellin. Documento memoria. "inicialmente el presupuesto se fue todo para
Educaci6n Tecnica y Tecnol6gica, pero nosotros lo que queriamos era que avanzaramos hacia que
esta comunidad tambien tuviera universitarios en las distintas universidades, tanto piblicas como
privadas."
36 carmona , Juan David . Interview by author. Personal interview. comuna 13, Medellin,
Colombia, January 11, 2010.
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program. On the other hand, the complexity of the policy, the technocratic
design, and the contracting requirements to access the PB funds makes it
virtually impossible for individuals outside of knowledgeable organizations to
access the funds on their own, and so the program can not include the entire
population of the affected area. From this point of view, it has become a
segregation tool.
Banco de los Pobres -A New Finance Strategy
A third set of policies important to the transformation of Medellin is the Banco
de los Pobres, or the bank of the poor. This is a new banking structure created
by the municipality that provides micro credits in marginalized areas of the city
and promotes entrepreneurial projects. The goal of this Bank has been to create
and strengthen the productive activities of people who are in a lower income
bracket.
This project of the Alcaldia de Medellin, was managed through the Social
Development Secretary. It seeks to grant alternatives to financing community
member projects by means of small credits that can be paid in flexible time
frames. This financing provides the generation of income and the improvement 103
of the quality of life of the communities that belong to high vulnerability areas
in the municipality of Medellin. The credits assigned by the Banco de los Pobres
are directed to owners of small businesses or a business district of usually
informal economies. To have access to the credits, users must be from lower
socio-economic levels (1, 2 or 3) and be residents of Medellin. 1
The Banco de los Pobres has four strategies that, as a whole, work to strengthen
microcredit:
*Credit lines
eCenter of Business Development of the Zone, CEDEZO (Spanish)
*Microcredit Network
*Seed Capital Contest
"This bank program started in 2002 and as of March 2010 has 5,300 credits for a total of 11,400
million pesos (US$4,222,000) from those credits. Eighty-five percent of the bank's users have
never had any other history of credit. The bank calculates that these credits have benefited a
population of more than 25,000 people. The credits fluctuate between $129 to $1,296 dollars. The
project is self sustainable thanks to the annual interest rate of 11% that covers overhead of the
bank." Ciudades para un Futuro mes Sostenible,
Departamento de Urbanistica y Ordenaci6n del Territorio,
Escuela Tecnica Superior de Arquitectura de Madrid -- Universidad Politecnica de Madrid --
Ministerio de Vivienda, 2004
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Conclusion
This project is important because it provides financial coverage for populations
that not have access to formal credits. One of the large achievements of this
Banco de los Pobres was that it has been awarded the qualification of good
practice in 2004 by the Best Practices Database of the UN-Habitat. But at a close
look the achievements of the program at the scale of the neighborhood is not
easy to measure, but it is observed that during the urban transformation of
neighborhoods that were part of PUI and focus of this study, local business
along important corridors of the comunas grew by 300%. This shows an
important increase in the number of entrepreneurial companies. But a direct
correlation of this influx of new micro business and the flux of small credits is
not clear.
Social Urbanism (Urbanismo Social)
Another important policy During the Sergio Fajardo Administration was the
creation of a new urban philosophy called; Urbanismo Social (Social Urbanism)
this term was coined at the Company of Urban Development EDU. This term
was appropriated to describe the social implications of the physical
interventions that the city was making. It is important because this concept
explains the change in the physical investment strategy of the city. The next
chapter (4) surveys those physical interventions that are a part of this social
urbanism concept thinking.
I examine this concept of "Urbanismo Social" or Social Urbanism as applied to
the socio-political and urban transformations performed from 2003 to the
present in the city of Medellin. Under this umbrella term of social urbanism, I
combine the political line that created Medellin, la cuidad mas educada with the
thinking of other groups and institutions who are not affiliated with this political
line but sympathize with its goals. Urbanismo Social is a concept that tries to
universalize the learning experiences of the case of Medellin so that it can be
exported in terms of its basic principles to other contexts worldwide.
The term Urbanismo Social was coined by Alejandro Echeverry, then Fajardo's
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newly appointed Director of the Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano, or EDU.3
38 Alejandro Echeverri, architect (Medellin, 1962), graduated in 1987 from the Universidad
Pontificia Bolivariana (UPB) in Medellin (Colombia) and studied from 1998 to 2000 in the Urban
Studies Doctoral Program at the Barcelona Advanced Technical School of Architecture (ETSAB). He
was a professor at the UPB and director of the UPB Architectural Studies Group, as well as a
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Echeverry is a well known Medellin architect who was also politically affiliated
with Fajardo and his Independent Party. Echeverry and European-educated
urbanist and professor of architecture at the Univesidad Pontifica Bolivariana in
Medellin, had lead a research team studying what role architecture should play
in the improvement of living conditions in poor neighborhoods. For years, he
explored how to use physical forms to improve informal communities and
incorporated previous experiences of governmental and NGOs projects in these
Medellin communities. To do this he led studios of students who designed
projects for these informal communities. These projects were not intended to
be built, but rather to create theoretical models to study. His diverse group of
researchers, professionals and students came from multiple disciplinary
backgrounds. Echeverry,39 sees architecture as a fundamental tool to make
transformations at many levels in the city. "In the transformation of the city
there are many components and one really important one is the physical one,"
he says. "It [the physical component] is not the most important, but it is a really
important one. It is a great tool to activate the participation of the community,
and to generate places of encounter."4
A core issue in Echeverry's thinking is the quality of the architecture. This
perception of quality and how quality will affect the feelings of the inhabitants
where the interventions were to be implemented became a central component
of the social urbanism discourse "To us," said Echeverry in an interview for this 105
study, "the issue of dignity and pride was one of the most important elements
of the interventions. Building in the poorest parts of the city with the highest
quality and with the best architects was not an issue of secondary
importance."41
visiting professor in Urban Studies at ETSAB in 1999. His work received recognition in 1996, when
he was awarded the Fernando Martinez Sanabria National Architecture Prize in 1996 from the
Colombian Architecture Society, the same year in which he won honorable mention at the X
Panamerican Biennial Architecture Exhibition in Quito, Ecuador. He has won several national
architecture and urban design contests, the last of which is a first place award in the National
Contest for the Reorganization of the Aburra River basin and the Tres Aguas park, in Caldas
Antioquia, in 2006. He has been on the jury panels of several national and international contests,
including the XVIII National Architecture Biennial of the Colombian Association of Architects in
2002, in the Architectural Design and Urban Design categories. He has spoken at national and
international conferences and worked as a private consultant in the fields of architecture, urban
design and territorial planning for several Colombian cities. He was Director of Urban Planning for
the municipality of Medellin from 2005 to 2007 and General Director of the Enterprise for Urban
Development (EDU) of the municipality of Medellin from 2004 to 2005, during the administration
of Mayor Sergio Fajardo.
39 Echeverry, Alejandro . Interview by author. Personal interview. Poblado, Medellin, Colombia,
January 7, 2010. Translations from Spanish to English are by the author unless otherwise noted.
40 Ibid. (Alejandro Echeverry Ex director of the EDU 2004-2007)
41 Ibid. (Alejandro Echeverry Ex director of the EDU 2004-2007)
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In addition, the architecture and urban interventions were seen as a way of
democratizing or homogenizing the city through having equitable distribution of
public infrastructure, breaching the social gap. "When we review the territory of
Medellin, we realize that the territory is segregated in terms of [differing] levels
of opportunities provided to the population. In the places where there are the
least opportunities, are the populations who are the most marginalized of the
city." (Echeverry, 2010)42 This mapping of opportunities, or lack thereof, in the
territory became the navigation chart that guided where and how the
interventions needed to be implemented.
In emerging literature about this Medellin case,4 3 "Urbanismo Social" is
understood as a philosophical approach to interventions in the city that are
aimed at improving the conditions of poor neighborhoods through high quality
architecture and urban design that is the result of a bottom-up design strategy.
This approach in Medellin represents the first time the community has been
involved-in direct collaboration with the government- in the process of
decisions making of their environment.
In reality this "Urbanismo Social" is indeed a re-urbanization strategy that
intends to deliver a higher quality of architecture and urban interventions to the
city in general but particularly to the poorest areas of the city traditionally
abandoned by the state. While citizens are involved, and there are many levels
of participation in the Urbanismo Social, it is far removed from the idea of a
bottom-up approach as might be defined in wealthier countries with high levels
of community participation as part of the planning process. The Urbanismo
Social is still a "top down" design approach, performed by the educated elites
guided toward the poor. Nevertheless, this process, in the context of the city of
Medellin is radical. It is radical in the sense that the government is working
directly and intensely with residents of poor communities building public
infrastructure with a higher level of quality than the state has ever done before.
42 Juan Diego Lopera, Sub director departamento de Planeaci6n Medellin. Lopera, Juan Diego.
Interview by author. Personal interview. Alcaldia de Medellin, Medellin, Colombia, January 7,
2010.
43 Ge rarj Martin , and Diego Corrales. "Urbanismo Social." In Medelfi n: transformaci6 n de una
ciudad. Medelfi n: Alcalci a de Medellin., 2009. 106.
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Selection of the Interventions: Indice de Desarrollo Humano
(IDH) Indice de Calidad de Vida (ICV)
Social Urbanism intends to distribute homogeneous opportunities throughout
the geography on the city in terms of equal access to the city public
infrastructure. To understand which areas in which the city was required to
invest to achieve this homogenous city infrastructure, the city needed an index
to evaluate levels of equity in the territory.
In an Acuerdo" enacted May 31, 2004, the Consejo de Medellin adopted the
Development plan for the 2004-2007 period which declared that it would use
two measures to verify whether proposed project initiatives were improving
the quality of life of the citizens: The Indice de Calidad de Vida ICV (quality-of-
life index) and Indice de Desarrollo Humano IDH (Human Development Index).
This Acuerdo established that when these indicators are mapped over the
territory of the city, the city resources should be geared toward the areas with
lower IDH and ICV, to maximize their impact. In other words, priority should be
given to those areas with the lowest indicators to obtain larger marginal
benefits. This statement gave cart blanc to the mayor's office to intervene in
those areas of the city where the state had never intervened before. This 107
radically changed the investment pattern that the city had followed for
decades.45
Gomez (2007) critiques the process of use the IHD and ICV as instrumental
figures to decide and evaluate the success of the strategies implemented by the
administration.46 She concludes that there are significant limitations in using
these techniques to evaluate the actual success or failure of the administration,
given the fact that the surveys' measurements are performed in areas where
44 An Acuerdo is a law at the Municipal level.
4s See chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of the history of state involvement in these
parts of Medellin and its surrounding municipalities since the city's foundation.
46 Lo que se logra inferir es que el gobierno municipal sustenta su gesti6n en indicadores
universales, como el IDH y el ICv, y de datos del Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n-DNP, que
son aplicados en la encuesta de calidad de vida, y retoman las recomendaciones del programa
MECOVI del BID, del Banco Mundial, la CEPAL y el DNP para medir educaci6n, salud, vivienda,
medio ambiente, servicios piblicos, etc., mediante una encuesta de percepci6n ciudadana con
individuos de diversos estratos sociales, con la cual no se logra saber que ha pasado en las
personas en situaci6n de desplazamiento, los sin vivienda, sin empleo, sin acceso a salud publica,
etc., porque las informaciones del gobierno son en terminos de gesti6n, mas no de evaluaci6n
comparativa con la situaci6n inicial.
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there are economically heterogeneous
of those who are more marginalized.
'ft
groups. These surveys hide the opinions
Figure 3 ICv and IDG 2002 Medellin. Lighter colors represent less quality of the indicator measure in both
diagrams. Comunas 1 and 2 appear to have the lowest level in terms of these indicators of quality. Source:
Alcaldia de Medellin.
This measuring strategy has been instrumental in bringing larger resources of
the state to areas neglected for decades; but it has its limitations. These
limitations include the one that Gomez argues above as well as others I have
encountered in my own research. The measurements of the territory are made
at a Comuna scale and not in terms of smaller neighborhood divisions.
Therefore, the measurement favors more economically homogenous comunas
like 1 and 2 that only had lower estratos 1 and 2,4 but in areas with a more
heterogeneous estratos like the comuna 13, where you can find up to estrato 4
(upper middle class), this disparity cancels the actual measure. This makes
difficult to assess the effectiveness of the projects implemented and also hides
Estratos: Socio economic strata: is a tool of the Colombian government (Ley 142 de 1994,
Articulo 102 ) to classify real estate properties in accordance with the classification of the DANE
that evaluate the real estate unit based on poverty level, public services, location, indigenous
population and others. This classification determines the level of taxation, the fare of public
services (water, energy, phone and gas), access to the free health services, fares at public
universities, poverty alleviation programs etc. In most cases estratos 1 and 2 get service subsidies
from the upper estratos 4, 5 and 6.
. ...........
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the actual lack quality of life in communities with mixed incomes levels
(estratos).This contradiction in the measurement is acknowledged in my
interviews with individuals in the City of Medellin Planning Department.
The limitation of the scale of measurement of the Indexes also justifies why the
city intervenes more strongly in the comunas 1 and 2 than in other areas like
comuna 13 because these comunas (1 and 2) being at the bottom of all indexes
and homogeneous in their composition the mayor office can show more clearly
measure the improvement. In the end, this has meant that the PUI of the
comuna 13 (a more diverse and politically sensitive area) is still being executed
and planned, making in my opinion the projects implemented there less
effective.
Conclusion
The instrument of the IHD and ICV has been important in directing where the
intervention of the city needs to be placed. But it has limitations in mapping the
real situation of the territory. Besides the flaws in survey techniques that other
authors have highlighted, the scale of the measurement generalizes
heterogeneous territories and thus hides valuable information. I concluded that
it is necessary to find tools of measurement that account for simultaneous and
diverse scales that could produce a clearer image of the actual state of the
territory. The scale of the neighborhood could provide a more accurate 109
measure, but other scales should also be evaluated and contrasted with each
other.
Also, this kind of territorial measuring tool hides interactions at the borders of
the neighborhood polygons and the overspill effects of the interventions in
adjacent areas. It is indifferent then whether the strategic infrastructure is
placed on the border of regions or in the polygon's center. The inability of the
current indexes to measure these nuances, in my opinion, has permitted the
placement of some infrastructure (like the case of the Parque Bibliotecas San
Javier in Comuna 13) in areas that are better off than the rest of the
neighborhood. While this intervention of a Parque Biblioteca provided much-
needed resources to the area, it is important to point out that it was not built in
the areas with absolute lack of state services where the project would have had
a larger positive impact.
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EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellin (ENTERPRISE OF
URBAN DEVELOPMENT -EDU-)
Once the areas of the city where infrastructure was needed were selected, the
Mayor's office needed an institution to plan and execute the infrastructure
projects. For this task the city of Medellin selected an already existing entity
that had a bad reputation (because its institutional independence had permitted
corruption) but that had the necessary institutional independence to be able to
negotiate with the multiplicity of actors, groups, companies and institutions that
needed to make projects on the selected territory. This entity was the EDU
Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellin (Enterprise of Urban Development -
EDU).
The EDU was created originally in 1993 to develop a parcel of land remaining
from a failed urban renewal project in downtown Medellin. Modified in 1995,
the ENTERPRISE OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT (EDU) the city endowed it with
administrative and financial autonomy and with its own assets to undertake
development of urban and real estate projects "for the improvement of the city
of Medellin and the welfare of its citizens."48
This kind of institutional autonomy is similar to the one applied to other
successful companies owned by the municipality, the EPM, which is the 7th
most profitable company in Colombia and has the 2nd largest number of assets
in the country. This permits the companies to compete for the profits of the
market and benefits from the support of the municipality as a partner. In return,
profits from these companies get reinvested in the company or enter into the
budget of the municipality.
At the moment Sergio Fajardo become mayor of Medellin, the EDU institutional
autonomy became a perfect instrument to make possible the intense urban
transformation he and his team intended. A large percentage of the
administrative positions at the EDU are filled by academics from the
architectural schools of Medellin, especially the private architecture school the
Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, and members of the research team lead by
Alejandro Echeverria. The decision to use the EDU (which before Fajardo was
considered a beacon of corruption) as a vehicle for the Mayor's policies was
4 EDU. "Origen." EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano Medellin . www.edu.gov.co/
(accessed February 4, 2010).
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made because the agency had contractual autonomy. This contractual
autonomy permitted the company to be exempt of many bureaucratic
restrictions that the departments and secretarias of the municipality have. And
the ability of the Mayor to appoint his director and personnel gave this office
the necessary communication mechanism and the ability to maintain the
necessary control over it. This move in turn would reduce bureaucracy and
decrease planning and development time of the projects.
The objectives of the EDU are:
* Develop and Execute Integral Urban Projects, strategic for the
realization of the Development Municipal Plan (POT).
* To carry out the articulation of the different sectors and the inter-
institutional coordination.
* Promote the participation of the private sector in real estate projects.
* Promote citizen participation.
* To be an efficient, effective transparent and profitable company.
This strategic move created an autonomous company with the power and
academic knowledge of decades of research of its new directors and
administrative staff to transform the city. Today the EDU has more than 400 m
employees in 14 different locations all over Medellin. The EDU is in charge of
developing all projects of the city included the integral urban projejct (PUI). The
next chapter focuses on each one of the projects developed by the EDU that
have relevance for this study because they were implemented in the most
marginalized and violent areas of the city.
Inside the EDU works very similar to an architectural company, because most of
its employees (70% approximate) and administrators are in fact architects,
designing and administrating the construction of a multiplicity of projects. The
other group of professionals at the EDU-lawyers, social workers and
engineers-are a minority. This reflects the power relationships involved in the
inner-workings of the EDU company. The architectural discourse and jargon
(more in favor of the object than the social or legal) dominate the
communications with the public. Frequently these EDU architects use the
English word "render" to talk about computer generated three-dimensional
images.
From the policies reviewed, I concluded that the DDR, even as a failed project
contributed to the lower homicide rate in Medellfn and opened the door to a
series of projects and polices implemented during the Fajardo administration.
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The new tools to measure the needs of the city (the ECV and the ICH) engaged
with the mission of the Fajardo political party to invest in infrastructure in the
city's poorest communities and the reinforcement. The independent company
of the EDU made it possible for the Mayor's office to implement these projects
by being able to bypass many bureaucratic procedures that a state entity would
have had to wade through.
Chapter 4
"Medellin, la cuidad mds educada" Physical
Transformations
Along with the policies described in the previous chapter a fundamental
strategy of the Sergio Fajardo administration was the use of physical projects to
transfor-socially and physically- the city. This chapter describes the projects
most relevantfor this study that were undertaken between 2004 and 2007.
These projects, planned and executed by Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano EDU
(Enterprise of Urban Development), are described below:
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1. Parques Bibliotecas (Library Parks) represent every goal that the program
of Medellin, la ciudad mas educada was trying to achieve. They became the
flagships of the Mayoral campaign's intervention.
2. Colegios de Calidad (Quality Schools) and the relocation or renovation of
schools reveal this campaign's new approach to educational facilities'
quality in terms of design, building materials, and location.
3. Centro de Atencidn Inmediata CAI (Center of Immediate Attention CAl) are
police centers which exemplify the new approach to security, a project
which was actually the rebirth of an old but previously failed idea.
4. The CEDEZOs Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal Local (Centers for
Enterprise Development) are a non aggressive presence of the state in the
informal settlement territory.
5. Proyecto Urbano Integral PUI (Integral Urban Project), large-scale
integrated urban projects (PUI) in the city's most marginalized areas, is the
most important physical interventions in the case of Medellin.
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Parques Bibliotecas PBs (Library Parks)
The Parques Bibliotecas (PB) projects became the flagship for Sergio Fajardo's
campaign. They represented every goal that the program of "Medellin, la ciudad
mas educada" was trying to achieve-physical interventions in the most poor
communities with the best standards that the city can produce-providing
educational services to the community free of cost and revitalizing newly
created public space.
What are the Parques Bibliotecas? These are not your average libraries. The 5
Parques Bibliotecas are state-of-the-art spaces with internet rooms, reading
lounges, theaters, and outdoor open plazas with 360* views of the Andes
mountains encircling the city down below. They have been built in communities
that for as long as forty years had been isolated from educational resources.
Now, they are where community learns, socializes and finds moments of quiet
peace. They are a spaces open to everybody.
The Parques Bilbliotecas are buildings that contain a small collection of books
and that operate as community centers that provide space and activities 365
days of the year and over extended hours. These services are targeted to all age
brackets; most of the educational services are geared toward providing spaces
and activities to fill after-school time for the grade-school population, and to
provide entertainment and training and community space for the rest of the
population. Each parque biblioteca is visited by a staggering 1,500-2,000 people
per day. The parques are also hubs to deploy multiple programs of the different
Secretarias' of the municipal administration. The installations of the Parques are
used by the community, but also by the city in general as a network for events
at the city level. For example, the BID (International Development Bank)
convention in 2009 that included visitors such as the former U.S. President Bill
Clinton, was held in all of the 5 parques bibliotecas. The city has a plan to build 5
more parques bibliotecas; 3 of them start construction in 2010.
The 5 Parques Bibliotecas used 5 percent (186,000 million Colombian pesos or
$93 million U.S. dollars) of the 5-billion pesos investment budget of the city and
were designed through a public competition among some of the most
renowned architects of the city and country. This assured a level of quality of
the design that has not been seen ever in these communities. The Parque
Biblioteca Espaa, designed by the architect Giancarlo Mazzanti, won the 2008
1 A Secretaria is a department branch of the Municipality. The Medellin Mayor's office
has 10 Secretarias and 1 Department.
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Figure 1 Parque Biblioteca
Spain, park at the entrace
of the library source: Jota
Samper
lberoamerican Architecture Biennial award. 2 This award in a way confirms the
Mayor's claims that these buildings were the best buildings that the city could
produce.
Upfitting funding for the parques bibliotecas came from different sources like
the Japanese government for the Belen parque biblioteca and the Crown of
Spain for the library in Santo Domingo. In the latter case, Spain sent the King
and Queen of Spain to the inaugural day and naming of the library. This was the
first time the Royal Crown-in the entire history of colonization-had ever
travelled to Colombia. They climbed the hills of Comuna 1 and 2 (historically the
most dangerous neighborhood in what had been the world's most dangerous
city) in the recently opened Metro Cable. This involved 400 men from the Spain
Secret Service and the re-routing of all metro trains in the metropolitan area. In
the interviews for this study, a community member remembered this day as
"when the King and Queen came here . . . and they did not really come to
Medellin, they came here to Santo Domingo." 3 Other libraries received
equipment donated from large private companies in Medellin.
All libraries are administrated by the network of Cajas de Compensacion
Familiar, or FAMILY COMPENSATION FUNDS, a Colombian type of government-
regulated NGO. A Caja de Compensacion is a nonprofit company whose
objective is social disparity reduction through the redistribution of a percentage
of the income of all employees of the country. A caja de compensacion receives 115
a percentage of all employee incomes, and with that pool of money provides
public services that include healthcare, education, cultural programming,
housing, recreation, social loans, and job training. Over the Colombian territory
there are multiple Cajas de compensacion that compete with each other for
employers and employees subscriptions. All Colombian employees need by law
to subscribe to a Caja de Compensacion. The cajas grew out of partnerships
between the labor unions of the industrial companies in Medellin in the 1950's
and the local and then later national governments. The first Caja was
COMFAMA. The success of the project extended to the entire Colombian
territory.
2 Broome, Beth. "Parque Biblioteca Espaha I Project Portfolio I Architectural Record."
Architecture Design for Architects I Architectural Record.
http://archrecord.construction.com/projects/portfolio/archives/0811parque-1.asp
(accessed May 1, 2010).
3 The social contradictions of this type of cultural re-conquest or at least imperialism of
the Spanish Crown in this visit to one of its long lost colonies are a worthy subject of a
larger discussion that is absent from this study.
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This decision regarding what mechanism would be the most efficient to manage
the Parques Bibliotecas made sense given that the Cajas de Compensation
already provided most of these services to the income bracket where the areas
of the PB were located. The Cajas already operated in areas where there had
never before been a permanent presence of the state or the legal security
services. COMFAMA staff had negotiated with community and local armed
groups. This allowed them, over the years, to build facilities and create
important community alliances and to gain the expertise and the trust of both
the municipality and the communities where the Parques Bibliotecas were
placed. The PBs are different from the facilities managed and owned by the
Cajas de Compensation, where services are provided for charge or subsidized
based on worker's affiliation. The Parques Bibliotecas offered for the first time
the opportunity to access services of education, internet and recreation without
any cost and without restrictions given to one's economic status. Being able to
access, for the first time in their life, training on how to use and then actually
use a computer, without being judged for their economic background, is a
recurrent theme in my on-the-ground interviews. Unemployment rates in
Comuna 1 and 2 reach as high as 60 percent and main sources of employment
are informal. This makes the majority of the population ineligible to be affiliated
with cajas de compensacion because they do not have formal employment. The
introduction of a state-funded public building like a Parque Biblioteca,
specifically in the area of study (Comuna 1 and 2) that provides access to the
entire community without cost, generates the necessary space for encounter
and deliberation and decision making about the collective. Also the negotiation
process between the government and different community groups regarding
the building of this PB in these Comunas (the Mesa de Trabajo Unidos por Santo
Domingo, Asociaci6n de Comerciantes y el Comite Visi6n Nororiental) "had
empowered such groups" 4 Restrepo et al. (2007) and positioned them as valid
and legal organizations in the neighborhood territory with sufficient power to
leverage municipal interest. In reality, this leverage is more a perception than a
real equivalence of power between the community (represented by local
organizations) and the municipal state (represented here by the EDU) in the
Integrated Urban Project PUI. But it is important to understand that a
negotiation process about the modification of the physical space in this comuna
4 Restrepo, Eliana. Thesis Parque Biblioteca Espaiia, Como Aporte Al Desarrollo Local.
Medelfi n: Instituci6n Universitaria Colegio Mayor De Antioquia, 2007.
Figure 2 Five Parques Bibliotecas:
Ladera, Spain, Madera, Belen and
San Javier. Source: Alcaldia de
Medellin.
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is happening for the first time through these interactions.5 This negotiation and
agreement process between the state and the community became the
document the Pacto Ciudadano (Citizen Pact) where negotiations about the
naming and initial contents of the libraries were decided.
The Parques Bibliotecas also replaced existing obsolete and historically
repressive infrastructure, like in the case of the Parque Biblioteca Belen and
Parque Biblioteca Ladera where the DAS (the Colombian equivelent of the U.S.
FBI) jailed political prisoners was replaced by Parque Bibliotecas. In Madera and
San Javier, the Parques Bibliotecas were placed in empty lots where before
gangs had occupied the spaces for illicit activities in the neighborhoods. The
Parque Biblioteca Espana in Santo Domingo, by contrast, displaced up to 50
families from a high-risk area next to a creek. This area is high risk because of
the danger of rain-induced landslides. The city had to find a place for the
relocation of these families. This process generated controversy and the Citizen
Pacts here were also instrumental in the final placement of the infrastructure
and relocating the families.
Each park generates its own zone of influence where an increased perception
of safety is generated. It also gave clear use to contested spaces that lacked real
security and were used for illicit practices. Today, before entering the Parque
Biblioteca Espaiha, the public needs to cross a small park with a fountain. This 117
area is recalled in my interviews with community members of the Comuna 2 as
the place where dead bodies appeared and killings were committed. "There was
so much violence in this neighborhood, there was so much death, that place
there," said one community member, pointing at the park where kids were
playing, "that was a dangerous hole. If this park could speak, it would say so
many terrible things."6
s Historically only wealthy neighborhood have been able to leverage power over project
decisions in their territory. In 1996, the Poblado (comuna 14) neighborhood stopped a
new road infrastructural project. Proyecto Transversal Intermedia.
6 Marin de Mesa, Luz Elena. Interview by author. Personal interview. Santo Domingo
Savio, Medellin, Colombia, July 21, 2009.
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Figure 3 Park in front of Parque Biblioteca Espana 2008. Source: Hector Javier Cruz
Finally, new policies and programs of the municipality were and continue to be
launched from these Parques Bibliotecas because of their strategic placement
inside the communities. Programs at national and local scales are run out of the
offices inside the Parques Bibliotecas, such as the Familias En Accion, economic
and social subsidies for low-income families at a national level and a similar local
subsidies programs like Medellin Solidaria. This association between these
beneficial programs of the municipality with the physical structure of the
buildings formalized a new positive relationship between the state and the
marginalized communities.
Conclusions
* The parques bibliotecas became an extension of the power of the state in
the areas where the state has never before had a permanent presence.
Even more importantly, this new permanent presence is non-aggressive and
non-repressive.
* The quality and city image that these buildings create made them ideal
places to hold important events at city scale like the BID (International
Development Bank) conference. These events incorporate these
............................................... .................................... 
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marginalized territories into the productive activities of the city. In this way,
these areas are recognized as vital to the wellbeing of the city in general.
* The Parques Bibliotecas have replaced some of the negative areas in terms
of violence or repression (by the state and illegal groups) with non-
aggressive, inclusive public spaces and buildings.
* The Parques Bibliotecas are seen as safe spaces vitalized by the constant
influx of people thanks to programs that happen in them during extended
hours. These PBs maintain an active street and public space around them.
. The parques bibliotecas as a physical space benefits the community through
the implementation of its (physical) space, programs and policies of the
state, which in turn, become an extension of programs that legitimize the
authority of the state in the neighborhood.
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Figure 4 Location Parques Bibliotecas overlaid on the ICv index. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
Colegios de Calidad (Quality Schools) and
reformed schools
The Colegios de Calidad (Quality Schools) and the relocation or renovation of
schools reveal the Sergio Fajardo mayor campaign's new approach to
educational facilities' quality in terms of design, building materials, and location.
This section describes the physical transformations of the traditional physical
structures of education and their new approach to quality of design. Two of the
most important examples of this approach were the new type of large-scale
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schools distributed throughout the city territory and the renovations of 141
existing schools to comply with new state standards of quality of education.
The Quality Schools were ten new schools built throughout the city with funding
from the service company EPM (energy, sewer, water, gas, phone, cable) which
is owned by the municipality. They are large educational facilities that
overshadowed in scale and design any of the existing public educational
facilities of the city. They set a new standard to which all existing public schools
would need to be upgraded to meet. In Colombia, public education usually is
located in and teaches members of poor communities. This new standard of
public education represented the first step in positioning public education at the
same level than private schools (which target families with medium and high
incomes).
Figure 5 Quality School San Antonio de Prado. Source: EDU
In 2005, the Empresas Publicas de Medellin (Public Businesses of Medellifn),7
was celebrating its 50th year of existence. The company offered Mayor Fajardo
7 Empresas P6blicas de Medellin (EPM) is a Colombian company that provides public services such
as water and gas. It was founded in 1955 and is the property of Medellin itself. It is the largest
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the possibility of making a gift to the city. The Mayor decided to use the funds
to create 10 new large schools in the city. Placement of these schools was again
based on the ICV and IDH indexes. The 10 Colegios de Calidad were the first new
public built schools in the city in 20 years. The scale of the schools was also
larger than previous facilities in the city. Ten schools is not a high percentage of
all public owned schools of the city. What is important about the introduction of
these new facilities is that they are a new way of understanding how the quality
of the education facilities should be measured and why.
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Figure 6 Colegio de Calidad comuna 1. Source: Alcalia de Medellin
Architects for these 10 schools were selected by the Mayor himself. Fajardo's
father was an architect and many of Fajardo's colleagues from his university and
professional life were architects. Fajardo asked the architects up front to only
charge for the schematic design fees. The Mayor later gave the EDU the task of
completing the design and administration of the construction of the projects.
public service company of its kind in Colombia. Also, it is the Colombian company with the 7th
highest income, receiving 3,05 billions of COP. It also is the company with the second highest
assets, after Ecopetrol. Source: Empresas, Supersociedades, Supervalores y C maras de Comercio.
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Figure 7 Location Colegios de Calidad over IcV index, Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
141 Reformed Schools
The Mayor's office also included a campaign to revamp 141 existing schools, the
ones that were the most dated in the city. This involved interventions at various
dimensions. Most of the schools were located in the poorest areas of the city.
Many of the schools by that point required maintenance or complete
reconstruction. The public schools system in Medellin, for many years, had been
neglected.
Figure 8 Before-and-after picture of reform school at Sergio Fajardo conference in Boston, MA 2008. Source:
Sergio Fajardo Medellin del miedo a la esperanza.
These schools fill two basic categories of neglect. (1) Schools that were from the
start placed in facilities inadequate for the purpose of education, especially of
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children. Such schools had been originally placed in buildings that before had
been homes built by informal community members inside the informal
settlements (2) Also complicating the problems of public schools in Medellin
was the fact that these schools had not been maintained for long periods of
time because the city did not invest the resources in them.
These two types of projects changed the way the spaces for public education
were understood in the city of Medellin. The interest in the quality and
appearance of the school made them undistinguishable from private education
facilities and in some cases even superior.
Figure 9 Location of 143 reformed Schools over the ICv index. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
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Centro de Atencion Inmediata CAI (New Police
Stations: Center of Immediate Attention CAI)
The Fajardo administration also implemented many security strategies. The
Center of Immediate Attention CAI (Center of Immediate Attention CAI) is a
decentralized police unit, intended to maintain continuous police contact with
the community. The CAI main goal is preventing criminality and to supply
Figure 10 Small Police station CAl
Source: Policia Nacional
8 I personally went to a school that is an example of the state's lack of interest in the
quality of public school facilities. My school was sold to a private company and then the
public school was moved to a smaller and improvised building where it is still located.
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security services and a pacific coexistence by providing efficient and timely
resources of the National Police by having police forces inside the community
instead of outside of it. A special quality of these small new buildings is that
most of the CAls were placed in neighborhoods based on the requests of the
community. The community needed apply to have the station placed in their
neighborhood. Thus, this is not an imposed (state or otherwise) security
measure, but instead one that the community requests.
This idea of the CAI is a Colombian police strategy that began in the 1990s and
which communities embraced during the first years of its implementation. The
program added new units in all major Colombian cities. By 1992 the war against
the leaders of the narcotraffic organizations had changed this situation; the war
against the cartels had made the national police to be the actual target. Pablo
Escobar offered a monetary reward for each policeman killed, paying as much as
2 million pesos ($1,000 U.S. dollars per policeman). The decentralization of the
CAls made them an easy and static target. Drive-by shootings and bomb attacks
made the CAI's very insecure locations, for police and citizens alike. By the end
of 1992, many CAl's had been officially abandoned "because they did not offer
security to the officer in them,"9 according to an official statement of the
Colombian national police.
Figure 11 Small Police station cAl. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
9 El Tiempo. "Antioquia: Otros 3 Atentados Dinamiteros." El Tiempo.com Archivo.
www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-238387 (accessed February 3, 2010).
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Twelve years later, by 2004, the Colombian situation had changed again. The
war against the drug cartels-as seen in the early 1990s- was over. The police
were not necessarily the target of terrorist attacks. The CAls again were seen as
a good strategy to distribute a desired police force over the territory. The
Fajardo administration supported this plan of increased police security and
many of the new CAI occupied the abandoned infrastructures of the 1990s. A
series of new ones, especially in the areas where there never had been a
permanent presence of police force were constructed. These new or renovated
ones have a surface area of 30 square meters and are built in reinforced
concrete and with bulletproof windows and doors. These new security additions
to the buildings were made to prevent the failures of the past. Each CAI cost 110
million pesos ($55,000 U.S. dollars). In total, Medellin invested 120,000 million
pesos ($60 million U.S. dollars) in security infrastructure between 2004 and
2007.0 This is a significant cost but it is important to place this in context: this
investment in police forces is still 30 million U.S. dollars less than this
administration spent building the Parques Bibliotecas. In the end, they built 14
new small police stations and renovated 2 police stations.
These new police stations provided security where it was needed and required
by the community, eliminating the negative aspects of a repressive institution
that the police can represent in marginalized and informal areas. They are a 125
permanent presence of the security legal forces that claim the space of the
neighborhood and made it more difficult for the illegal armed groups to contest
their authority. The actual efficiency of this model of security requires further
study, but its value, in my view, resides in its (at least attempt at) non-
repressive presence in the neighborhoods
ow0
Figure 12 New police CAl and police stations over the icy index. source: Alcaldia de Medellin
10 Del Miedo alIa Esperanza, Alcaldia de Medellin 2004 /2007 pag 60
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CEDEZOs Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal
(Local Centers for Enterprise Development)
The structure that represented the Fajardo administration's physical economic
support policies was the CEDEZOs. These new buildings were conceived as
physical spaces in the comunas to promote the development of small and new
enterprises in these areas. Fransico Noguera (2008) explained that, "In essence,
a CEDEZO is the place where business ideas turn into successful micro
enterprises and SMEs." CEDEZOs are located alongside the Public Libraries in the
poorest neighborhoods, hosting a microfinance initiative called Red de Figure 13 cEDEZO comun 13
Microcredito (The Microcredit Network), which is comprised of the government- Source: EDU
funded Banco de las Oportunidades (Opportunity Bank), as well as another
fourteen private microfinance institutions. The Microcredit Network allows each
entrepreneur to be directed to the institution(s) that can best serve them,
according to his or her particular needs, credit history and previous experience.
Figure 14 CEDEZO Santo Domingo comuna 1. Source: EDU
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Figure 15 CEDEZO Santo
Domingo comuna 1. Source: EDU
Figure 16 CEDEZO comuna 13
Source: EDU
On a regular basis, CEDEZO staff will invite the citizens from their area of
influence to attend Credit Fairs, which are meant to offer information about the
financial and non-financial services offered by the different members of the
Microfinance Network. This associative and client-centered approach allows the
microfinance industry to work in a coordinated manner; the entrepreneurs
benefit from having different alternatives available at a single location and are
thus able to make better choices regarding their needs for financial and
mentoring services.
Besides providing access to credit through the Network, CEDEZOs promote
Medellin's entrepreneurial culture through a larger number of innovative
initiatives. CEDEZO staff, alongside participating NGOs, is available to help
citizens to complete a business plan. New entrepreneurs also receive special
attention and mentoring to incubate their business ideas in a physical space
provided by CEDEZOs, until they become ready to take the next step and
become independent. "
The entrepreneurial component of the CEDEZOs has proven to be important in
distributing the policies of the municipality in terms of credit and support to
small companies, providing venues to improve income conditions of the
majority of informal companies that exist in these areas. But a fundamental
achievement of the CEDEZOs that is not expressed by the municipal 127
administration advertisement is that the CEDEZO's buildings are property of the
Mayor's Office and thus a micro-Mayor-office. The centers become extensions
of the power of the state in these areas where the state has never been before.
Even more importantly, this new permanent presence is not only non-
aggressive or non-repressive, just as in the case of the Parques Bibliotecas, the
CEDEZOS also comprise some of the benefits provided by the state for the
marginalized communities. This provision of services legitimizes the authority of
the state. Also like the Parques Bibliotecas, the CEDEZOS and the security forces
around them, provide new secured spaces controlled by the state. In my opinion
the only short coming is that contrary to the Parques Bibliotecas, the CEDEZOs,
like many financial buildings only provide services during limited business hours
and not the extended services that keep the street active. So their contribution
is that they provide immediate access to those credit services of the state and a
perception of the extended presence of the state.
"Noguera, Fransisco . "Medellin's Promising Transformation: "Cultura E" (as in Entrepreneurship)
| Blog I NextBillion.net I Development through Enterprise." NextBillion.net I Development
through Enterprise. http://www.nextbillion.net/blog/medellins-promising-transformation-cultura-
e-as-in-entrepreneurs (accessed April 19, 2010).
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Figure 17 New CEDEZOs over the ICv index. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
Proyecto Urbano Integral PUI (Integral Urban
Project PUI)
Beyond individual projects, large-scale, integrated urban projects (PUI) were
also undertaken. These in my opinion are the most important contribution of
the physical structures of the Medellin case. This type of PUI projects bring
together all the different initiatives that have been explained in the last two
chapters (policies and physical projects) and applied them in a short period of
time (two years) throughout the most marginalized areas of the city. The PUI
are in my opinion the most important strategies that can be implemented from
the Medellin case to other contexts. The PUI are large urban projects that
involve multiple community, state and private partnerships in the poorest areas
of the city. All of those independent initiatives, like the parques bibliotecas, the
CEDEZOs and the new and renovated schools, all became components of the
larger urban project that was the PUI.
The PUI is a physical urban project strategy in the most marginalized areas of
the city. These areas needed large infrastructure investments to incorporate
them into the city's productive activities.
Two particular territories of the city were most affected by this type of project:
Comuna 1 and 2 and Comuna 13. The impact of such projects is larger here
because these areas were the least developed in terms of government services
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and programs implemented in the last 40 years. These areas were developed by
and large informally, which began a community within a condition of
abandonment and poverty of informal settlements. Besides being the least
served, these areas were considered the most dangerous and violent in a city
considered the most violent and dangerous in the country. These two
conditions (poorest and less-served) epitomized in the city territory many of the
issues of the National Colombian conflict. These PUI were and still continue
being implemented by the Empresa de Desarrrolllo Urbano EDU (Enterprise of
Urban Development).
Previous experiences
The EDU based this new approach to intervention in marginalized areas is called
Projecto Urbano Integrado (PUI) on three basic previous experiences. One of
them was an international project called the Favela-Barrio (The Slum
Neighborhood Program) in Rio de Janiero, Brazil. The other two are Colombian:
the Programa de Desmarginaci6n (De-marginalization Program) in Bogota and
the PRIMED (Program of integral improvement of subnormal neighborhoods in
Medellin), a NGO project in Medellin supported by the German government.
Favela-Bairro (The Slum Neighborhood Program) is a Strategic Plan for Rio de 129
Janeiro, promoted by the Municipal Housing Secretary promoted in 1993 as part
of the city housing policy. It began urban improvements to urban infrastructure
and the creation and access provision to urban facilities, involving around
253,000 residents in 73 communities. "The objectives intended to generate
social benefits that consecutively could contribute to the integration of the
favela (a term used in Brazil when referring to shantytowns) into the urban
fabric and convert it into a regular neighborhood. In 1995, the International
Development Bank (IDB) provided part of the financial resources." (Blanco,
Kobayashi, 2009, 12)
The experiences learned from the Favela-Barrio program were transferred to
the PUI. Today the experiences learned from the PUI are being re-introduced to
Brazil through the support exchanges of the EDU and diverse planning
departments in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. This could generate a circular
retroalimentacion or "retrofeed."
1 Carolina BLANCO; Hidetsugu KOBAYASHI. 2009. Urban Transformation In Slum Districts Through
Public Space Generation And Cable Transportation At Northeastern Area: Medellin, Colombia.
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Programa de Desmarginaci6n (De-marginalization Program). Bogotd,
Colombia is a program and operated from 1998 to 2001, with the objective to
solve problems of marginality in the city of BogotS. The program tried to solve
problems of physical infrastructure and the social sector of the inhabitants with
the lower income. The project was developed by the Instituto de Desarrollo
Urbano (IDU), members of the BogotS Mayor's Office and the community
members. The IDU selected the areas to intervene in and the type of
intervention: water, sewer, roads, parks, schools, hospitals. Followed by social
programs designed to enforce community participation, which included
collection of funds from the Juntas de Accion Comunal JACs of the 25
neighborhoods. (IDU, 2006).
The EDU approach to participation techniques and inclusion of JACs and other
local actors local is model on the IDU program.
Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Bairros Subnormales en Medellin
PRIMED (Program of integral improvement of subnormal neighborhoods
Medellin) was instituted in 1993 by the city of Medellin in cooperation with
Germany government (Ministry of Finances with the support of the KFW bank
group) to create the PRIMED. PRIMED's objective was to deal with issues of
illegal tenancy and with informal construction in areas of high risk,
unemployment, school desertion, low quality of housing, lack of public services,
hygiene, violence and insecurity, collective space and to improve on the lack of
trust to governmental institutions. Funding for this project was proved by the
Nation, Department along with the Program of the United Nations for
Development (PUND) 13
The PRIMED intervened in (built or renovated) 9,400 housing units in comunas
4,6,9, and 13, benefiting 11,000 families. This project initiated one of the first
participative methodologies in the city and "gave the state recognition that
came from the respect that the citizens felt that the needs were heard and that
solutions were dealt between the sate and community that resulted in an
increased quality of life of these areas." (Consejerfa Presidencial para Medellin,
1993). Blanco, Kobayashi (2009) pointed out that this was one of the first
programs with an integral approach to face the reality of the informal urban
sectors in Medellin. The program was awarded "Best Practices" at the United
Nations Conference on Human Settlements held in Istanbul, Turkey. In 1996 the
project, according to Blanco, marked a remarkable antecedent in the country,
especially because it was not limited to the physical component of upgrading,
13 The coordination of the project was done by the corporation Corporaci6n de Vivienda y
Desarrollo Social del Municipio de Medellin (CORVIDE), a mixed (public and Private) NGO.
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but included a complete social perspective that included training and
community building strategies.
The PRIMED had an interdisciplinary approach that combined multiple state
local organizations and also academic support from the local universities.14
Initial members of the PRIMED were also members of the research group at the
Universidad Bolivariana, who later became part of the new staff of the EDU
under mayor Fajardo's Administration. This proved that there was a transfer of
knowledge and a continuity of the successful practices.
Metodology PUI
The PUI methodologies were first implemented by the EDU during their work in
the Northeastern area (comuna 1 and 2) and later would become a model to be
replicated in other areas of the city. The PUI project contains 3 main
components that are supposed to reach the highest standards available:
* Inter- Institutional coordination
* Social component of community participation and
* Physical component, which includes public space, environmental recovery,
housing and transportation.
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Institutional Coordination
The EDU, through the PUI, became a link that coordinated the different
initiatives that the departments of the Municipality (Secretaries) had in the
areas of intervention. It also, through the feasibility studies, started a process of
communication to attract external investment and social acceptance. This, in
turn, permitted the project to make strategic alliances with the public and
philanthropic sector, NGOs, and universities. Multidisciplinary groups and
discussion tables were organized as a way to specify the goals and the best ways
to achieve results without duplicating efforts. This allowed the Mayor's office to
search for external funds from diverse entities that included private companies
and partners such as the Royal Crown of Spain that donated the collection for
the Library Park in Santo Domingo.15
14 Fernando A. Avila Cortes (El Vale) at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia, sede Medellin,
directed the Office of the PRIMED from the Facultad de Arquitectura.
1s Some entities that collaborated in the development of the PUI from the EDU showed the level
of inter-institutionality necessary to make these projects possible. Says Oscar Santana: "There
were several groups that intervened in this project: the Medellin Mayor's Office through the
Planning Administration Department, the Estate, Public Works, Education, Social Welfare, Social
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This strategy of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary coordination is one of the
most important achievements of the program. As Juan Diego Lopera, Sub
Director Departamento de Planeaci6n Medellin explained, "It is not that before
there were not investments. It is that these were guided by other interests
(political) and did not generate the necessary impact. The lack of coordination
sometimes resulted in redundant interventions by different branches of the
municipality."16 These strategies of the PUI made the process more difficult to
be controlled by individual political interests and created a good network of
communication between different branches of the Municipality.
The PUI and EDU and their relationship with the other branches of the
Municipality
The PUI is a tool that permits all the different departments (secretarias) of the
Mayor's office, in unison, to achieve their physical goals imposed by the general
plan of the city (POT) over a specific territory. See Figure 13
Figure 18 PUI Nororiental with all
projects by all secreatrias and other
partners highlighted. Source: EDU
Development, Citizen's Culture, Environmental Secretaries, the Urban Development Company.
The contributing partners were: the Spanish government, Comfama, Comfenalco, Aburra Valley
Metropolitan Area, EEPPM Foundation, Biblioteca Ptblica Piloto, Empresas Publicas de Medellin,
UNE -EPM Telecommunications".
1 Juan Diego Lopera, Sub Director de planeaci6n Medellin. Interview with author in January 2010.
....... .......
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Figure 19 Map of relationships between the different Secretarias, Departments and government institutions
at the municipal level that intervened in the final result of the PUI. Source: Author.
Social Component
The goal of this component is to introduce community participation into the
planning process. For that goal, a structured system of public meetings was
generated to create lines of communication between the EDU-State and the
community. The EDU used two kinds of community groups' networks to
communicate with the general community: the political leaders represented by
the individuals who are politically affiliated in the area or linked with networks
inside the Juntas de Accion Comunales (JACs), and the other were EDU-selected
groups of individuals called "Leaders" who enacted an exponential system of
communicators. These two kinds of groups helped to collect the community
members to the meetings and to distribute information about the development
of the diverse programs.
Figure 20 Area of the PUI
Nororiental divided in the three
project zones. Pinpointed are all
12 neighborhoods affected by
the project. Source: EDU
The PUI Nororiental defined areas of interventions through community
workshops, such as one of the initial workshops: talleres de imaginarios or
Imaginaries' Workshops. These were meetings to gather ideas from the
communities about specific areas of the neighborhoods. These workshops
helped to identify places of intervention and the types of public equipments
needed. At these meetings assistants are asked by the EDU staff to tell and draw
how they "Imagine (Dream) their future neighborhood." Here decisions about
the naming and use of the areas of projects are also selected. See Figure 15.
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Participation in these meetings is extensive, usually gathering community
members by the hundreds per sector. Each PUI area is divided into sectors by
the EDU to make these larger meetings manageable and also because the area
of the project was so extensive. These sector divisions also make the
participants engage in the discussions about projects that would affect them
more directly. Questions and answers collected in these workshops include:
How do I imagine my park? What does this place mean to me? Which memories
does this place bring to me? What would I like the park (building, public space,
etc) to have? What would I name my park?
Figure 21 "Imaginaries Workshops" with the community held in 2005. Source: Urban Development
Enterprise EDU - Medellin Mayor's Office
The information gathered at the imaginaries workshops is processed at the
other EDU offices and transferred into the final presentation of the project in
which the "renders" of the project are presented to and approved by the
community members. This communication strategy is maintained during the
entire planning and development process and long after it has culminated.
Teams of social workers inside the EDU maintain these networks and continue
communicating about developments of the different programs. It was through
this initial network that it was also possible for me to interview individuals in the
community that have participated on the project.
The methodology of participation in the PUI might not strike one as particularly
innovative in terms of public participation in the development of large urban
projects. Compared with the techniques employed among communities and
governmental institutions in the United States, it looks very similar to standard
techniques. What is revolutionary in this process in Medellin, is that it is
employed, for the first time and on such large scale, and probably is one of the
first introductions of it's kind in Colombia. Also it is important that it was done
.. ........... ................................ . ......... . ..... . ....... 
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in the area with the lowest quality of life indexes. From the perspective of an
outsider, EDU participation techniques seem a far cry from a revolutionary or
real participatory process. As with the Participative Budget PB, this process is
extremely hierarchical. It is really clear that the power to make the decisions is
in the hands of a specialized group of technocrats who run the participatory
process and who also prepared the plan back at the offices of EDU, where the
most important decisions are made. At the public table, small but symbolic
decisions are taken. The recurrent cycles of participation create a satisfactory
illusion of participation and empowerment, and as a result a large majority of
individuals felt that what was represented in the project "renders" resemble a
realistic image of what they proposed in the "imaginaries" workshops and
subsequently they also agreed to the final product as long it was finished.
In general, the understanding of the achievements of the social area of the PUI
is less tangible. A study from the Departamento Nacional de Planeacion DNP/
The National Department of Planning concluded that: "In the social order the
delivery of projects is not as clear like in the case of the physical component, but
it is observed that the communitarian organizations have been successfully
empowered and that also a successful network of communication had been
increased."
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Physical Component
There are four lines of physical intervention in the PUL: Public facilities, housing
environment, and public space and transportation.
a. Public equipment and facilities provided collective spaces and new structures
for policy programs implemented by the city. Many of the public programs
initiated by the secretarias had a physical representation that created a
permanent presence of non-repressive and, in most cases, state institutions.
Each program initiated by the Secretaria will contract the EDU to perform the
physical component of their program and the inclusion in the PUI.
b. Housing
This section includes new dwellings and upgrades of existing ones as well as
legalization and securing of tenure processes. These last two followed the
learned experiences from the work of the PRIMED. In Colombia and Medellin
there existed a culture that gives preference to owning a housing unit over a
Figure 22 Relocation housing rent option. The ability to obtain title and legal ownership of the housing units is
project along the small river an important factor in the success and sustainability of the transformation
Juan Bobo. Source EDU process. This controls negative aspects of urban development such as
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gentrification. Urban improvements of the neighborhood impact the value of
existing units that are legalized, increasing their value. This added value goes to
the resident owner and in this way it benefits the entire community that had
been granted a title.
Figure 23 Relocation housing project along the small river Juan Bobo. Source: EDU
c. Environment.
This component mainly involved the recovery of the multiple small rivers that
represent an environmental hazard and physical risk to adjacent structures.
Medellin's topography and location in the Andes Mountains generates a
multiplicity of small rivers call quebradas, a total of 35 small streams collecting
water from the top of the mountains to the Medellin River at the center of the
valley. In rain intense periods, these small rivers on the steep hill become
hazardous areas for any construction on their vicinity. (See figure 16.) The
creation of green corridors along the multiple small rivers is one of these
strategies to collect illegal sewer deposits in these streams.
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Figure 24 Rivers in the in the city of Medellin and their slopes (orange red and brown represent risk slopes)
Source: EDU
d. Public space and transportation
Priority was given to pedestrian mobility over car mobility and to the creation of
a network of public spaces and boulevards. Also, there was the integration of
the metro system with the new Metro Cable, executed by the Empresa Metro
de Medellin as part of their expansion plan. 137
Figure 25 Metrocable and public spaces and parks along the small river. Source: EDU
Chapter 4
The Metro cable (cable car), with a capacity of 64,000 trips a day, is a clever
strategy to deal with issues of scarce space and the elevated topography, which
makes mobility in these areas extremely complex. The Metro Cable was put in
place by the administration previous to Fajardo and executed during Fajardo's
term. It was the result of years of planning and discussion in the inner circles of
the planning department and the Empresa Metro de Medellin. "That idea of the
cable was created here at the Planning Department. The Cable (Metrocable)
was made by Luis Peres (Ex Mayor). What changed with the cable is that all this
lack of public infrastructure gets connected by the transportation."17 But what
already existed in this PUI became the standard for all the other ones to have
this transportation system as part of their overall project. But what was a pre-
set project in the PUI Nororiental became a strategic tool for all other PUIs. The
PUI of the Comuna 13 includes one metro cable plan, executed during Sergio
Fajardo's administration. The future PUI Centrooriental includes three different
lines of Metro cable with a connecting trolley line.
Implementation
The development of the project (Gestion) followed 3 main stages: design,
execution and operation, which in turn were divided in ten stages. These stages
range from the initial survey to the final occupation and appropriations of the
users of the diverse spaces.
D5 s*nosStage
GESTSON
stagel stage2 stq3Sae tagell stage8 sg stage l
Selection of~Bi Contrctin Consruc ion ll Ie~lt Dlvr
Figure 26 Timeline of the PUI project from design to operation. Source: EDU
Conclusion
The ability to coordinate all initiatives from the municipal branches (Secretarias)
along with private and public funding from different sources in a myriad of
(sometimes more than 200 individual physical projects) all executed in a short
1 Juan Diego Lopera, Sub director Departamento de Planeaci6n Medellin. Interview January 2010
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three-year period is what makes this project so effective and important to
study. This is especially true in terms of the project's ability to modify the
physical public structure of a neighborhood where the state has not had any
important presence. This project empowered in a positive way the introduction
of the absent state into the community. Also the opportunity to make these
projects as a continuum of a single large urban project allowed the
implementation-instantaneously-throughout the existing neighborhood of a
new network of publicly connected amenities that created a series of connected
safe spaces. These are safe spaces for both the community and the state.18
These new areas permitted these once isolated communities to maintain open
lines of communication that are based on the necessary physical human and
architectural presence of the state. And lastly, the new buildings and
infrastructures compete in quality and style with any new project executed
anywhere in the city. This empowers the communities who up to this moment
have been approached by the interventions of the state as second-hand citizens.
It4
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Figure 27 Map of Urban Integrated projects PUI in blue. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
18 Conditions of safety in these areas at intense moments of increased violence impede the
normal executions of any project of the state or any other organization. Maintaining those lines of
communication at those moments is important for the sustainability of any kind of long-term
initiative.
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PUI Nororoiental (PUI Northeastern Area), Medellin
The territory
Based on the Indexes of (IDH) and (ICV), the municipality selected a series of
areas that required immediate intervention. One of those areas was the
Northeastern Area of the city where comunas 1 and 2 are located within a
territory characterized by an intricate topography, lack of good transportation
systems and the presence of thousands of squatters who have formed illegal
settlements over a period of more than 60 years. This combination of factors
generated their isolation from the productive and control systems of the formal
city. This, as I explained in the previous chapter, created the ideal conditions for
illegal armed groups to target the territories and use youth has social capital for
their armies. The Comunas 1 and 2 combined saw, by 2003, the largest number
of demobilized paramilitary entering the DDR process with the national
government and also the largest number of urban militias that self demobilized.
This amounts to a total of 530 demobilized individuals in government programs
by 2007.
The limit of the established PUI nororiental is an area that covers 12
neighborhoods in the two comunas 1 and 2. The line of the Metro Cable K
became the center or spine along which all the other interventions were placed.
The PUI Nororiental was subdivided in 3 sectors. This division intentionally dealt
with the territory in fragments or smaller sections to make the public meetings
more manageable in scale and also to make sure that the community that was
going to be benefited for the projects developed in their vicinity. See figure 15.
Public meetings for the development of the PUI included hundreds of
participants per meeting.
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
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Figure 28 Area of the PUl Nororiental in relationship with comunas 1 and 2 with all projects highlighted.
Source: Author, based on EDU information
As explained in chapter 3, each secretaria (department of the mayor's office)
that has projects in the area of the PUI in terms of physical or policy oriented
coordinated with the EDU for their inclusion in the PUI. The following maps
show how each secretaria distributed its programs over the area of the PUI
project. They give an accurate picture of the distribution and the scale of the
interventions of the PUI. Not all interventions of the secretarias were physical
projects but I have included them in this section because it shows their
distribution over the territory and the relationship with the most significant
build projects. It shows a correlation between application of the policies and the
distribution of the projects. This permits us to visually understand the scale of
the project.
Secretaria Social Welfare
Infant protection
Program BUEN COMIENZO - BUEN ViVIR
School Restaurant
Food Provision
AF Food for Seniors
Unit for criminal youth
Unit for Homeless youth
+ Program Homeless POR UNA VIDA MAS DIGNA
Unit for Displaced population
Unit fro senior homeless
* Unit for attention to the Senior population
Senior housing
l PROTECCION SOCIAL AL ADULTO MAYOR
Center for senior homeless
A Atention to disable population
Figure 30 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Social Welfare. Source: EDU
Secretaria Health
aPopulation covered by government subsidies
179,500 subsidies
Population not covered but affiliated
80,000 individuals
Family and community health
11,955 families - 52,217 individuals
Poor health: 489 families treated
Malnutricion: 1284 children atented
Salud Oral: 6493 familes treated
Health Programs at schools
Salud Oral: 11887. individuals
Salud visual: 13,000 students treated
Salud Auditiva: 11,800 students treated
Nutrici6n: 11,000
Sex education at scholls
1800 students
Ri Medelin New hospital
Unidad Hospitalaria Santa Cruz
Figure 29Area of the PUI nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Health. Source: EDU
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Secretaria Goverment
Barri s mo Do ngo - -I-
Program of follow up with DDR Members
- Surveillance, control and training for the use of
public space
GM lAssistance for population affected by Human Rights
violations
Figure 32 Area of the PUI nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Government. Source: EDU
Barrio La Avanzada
COMUNA 1Barrio La Avanzada
Secretaria Citizen CultureBarr®o La Esperanza 2
Barrio abints and o o
.BP em oa mMo rco u t M E E L LN.C4D6
VOE
Barno
Program MEDELLiN CIUDAD
*an Patiiatv Budge
MULTICULTURAL
Barro L FraciaCultural Program MEDELLIN UN GRAN
ESCENARIO
OCProgram of Libraries and colection of
cultural history
Preogram for youth MEDELLIN CIUDAD
till JOVEN
Gender equality Program
Rio Medelmi 1
Participative Budget
Figure 31 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Citizen culture. Source: EDU
INDER (Recreation)
Daycare facilities LUDOTEKAS
Recreation
Sport schools
Program
Aerobics
M Program
adopt a park
CLUBES DE VIDA
Figure 33 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions of the INDER a independent institution that manages all
recreational programs and facilities own by the city. Source: EDU
General Projects
Metre Lne A
MetoCabe ine
Pubic Space and mFily
Street mpLinement Urban Roads type A
Street Improvement Urban Roads type B
Continuity of urban Roads
Connections between neighborhoods
Street Improvements Neighborhood
Roads
New and improve Pedestrian Roads
New Bridge (pedestrian and Cars)
New Bridge (Pedestrian)
New Sector Park
_J, New Park along river
New Neighborhood Park
0 New Small Park (mirador)
Housing
Resettlement plan (Housing)
New park terraces
New Mixed use buildings
Public Buildings
Improvement public buildings
New public Buildings
Improvement Neighborhood center
New Neighborhood center
Expansion
Figure 34 Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all General Public Works. Source: EDU
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Secretaria Education
Quality Schools
Public Schools
School remodel.
hMeSchool remodel (with EPM funds)
Figure 36 Area of the PUI nororiental showing all interventions of the Secretaria of Education. Source: EDU
Figure 35Area of the PUI Nororiental showing all interventions all interventions. Source: EDU
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The project highlighted above (Figures 23 to 29) show this multiplicity of
initiatives, most of them developed in the span of 3 years.
In Table 1, I outline the scale of the most relevant physical projects of the PUI in
the Nororiental. In Appendix 1, I provide a graphic description of these projects.
This table shows the multiplicity of the physical projects creates the web of
initiatives executed during the PUI Nororiental.
Concluding thoughts
I consider the PUI project to be the most important contribution of all the
physical projects in the Medellin case. This is because it is the result of refining
efforts over a long process of small and sometimes unsuccessful interventions
that tried to resolve the infrastructure problems of informal settlements and
marginalized areas. These include the multiplicity of projects from public and
private sectors, the invention of the institutional structure that allowed those
institutions and projects to coexist, and the idea of quality design as necessary
for the intervention.
Also the PUI small interventions created a context where the more significant
interventions, such as the Parque Biblioteca or the MetroStations, could attach
and expand their area of influence. Not performing such accompanying
interventions would have undermined the real impact of these citywide
projects. When governments and institutions around the world want to work in
informal communities, they usually just focus on improving housing
conditions.19 This important move also permitted a focus on quality instead of
simply the maximum number of units produced, an approach that usually
produces poor quality housing conditions and just transfers the original problem
to a new location with the added issues of social capital lost in the process of
relocation.
To understand the real success of the reviewed strategies implemented during
the Sergio Fajardo Administration, Chapter (5) "Evaluating the intervention,
'Medellin, la ciudad mas educada' takes into account the physical and policy
interventions described in this and the previous chapter and evaluate their
effectiveness based on my personal interviews with community members,
politicians and technocrats (planners).
19 The Darhavi slum redevelopment in India is one of those examples. Where authorities are
concern with create new housing for the residents of Daravi in a search to obtain the land for
other real estate purposes. Ridge, Mian. "In Asia's largest slum, free new digs are scorned." The
Christian Science Monitor - CSMonitor.com . N.p., 21 Mar. 2007. Web. 6 May 2010.
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0321/pOlsO4-wosc.html>.
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Buildings
Parque
BIBLIOTECA
SANTO
DOMINGO
Cost in Area m2 Area Constru
Public ctionMillion COP
space period
14.000 5000 15.000 May Public library and
m2 2006/M community
lay 2007 center
CEDEZO CENTRO 375 400 404.5
DESARROLLO M2
EMPRESARIAL (secretariade
ZONAL
desarrollo
social)
UNIDAD
DEPORTIVA
GRANIZAL
Centro de Salud
Santo Domingo
Savio
Restaurante
Instituci6n
Educativa La
Candelaria
1.992
(Inder)
1.609
2 CAI
Public Space
577 9320M2
Sept Entrepernurialshi
2005/D p center
ec 2005
3
2
19
N/A Community
dinner next
school.
N/A
____ I ___________
7_iIL7~ _
1 I PASEO 413 2895M2 Apr Pedestrian Street
PEATONAL DE LA (secretaria 2005/ to the Parque
CALLE 106 de obras Jul Biblioteca Espana
piblicas) 2005
....... 4 ..... ....
1@ PARQUE LA 260 1630m2 Ago Park next to the
CANDELARIA (secretaria 2004/D Metro Cable
de obras ec 2004 station
p blicas)
1! PARQUE 170 1260m2 Ago Small park
MIRADOR Y (secretaria 2004/D
PARQUE DE LOS de obras ec 2004
NINOS pdblicas)
Mar Sports facility
2007/
Dec
2007
N/A Medical center
147
---- ----- - - ....................  ...
..........
..........
........................
230
Chapter 4
la PASEO
URBANO106A
6 Corredor vial 42B
61
6 Mercado barrial
Carrera 42C6,
6 Jardin Los Pozos
6 Parque Paulo VI
6 ParqueLavaderos
la PASEO
ANDALUCIA
CALLE 107
7 PARQUE BALCON
DEL AJEDREZ
10 PARQUE DE LA
PAZ Y LA
CULTURA
13 PARQUE DE LA
IMAGINACION
460 millions
2415
(secretaria
de obras
piblicas)
3250
(Secretaria
de obras
ptblicas)
159
(secretaria
de obras
p blicas)
94
(secretaria
de obras
p6blicas)
136
(secretaria
de obras
poblicas)
1853M2
8840 m2
.
350
550
790
1.100
13645
m2
Arboles
sembrad
os: 159
950m2
1330m2
690m2
May
2007/N
ov 2007
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Sep
2005/
Jun
2006
Jan
2006/
Apr
2006
Oct
2005/
Dec
2005
Jan
2006/
May
2006
Pedestrian street
scape
Projects along
I the streed 42B
.. .. . .. .~....... . ....
Neighborhood
market
Projects along
the streed 42B
Fountain in the
place of an
outdoor laundry
over a small river
Park
Fountain over a
small river
Street
improvement
Park part of the
improvements
along the Metro
Cable Line
Open-air theater
next to metro
station
Park in the
neighborhood
Villa del socorro
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PARQUE
PRIMAVERAL
NUESTRA
SENORA
CAMINO
BRIDGES
BRIDGES
PEACE
BRIDGE
MIRADOR
BRIDGE
GUADUA
Medio Ambiente
PARQUE LINEAL
QUEBRADA LA
HERRERA
Housing
PROYECTO DE
CONSOLIDACION
HABITACIONAL
EN LAI
QUEBRADA JUAN
BOBO
166
(secretaria
de obras
piblicas)
405
(secretaria
de obras
pdblicas)
1600
(secretaria
de obras
piblicas)
246
(Secretaria
de obras
piblicas)
$2404 (6rea
metropolita
na)
$3200 (sec.
Medio
Ambiente)
500m2
35ml 2195m2
Nov
2006/
April
2007
Dec
2006/
Jun
2007
64 ml 2265m2 Dec
2006/
April
2007
Ir
66 ml 5560m2 Jun
2007/N
/A
280 18.324m N/A F
2 F
5054
housing
108
improv
115 uni
Pedestrian Bridge
Pedestrian Bridge
connecting two
neighborhoods
Andalucia and la
Francia with
ival gangs
Pedestrian Bridge
Park along the
River Herrera
new 5606 m2 N/A Housing
relocation and
irenovation along
the River Juan
Boboed
ts
Table 1 PUI Nororiental Most relevant Physical projects
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Evaluating the intervention,
"Medellin, la ciudad mas educada"
Methodology
This chapter the story, by analyzing what people in Medellin who have lived
through this urban planning as peace building process say and think about it.
What, if anything, do they find successful? What, if anything, do they regret?
Would they do it again? What strategies do people think would work in other
contexts? I conducted 25 of interviews in Medellin on January 2010. I
interviewed two groups of people: 1) planners and politicians who have been
involved in this urban planning project before, during, and now after it is well
underway, and 2) community members who have lived in Comuna 13, 1 and 2,
the three neighborhoods most impacted by these urban interventions. The
neighborhoods were identified as the most underserved by state services and 151
were among the city's most violent before 2003. All of the community members
interviewed lived in these neighborhoods before, during, and after the policies
and physical projects were implemented. Having these two perspectives-
politicians and technocrats versus community members-which sometimes are
opposed to each other, makes it possible to decant which, if any, of the polices
implemented were effective and why.1
With this series of interviews, I sought to explore the period of urban planning
as peace process (2003-2007), an issue not covered in a range of literature
about the Comunas. This literature includes published oral histories of the
Comunas, from the perspectives of those living in the Comunas (Estrada and
Gomez 1992; Boyd 20082 and Aricapa 2005) The role of city planning is also
absent from recent publications about violence and peace process in Medellin.
I had originally intended to interview community members who were present during the
national program of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), but at the time of my
interviews meeting with these DDR participants proved to be too dangerous and needs to be left
for future research.
2 Aricapa Ardila, Ricardo. 2005. Comuna 13: cr6 nica de una guerra urbana . Medelli n: Editorial
Universidad de Antioquia.
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(Roxema, 2006; Bouvier, Making Peace in a Time of War, 2009). 4 Aricapa's local
narratives of the process of consolidation of Comuna 13 before during and after
the Operation Orion in 2002 compiles firsthand accounts of that neighborhood's
living conditions and manifestations of violence, but do not account for the
application of the new policies implemented in the seven years directly
afterward.
In addition to these publications, there have been other efforts to collect oral
histories from these neighborhoods that do include residents' reflections on the
impacts these policies have had in their lives. For this thesis, I examined a group
of sources compiled as part of the program run through the Parques Bibliotecas
called "Sala Mi Barrio" (My Neighborhood Livingroom). These compilations
include newspapers published inside the Comunas, family photo albums, and
short essays written by members of the community as part of historical memory
and writing workshops that took place in the Parques. I also drew on interviews
and the same kinds of neighborhood sources I have been creating as part of an
Historical Memory Project (in the Parques Bibliotecas) that Dr.Tamera Marko
and I conducted in 2007-2009.' This included five community documentary
videos I co-directed that document these specific communities since 2007
(Samper and Marko, "Medellin la Violencia no es toda la Historia," 2008 and
2009). 6 The "Sala Mi Barrio" histories and our "Medellin la violencia no es toda
la historia" project intends to offer a more complete perspective on the
geography of violence than appears in academic publications, media, and
Hollywood and Colombian film. It does so not by focusing on the perpetrators of
the violence or their victims, but instead by focusing on the urban and social
context in which these (violent and peace) acts happen. I put my most recent
January 2010 oral interviews in conversation with these other oral histories in
the following pages.
Below are the interview approach and the kinds of questions I asked all the
interviewees. A list of all the interviewees appears in Appendix 2.
3 Estrada C., William, and Adriana G6 mez V. 1992. Somos historia: Comuna Nororiental. Medelli n,
Colombia: s.n.
4 Boyd, D. 2008. "Riano-Alcala, Dwellers of Memory: Youth and Violence in Medellin, Colombia".
Oral History Review. 35 (2): 206-207.
s Tamera Marko and iota Samper. (Hi)story telling as peace process. Historical Memory Project
DukeEngoge Colombia (Medellin) Social Equality Through Education.
6This work helps communities in underrepresented neighborhoods in Medellin to document the
stories of their neighborhood in their own words to larger audiences and map neighborhood
resilience through the continued waves of violence. For sample video clips, see
http://dukeengagemedellin.blogspot.com & http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFzwPAdl9p4
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gFzwPAdl9p4.
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Interview Group One
a. Politicians. This group of interviews included the ex Director of the EDU
Alejandro Echeverry, who from the beginning has been a politically powerful
figure in ex Mayor Sergio Fajardo's cabinet. I also interviewed the Sub Director
of the Medellin Planning Department Juan Diego Lopera who was also a central
part of Fajardo's campaign.
b. Planners I interviewed six staff members (architects, social workers,
educators, and administrators) working on EDU. I also interviewed three
planners in the Medellin Planning Department.
Interview Group Two
This group of interviews included 17 community members from comunas 1,2
and 13 (community leaders, members of local NGO's, Women head of Family,
community members in general). These community members where invited by
public flyers posted on the parques bibliotecas, or identified as community
leaders by members of EDU or where part of the large network of community
that participated in the "Medellin la Violencia is not the whole story" project.
Interview Outline
All interviews followed a similar format intended to guide discussion that moved
beyond just the opinion about the policies implemented to focus on specific 153
ways their lives have been impacted by the policies. I designed these questions
with the hope of inspiring narratives that provide a larger experiential
background and context each person had with these policies. In this sense, I
wanted interviewees to share their (personal and professional) lived
experiences in Medellin with the reasons for these policies and how these lived
experiences were modified by the implementation of the projects and policies.
The interviews here were recorded and each person granted permission for
their names to be used and comments to be quoted in this thesis. All interviews
were performed in Spanish and translated into English by the author.
The interview outline was as follows:
1. Interviewees were asked to identify themselves and to briefly describe the
broad nature of their involvement with the neighborhood in which they live,
and for how long have they lived in this neighborhood. These permitted
identifying precedence (if he or she had migrated from other areas of the
country and under which circumstances) of the interviewee and to
understand where he or she stands in the community.
2. Interviewees were asked to cite a brief history of their experience in
Medellin and specifically in his or her neighborhood prior to the study
period and developments of interest in 2003. These questions try to map the
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history of the neighborhood but from the perspective of the interviewee and
not the history. It serves as a place of reference for map changes after 2003.
3. The interview focused on events after the 2003 period, specifically with the
new projects developed, such as the new public libraries, parks,
transportation and new educational facilities. The interview also focused on
soft infrastructural projects, which include public events, financial or other
incentives that were given. Soft infrastructural projects also include new
governmental or non governmental institutions that were initiated or
reinforced during this period, such as microcredit banks, subsidies,
participatory budget etc. Here I am looking for interviewees' experience in
the process of transformation of his or her community in relationship with
the policies and practices implemented by the mayors office.
4. If the interviewee recalled any of the previous interventions, the interviewer
asked the interviewee to discuss how they perceived the impact, if any, of
each one of the projects or policies implemented in his/her neighborhood.
The interviewer asked interviewees to be as specific as possible during this
phase of the interview.
5. As a concluding portion of the interview, the interviewer asked the
interviewees to provide additional information or perceptions about the
policies implemented in Medellin as a whole. This concluding section was
also an opportunity for the interviewer to ask any remaining questions
about specific policies that were not sufficiently expanded or that were
more illustrative to the research.
Of the 25 interviewees, 17 were community members and the other 8 were
politicians and planners and architects. I located the community members to
interview in two different ways. One way involved a social worker in the EDU
who contacted community leaders who had been involved in the planning
process in the neighborhoods I study. The second way involved my own
historical memory project doing oral histories for the past three years in these
neighborhoods. 7 Finally, while 17 community members is a relatively small
percentage of the total population in the communities I studied, it is among the
first series of interviews about the perceived outcomes of the project. The
procedures were simple in the sense that the community members' roles in the
project were bounded by the planning techniques. The technocrats had the
power and leverage to control the dimension of participation the community
members had. What is remarkable about this, however, is that not one
community member I interviewed mentioned this bounded control as being an
Eliana Restrepo EDU social worker. Restrepo, Eliana. Interview by author. Personal
interview. Parque Biblioteca San javier, Medellin , Colombia, January 7, 2010.
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issue or that they even sensed it was happening. I conclude that the community
members did not notice this. These interviews and my analysis of their
responses in this study are intended to raise more questions than answers. The
uniformity of responses, however, across the 17 community members in three
Comunas, is worthy of further attention.
Interviews: Evaluating the intervention
During the more than 30 hours of interviews among the total of 25 interviewees
for this project seven main themes emerged. In examining the responses, I
examined the ways the perspectives of politicians and technocratic planners,
challenge, contradict or reinforce the views of community members. In their
responses to the above questions, people perceived and defined the
effectiveness (or lack thereof) of the policies and physical projects implemented
during the administration of Sergio Fajardo (2003-2007). The seven themes that
emerged as being important to the transformation are as follows:
* Community Participation - Making the community a participant in the
decision-making process about the transformation of their environment.
* The Participative Budget8 -- Making more transparent the finances of the 155
municipality as a tool to support local organizations and to force
negotiations and collaboration between divergent local groups.
* Social debt (Deuda Social) -- The recognition that the state is partly
responsible for changing the environmental conditions of marginalized
communities.
* Institutional Support (EDU and the PUI) -- The institutional bridge between
state and community and the concerted instrument of intervention on the
territory.
* Illegal Armed Groups -- The presence and negotiations with armed actors in
the territory, the DDR process, and its consequences.
- Infrastructure As Security -- The use of the new projects and their amenities
as a way to increase perceived and real security of the neighborhood.
* Projects Changing The Perception of Security Through Design -- The
properties of good design as a way to de-marginalize not only the
environment, but also the community who occupies that environment.
8 See Chapter 3
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1. Community Participation
All interviewees-community members and politicians, architects and
planners-expressed satisfaction with the participation procedures of the
planning process. The fact that the community members are satisfied with the
participation procedures increases the likelihood that projects can be built and
will be sustainable in their neighborhoods.9 One of the dimensions they were
satisfied with was being part of the planning process of the Projecto Urbano
Integral (PUI) project, which the state entity EDU implemented. The EDU and
the PUI involvement, from the project's very beginning, was instrumental in the
signing of internal peace contracts between warring factions in the community.
These peace contracts permitted the planning process that opened the door to
the physical projects.
The community members and the EDU were involved in two main community
groups. The first group included the JAC. Each Comuna has a JAC, Junta de
Accion Comunal. These JACs are comprised of longtime community leaders who
now are the community representatives who communicate with the
municipality. The JACs have always been and still are more allied with the
traditional political parties (the Liberals or the Conservatives). This means they
are a kind of lobbying structure, economically and politically supported by the
traditional political parties. The EDU created another community network which
they called the Lideres Comunitarios (Community Leaders). The EDU invites
individual community members to become the link between the EDU
participative process and the rest of the community. They spread word in their
communities about EDU meetings and about the progress of the project. They
do this via word of mouth and through posters they put throughout their
neighborhoods. One of the first phases involved EDU staff attending community
meetings in the neighborhoods. 0 This, of course, could lead to jealousy among
JAC members who now are involved with another community leader structure.
While it was clear that there were some tense disagreements in opinion
between the two JAC members and 15 Community Leaders I interviewed, all of
them expressed that they were very pleased with their perception of their role
with EDU in the project participation process.
9 Peace negotiations.
10 See Chapter 3 "Imaginarios workshops."
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Another core technique of participation that EDU implemented in the initial
planning phases was the "Talleres de Imaginarios" or "Workshops of
Imaginaries." First, they invited JAC and Community Leaders to meet as a group
with EDU leaders and staff. After these meetings, the JAC and Community
Leaders put out an EDU call for a larger meeting with community members of
any age and gender or economic status. At these meetings the community
members gave their input about what they wanted to see change in their
communities and why. Sometimes people expressed this in verbal exchange
and other times they drew with pencils, crayons and markers what they wanted
to see in their communities. The EDU members also told them about projects
that the municipality already had mind for their community, such as the Library
Parks. EDU members then collected the notes and drawings from these
meetings and after determining which projects were viable," created three
dimensional images of them in the form of computer generated "renders."
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Figure 1 Workshops of Imaginarios and final render of a Parque Biblioteca Source: EDU and Alejandro
Echeverria.
In this case viability depended on many factors, including geography, city planning codes,
budget and interest from the branches of the municipality.
........... - - . - - - - , I
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EDU members, at another community meeting, then presented these renders
and the reasons for their viability to the same community members. Viability
was based on EDU budget and the projects that the municipality already
intended to build in the communities. All of the determination of viability is
done by architects, urban planners, politicians, engineers and lawyers through
the EDU. No community members are part of this closed decision-making. This,
of course, means that to some extent the community participation in terms of
creating their own dream projects is part illusion. On the other hand, it is more
community inclusion with these state projects than anything that had existed
before or that had been implemented in the city at large.
Although not all of the community ideas were rendered, all of the renders
eventually became built projects. This relation between the community
members' input and its appearance in EDU members' translation of it into
complex three-dimensional computer renders, represented in the eyes of the
community that they were listened to and that they were partners in the
decision-making process. In addition to the renders, another fundamental
aspect of inclusion for the community members was that the EDU members
fulfilled their promise to return to the communities after the workshops. The
traditional way would be that the politician would come, involve the community
in a project, and then they would never return. Luis Horacio Galeano, 58, a
community member who has lived in Comuna 13 for more than ten years, said,
The EDU has something great. They not only tell us what they
are going to do; they also tell us that you can participate. I
participated in the imaginarios about how we wanted the
Unidad Deportiva (sports facility) to be. We are doing the same
thing for the construction of the El Parque de La Memoria [Park
of Memory] that deals with the tragedy of El Socorro.12 I have
the image [of the final render] in my cell phone of how this
space is going to look.
El Socorro, is a neighborhood in Comuna 13 where there had been landslide due to torrential
rains that destroyed five houses and killed many of the family members inside. These landslides
are common in the hillsides up and around the city, where homes lack strong foundations and
slide down the hills during heavy rains. As part of the PUI of Comuna 13, they worked with the
community on what they wanted to do with this space. Part of the idea behind the project was to
create something in that space that would be more protected against a future landslide. "Fueron
28 los muertos por tragedia de El Socorro I ELESPECTADOR.COM." Noticias I
ELESPECTADOR.COM. http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/articulo-invierno-
medellin-deja-tres-personas-muertas (accessed May 6, 2010).
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Figure 2 Luis Galeano's Cell phone with the image of the render of the new park in commemoration of the
tragedy of El Socorro. The render image displays the icon of the Mayor Administration. Source: Luis
Galeano.
As Galeano alludes to here, the Talleres de Imaginarios generated broad
definitions of what the projects were supposed to be. They involved hundreds
of participants drawing and discussing in an effort to create a broad consensus
about a project name and the general aesthetic qualities. These decisions were
made in a space where clearly the EDU members have the intellectual and
institutional authority. The community members are free to describe what they
want included, but every section of the workshop is guided by members of the 1s9
EDU. Only a few of the EDU members, mostly the social workers, live in the
communities being work shopped. The architects, politicians, and urban
planners are usually from high to middle income neighborhoods, not from the
communities being work shopped. Many of the EDU staff are youth, newly
graduated from architectural school. Thus, people who have never lived in the
communities and who are a generation or two or three younger than the
community leaders, sometimes led these community workshops. This
permeates the entire workshop process with longstanding classed power
dynamic that in many ways runs counter to the spirit of equal collaboration
promoted by the EDU. My impression, from observing some of these
workshops, is that the community leaders are well aware of these class
dynamics but area also aware that this is the only option they have at the
moment to obtain something from the state for their neighborhood. None of
the interviewees' for this project indicated that they perceived that they as
community members had a lack of authority. On the contrary, they were firm in
their assertion that they made the decision on approving the "renders" that EDU
presented to them. The community members, in fact, always referred to
"renders," a word that architects in Colombia borrow from the English language
to mean what they would call in Spanish, "computer generated image." The
community members' ubiquitious use of the word "renders" also highlights how
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powerful it is that they see their ideas in three-dimensional image created by
professional architects.
Second, the participation of the community in the planning process empowered
and continues to empower the community members in the sense that it creates
an aura of leverage in their negotiations with the state about how and what
about the projects are imagined, designed and implemented.
I conclude that the community members perception of having (rather than
lacking) in the planning process is the result of this being the first time that this
level of community-city official planning strategies were implemented in
Medellin, and also that this is the first time that the state (represented here by
the EDU) was involved in a real transformation of their environment. According
to community members, this transformation and EDU's involvement in this
context, did not involve an expropriation. The community perceived they were
informed of, and in some ways, collaborated with at each step that the city took
in a non-aggressive environment. This created a sense of transparency and this
is what created the community's final compliance with the projects. If the
community had not trusted this process, they could have blocked the entire
project, as they have blocked the state trying to evict them from their houses
for forty years.
2. The Participative Budget
Mayor Fajardo's office implemented the participative budget, process inspired
from Brazil," to make more transparent the finances of the municipality and to
comply with international requirements that "asked" the state to increase levels
of community participation in governance. This is required by all international
development aid agencies giving support to Colombia, including the World
Bank, the International Development Bank (IDB), and the PNUD (UNDP United
Nations Development Programme). 4 From these interviews, I conclude that the
Participative Budget has been successful in terms of two main categories. It is a
way (1) to financially support the already existing community organizations,
1 The strategies of the PB were first implemented in Brazil in the municipality of Porto
Alegre in 1986. This project was widely publicized as a best practice and became popular
in many European and Latino American cities.
14 G6 mez Hernandez, Esperanza. 2007. El presupuesto participativo entre democracia,
pobreza y desarrollo. 15: 0121-3261.
Figure 3 Participation at the
workshops in the PUI Comuna
Nororiental. Source: Modelo
Medellin, Alcaldia de Medellin.
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such as the Junta Administradora Local (local administrative group) JAC and
NGOs and (2) to force negotiations and collaborations between divergent
community groups that finally create a consensus on a priority of needs at the
comuna level to begin a common path.
Members of both the Planning Department and the communities who
participated in the planning agreed that the Participative Budget was a good
arena to consolidate divergent voices of the community into a common goal.
One EDU member, a social worker who lives in Comuna 6 and is participating in
the PUI for Comuna 6 and 7 said,
The PB [Participative Budget] has created important alliances
between other neighborhood groups that would have never
negotiated with each other, and created a singular vision of
community that goes beyond the local vision of the
neighborhood... [so] then there can be different neighborhoods
that can join resources that will benefit the entire comuna.
Another community member Juan David Carmona, who lives in Comuna 13
where he is a leader of an NGO, said,
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The PB has had a lot of influence in the way leaders of the
neighborhood interact with each other. Leaders and groups
who did not like each other now have to work together and this
has changed the mentality of the leaders from a closed circle
[who care only about their own] to think in terms of Comuna.
We know and acknowledge each other.
On the other hand, the community organizations that profit from the projects of
the PB are dependent on funding from this PB mechanism to maintain their
programs. I see this as a positive aspect. This competitiveness maintains the
quality of the community-generated projects and because of the yearly
application for funding; the community members themselves evaluate their
effectiveness as a function of a consensual priority. If everyone does not feel
they are profiting from the project, they as a community could cancel the
funding, and thus the project. Other authors critique this one-year based
process of funding as a shortcoming that does not allow the community to think
long-term, but I think because this yearly process requires constant consensus,
it does in some ways allow the community to maintain control over the
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effectiveness of the projects. Juan David Carmona also shares this dual praise
and concern for the PB yearly funding process: when he said "we still are not
self sustainable, we still depend economically on the PB."
Esperanza Hern ndez G6mez (2007) critiqued the PB process as a technocratic
endeavor that was easily manipulated by the municipality. 15 Gomez found that
the PB attracted already organized groups but its planning and contractual
complexity left out single individuals who tried to benefit from the program.
Many of the community members I interviewed who did not belong to large or
longstanding community groups mirrored the critique by Gomez. Community
member Amparo Torres H. said, "I have known about the presupuesto
participativo [PB], but I have not been able to participate."
Gomez also argues that it is a waste of resources when as a result of the PB, the
community decided to use funds in planning strategies as opposed to materials
for building the projects or giving it to a specific project already underway in the
community. I agree that this is in part a result of how technocrat the PB process
is but it is important to be clear that many of the community projects already
underway are much smaller in scope and involve far fewer community members
than the PB-funded projects. I also see that this PB process that requires
consensus provides the opportunity for the community to generate a plan of
greater scope by the community for the community.
The PB requires a higher level of consensus across many different groups and
this is why the PB was implemented in certain Comunas first. Community
member Juan David Carmona said
The Comunas with a higher understanding of the participatory
system are Comunas 13, 1 and 6. These comunas pioneered the
plans of local development [in 2004] along with the initiatives of
the Presupuesto Participativo.
They had NGOs with longstanding experience in the community, they had
community groups, and these groups had already started their own community
planning process but they did not have the financial resources to implement
their goals such as publishing their own newspapers, institutions for hosting
their own cultural events and sports activities, documenting their own history,
literacy projects and computers. These are the kinds of projects that people in
Comuna 13 were able to immediately implement with PB funding. Without this
funding, this would have been impossible.
1 G6 mez Hern6ndez, Esperanza. 2007. El presupuesto participativo entre democracia, pobreza y
desarrollo. 15: 0121-3261.
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3. Social Debt (Deuda Social)
The "social debt" concept advances the idea that the state is, in part,
responsible for the neglect of the marginalized areas of the city and for
improving the conditions of those marginalized communities. This idea is what
Sergio Fajardo's political discourse calls "Deuda Social," or "Social Debt."
Community members have confirmed this glaring gap-a problem of
separation- between the formal development of the city and the informal
development of the neighborhoods included in this study. Community members
narrate how they themselves built housing and neighborhood infrastructure
including roads, churches, sewers, and electrical hook-ups. Furthermore, the
political discourse of the Mayor and planning officials confirmed the idea that
the new administration was trying to change the approach toward these areas
that have long been neglected, some for more than 40 years.
This separation of these communities from state provided resources created, in
my view, three critical conditions that are reflected in the interviews.
* illegal groups as state-like actors: The long absence of the state provided
the space for illegal armed groups to fulfill state-like actions, along with
their own political and financial activities, in the territory. 163
* Settlers as second-class citizens: The aura of illegality in which these
communities developed transfers that illegal status to their inhabitants. This
acquired second-class status is reflected (and reinforced) in the way the
inhabitants of other parts of the city perceive the inhabitants of these areas
and in how these communities perceive themselves in relationship to the
responsibility of the state with them.
* Physical interventions seen as transformative actions: The communities
felt that the new physical interventions were the way that the municipal
state started to close the gap between the state and the community in this
territory.
Illegal groups as state-like actors
Often, community members described how their community's "independence"
from the formal state permitted other armed organizations to fulfill state
functions, such as security and dispute resolution. This ability to perform these
authoritarian actions often was supported by the absence of the state.
Community member Juan David Carmona said that in his community,
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the guerrilla had been the authority since 1990. They [the guerrilla] arrived in
the early 1980s but consolidated authority in 1990. The police would arrive
here and leave... [the guerrilla] intervened in all internal disputes in the
neighborhood. All community leaders at some point would need to negotiate
with the authority [guerrilla].
Gang (combo) control area
Figure 4 Map of Gangs of comuna 5 & 6 at January 2010 showing the multiplicity of armed groups fighting
control over territory. Source: Protected (provided upon request)
Carmona is part of an NGO that specializes in community communications. They
have their own TV station and they publish the first newspaper to exist in
Comuna 13 about Comuna 13. This existed long before the PB funding, but
currently is funding by the PB. Carmona argued that this media would have to
negotiate with the guerrillas to determine what photographs and information
could be published. Carmona adds, "Many were affected by this. When the
paramilitary (another armed illegal group) arrived to Comuna 13, all community
leaders were targeted as collaborators" because they had had to negotiate their
media communications via the guerrilla groups. These community journalists
then were either killed by the incoming paramilitary or they fled their
neighborhood. Carmona inherited the NGO when the paramilitary arrived
because the old leaders had to flee. Carmona was 18 years old. At 19, he was
negotiating with the PB to fund the communications project. Another youth
who works at this NGO is the founder and star of a Comuna 13 cable show
......... ... ..... ...   ...... -
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Figure 5 Santo Domingo Savio
1960s Source: Photo album of
the Padre Gabriel Diaz at the
parque biblioteca Spain
called "Live With Super Jakei"16 It is dedicated to community programming and
all filming takes place in a studio built in the second floor of the house where
the NGO is based. After Operacion Orion, a community member standing in the
midst of the chaotic military "sweep" in Comuna 13 of "guerrilla collaborators,"
accused Jake of being a FARC Commander. Jake was one of the 240 community
members arrested during this four-day Operacion. In fact, Jake had never been
involved with the FARC. According to Jake, the person who accused him was
actually jealous because Jake was then dating the accuser's ex girlfriend. Jake
was in jail for three months. He was 18 years old. When I interviewed him, he
said he returned to Comuna 13 because it was his home and because he felt it
was important to record cultural life there.
Settlers as second-class citizens
(D Mitlin 2003) writes about the process known as "land invasion" in Latin
American countries in which people newly arrived from the countryside fleeing
violence and poverty. In Latin America, "[miost low-income households in urban
areas ... lack secure tenure because acquiring land through formal channels, or
purchasing or renting accommodation on legally developed land, is beyond their
means."'1 The result, Geoff Payne writes, is that "non-formal tenure has
become the most common single form of land development in most cities."18
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My interviews with community members made it very clear that the newly
arrived population who live in Comunas 13, 1 and 2 are in this category and that
the state of illegality imposed limitations and constant insecurity on their living
conditions, including the constant threat of evictions, lack of access to water,
sanitation, drainage, health care, schools and other forms of infrastructure and
services along with the inability to exercise citizen rights and access government
programs for the poor (including grants and mortgages to improve their homes).
All of this further distances them from changing their status as second-class
citizens and increasing their access to basic life services. Maria Leonisa Gomez, a
resident of Comuna 2, said
When we arrived to Medellin [in the 1970s] there was no water.
No electricity. There were no roads. We would get lost coming
16 nterview video "la violencia no es toda la Historia comuna 13"
17 Mitlin, D. 2003. "A fund to secure land for shelter: supporting strategies of the organized poor".
ENVIRONMENT AND URBANIZATION. 15: 181-192.
18 Payne, Geoff. 2002. Land, rights and innovation: improving tenure security for the urban poor.
London: ITDG., pages 3-22.
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to our homes. There were just a few shanties [tugurios]. The
transportation would only arrive up as far as the barrio Villa del
Socorro [because the road ended there, a half-mile away from
their home up a steep muddy mountainside]. There were just a
few families. There were no schools or churches. We made the
church of the Divina Providencia. That was the first church with
the Priest Federico ... There were around 100 houses but [they
were] separated from each other.
Figure 6 First shelters at Santo Domingo Savio 1967. Source: Photo album of the Padre Gabriel Diaz at the
parque biblioteca Spain.
Gomez said that the priest provided food for the residents as they were building
the church and other infrastructural projects. In this way, the priest was serving
a function similar to the NGOs. While at face value to an outside, this might look
like it is simply mirroring the Catholic Church's colonial conquest exploitation of
poor residents; these were very different kinds of priests. Many of the priests
working in poor neighborhoods in the 1970s were aligned with Liberation
Theology.' 9
Figure 7 Padre Gabriel Diaz,
Priest at Santo Domingo Savio
church 1967 Source: Photo
album of the Padre Gabriel Diaz
at the parque biblioteca Spain
19 Araya, Victorio. 1983. God of the poor the mystery of God in Latin American liberation theology.
Maryknoll <New York>: Orbis Books.
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Sirley Natalia Cifuentes of the same Comuna, talking not about the 1970s but
the 1990s, "before (PUI) we collaborated selling food [empanadas] to build the
infrastructure of the neighborhood the streets and the sewer."
Another example of how separated these communities are from the most basic
elements of citizenship in the formal city and the nation is exemplified in the
Colombian identification card: the cedula. In Colombia, the only way to enter
state buildings, educational facilities, banks, and other basic needs, including
the right to vote, is with this identification card. Without a cedula, an individual
loses all his or her rights. Non possession of a cedula at "random" check points
common in Medellin is punishable by jail. An individual without a cedula is by
legal standards less than a citizen.
Many residents of these communities are not even aware that they, as
Colombian citizens, have the right to obtain a cedula. In middle and upper
income families, when you are seven years old, your parents take you with your
birth certificate to the Registraduria de la Naci6n for your first identification
card. When you are 18 years old, you follow the same process but you can go
yourself to receive your permanent cedula. The entire process for obtaining
both cedulas is free. Some residents of low income neighborhoods do not have
birth certificates, let alone knowledge of this bureaucratic process. Other 167
residents who have just fled their homes due to violence in the countryside had
to leave their documents behind or lost them along the way. This is yet another
dimension of separation between the formal and informal development of the
city.
In 2009, Department of Social Welfare (Secretaria of bienestar social) began
hosting events in which 300 people at a time would complete the process to get
their cedula.20
Physical interventions seen as transformative actions
How did the interviewees view the projects actually built in their communities?
All 25 interviewees believed that the physical interventions were the way that
the municipal state started to close the gap between the state and the
community in these territories. Community member Maria Leonisa Gomez said
20 Interviews at the secretaria of Bienestar social (social welfare)
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When they started talking in a meeting about the cable project"
I thought, knowing how terrible this neighborhood is, "Who will
bring that here? No one is able to get in here and then for
what? We will not be able to have access to it" ... and then we
had the opportunity to have it and how many other things I will
be able to see now.
This statement reveals not just a community member being satisfied with the
state project but the incredulousness with which community members originally
met the ideas of the state provided infrastructure because the state would be
afraid of entering there. Once the physical intervention happened, it opened the
possibility to imagine a different kind future state-community relationship. Luis
Horacio Galeano Ruiz, a resident of Comuna 13 said
They [children] have access to things that we were not able to
have before like the computers and the internet. We the less
economically favored now have access to the technologies, that
gift that they [the state] gave us ... I would not even know how
to start or turn off a computer... the metro cable has been
strategic. It is great because the image and the physical space
around the stations has improved.
This reinforces that the project that seemed impossible to arrive, arrived.
Furthermore, the services that were provided to the community were open to
everyone in the community .ad opening more possibilities for the inhabitants.
In this case the resource was computer literacy which can dramatically change
the youth's performance in school, access to the job market, and through the
internet to the outside world. I am not arguing that a child having access to a
computer automatically has all of these things. I am arguing that the community
members believe this and this changed what they believe to be relevant actions
and involvement with the state.
2 First public meetings in Medellin about the implementation of the metro cable
system.
Figure 8 Parque Bilioteca
Belen, internet Room Source:
Modelo Medellin, Alcaldia de
Medellin.
.. ............ 
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4. Institutional Support EDU and the PUI.
The interview produced many comments from EDU members and the
community members about the effectiveness of EDU as an institutional bridge
among public and private partners, as well as about the PUI process. I have
divided my findings into two categories: the institutional dimension of the EDU
and the intervention, or action, in the field of the PUI.
Institution (EDU)
* The EDU is an autonomous and efficient branch of the state, whose
independence helped to negotiate the bureaucratic process of the different
state organisms responsible for the territory of the study area.
* The community sees the EDU as the most visible representation of the state
during the Fajardo Administration. The EDU was seen as a non-repressive
organism of the state, which has achieved a permanent presence on the
territory.
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Intervention (PUI)
* The PUI was a concerted effort of all branches of the state at once that
intervened in a short timeframe (about 3 years) that made positive and
significant changes in the areas of action.
* The PUI provided a new democratic planning framework that provided
legitimacy to the physical interventions.
* The efficient delivery of the high quality projects agreed upon by the PUI by
the EDU, changed the relationship between the state and the community in
the sense that it built trust among the communities for the EDU and the PUI
and by extension the state.
Institution (EDU)
Camilo Restrepo, an architect who participated in some the mesas de trabajo,
planning ideas meetings at the citywide level. These are open to everyone and
operate in terms of not just individual communities but the city at large. He was
the architect of large city projects including the renovation of Medellin's
Botanical Gardens. Restrepo said,
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10 years ago there were talks about the violence happening in
these areas of the city but there was never a plan for it. And this
city, in relation to other Latin American cities, is a really planned
one. That was the contribution of the PUI.
Jos6 Fernando Jaramillo Giraldo, Director of the PUI in Comuna 6 and 7, mirrors
the above statement.
Before the EDU, planeaci6n [the Planning Department] would
intervene in the city but only in terms of partial projects, never
as a coordinated infrastructure. As an example you have the
PRIMED. 2 The PRIMED was an entity that tried to improve the
quality of the stock of housing already existing mainly in high
slope areas, and that today under the PUI is one of the factors
in which we intervened. At the PRIMED, there was the Instituto
de credito territorial [Territorial Credit Institute]. That was only
for new housing. But they were never interested in relocating
from zones of high risk. That [relocation] is also included in the
EDU. So the administration already had the tools to intervene
but before this idea of EDU, they existed but acted
independently from each other. What the process and the
methodology has done is put together all those tools and
enriched them with some others that did exist but were not
efficient.
Intervention (PUI)
Alejandro Echeverry, the first Director of the EDU under the Fajardo Mayoral
administration. He part of the Mayoral political movement and was
instrumental in changing the structure of the EDU and selected a group of
people, mainly academics to administrate the EDU. He is the person who coins
the term "urbanismo social" (social urbanism) which defines the goal of the PUI
and the EDU to bring physical infrastructure to low-income areas as a way to
more equitable social conditions. Echeverry says about the PUI as a tool to
22 Regularization of Informal Settlements in Medellin. Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de
Barrios Informales. PRIMED (Integral Program for the Informal Settlements Improvement of
Medellin).
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integrate all actions of the states in the community territories. It is not just the
state, but the state doing physical projects. He said,
We the [EDU] are the ones with the mission to incorporate all
those elements together by using the tools of the
administration and to involve the community in the process so
they [community members] believe that this will happen and
actually become effective. To integrate all actors interested in
the territory: the one who administers [the state], the one who
operates [the entities who make projects such as state funding
agencies, NGOs] and the ones who live there [the community].
Being able to integrate this vision is what makes this project
successful.
This view of the EDU as an integrator bringing many different actors into one
single project is corroborated by the community member Carmona. When I
asked Carmona what, if any, projects had been instrumental in improving the
quality of life in his neighborhood in Comuna 13, he said the "PUI, has made
parks, the house of justice and will start to make a series of projects, there is no
question that this has affected the lives of people." When I asked this same
question to the other community members I interviewed, they said "yes." While m
they did not elaborate with specific examples as Carmona did, this is not
uncommon when the response is positive.
5. Illegal armed groups
All the interviewees talked about the state of security and power in the areas of
study before the interventions. Their narratives explain, with different
emphasis, who possessed the power or authority in these areas. The discourse
on this subject did not substantially differ among the planners and the
community members. Planners did focus on national and citywide security
policies in terms of a more academic, broad and abstract understanding of the
National conflict. Community members, on the other hand, were more aware of
specifically who and when people threatened security, how a power force
entered their neighborhood, and ways these illegal actors exercised their
acquired power.
The Assistant Director of the Planning Department Juan Diego Lopera, about
ways that national security issues impacted security issues in the city. He
explained how the failed peace process between the national government and
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the FARC leaders under then President Pastrana's leadership impacted the
security in the city of Medellfn:
We reached a new critical point from 2001-2003 because the
violence had risen, because there was an increase in the
number of guerrilla groups that were in the city. Thanks to the
[Presidential] peace process, they [the guerrilla] were able to
get to the urban center, and inside the city they financed
[themselves] through extortion, selective kidnappings.
These selective kidnappings are different to mass kidnappings that happened in
the rural areas. Lopera argued that
That [Presidential] peace process reduced the economic
possibilities in the city, and also it was the moment that
external investment left the city along with a large group of
Colombians. We were in a peace process that generated a lack
of governability given the rise of violence by these groups. Also
this justified the creation of what were called Paramilitary
groups and this was reflected in the city of Medellin in the
poorest and more isolated communities at the edges of the city.
He is referring to armed actors in the neighborhoods where the community
members live. The youth in these communities are deeply impacted by the
presence of these armed actors in these neighborhoods. For these youth, it
becomes a possible source of income where income is hard to come by. The
architect Restrepo said "Living with the violence in this country, is living in a
non-declared war, where being paramilitary or Guerrilla is a job."
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DRR)
In terms of the DDR process, all the interviews reflect a general lack of
satisfaction with the outcome. The planning department and politicians agreed
that the process was not totally successful but did consider some dimensions of
the process to be effective. Juan Diego Lopera, the Assistant Director of the
Medellin Planning Department explained that,
the city of Medellin was the only one that has programs and
resources to reincorporate this population [ex parmamilitary
members]. If you look at other areas of the country the national
government offered some of the resources [for re-insertion],
but Medellin also had a program to continue with this process.
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Unlike the national government program, the city of Medellin went beyond just
disarmament with impunity; it also provided education, healthcare, and job
training. "This was important," Lopera said, "because at the end this population
will if they come from other places stay here, and if we were able to do it right
this will be really beneficial for the city."
Jose Fernando Jaramillo Giraldo the Director of the PUI Noroccidental,
considers that the DDR process was largely a failure, due in great part to the
change of political ideology with Alonso Salazar, the new Mayor who succeeded
Sergio Fajardo Marin. Marin says that this is because the community has lost
trust in the DDR process because of its failure in the sense that violence is on
the rise again. He said that the EDU is working in these communities with
physical projects but the new Mayoral administration has not followed up these
new projects with social projects aimed at helping the community negotiate
peace accords.
This kind of discontent with the DDR process can be more acute in communities
in which people live with the consequences of the failed peace process. Eliana
Restrepo, a resident of Comuna 6 for three decades, her entire lifetime said of
the DDR process,
this one is a demobilized but still walking the neighborhood
with a gun in his pocket? So what was left of the 173
demobilization? It was left in a paper trail. We the inhabitations
do not believe in that process.
The territory of Comuna 1 and 2 had been divided in pieces of territories or turfs
by the multiplicity of gangs fighting each other to conquer the vacuum left by
the DDR dismantling of the large paramilitary AUC and Oficina de Envigado
extortion and drug network. See Figure 4. With the ex leader of the AUC or
other groups either extradited or dead, each gang would claim its territory
sometimes as small as a single block. Restrepo said that this is "why Medellin
lives in a new process of violence where there is an internal dispute for power,
they are killing themselves from the inside out."
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Figure 9 DDR Process with the AUC Medellin 2003-2007. Source: Alcaldia de Medellin
What is interesting about the perceptions of the DDR is that during my
interviews two years before with community members in 2008,3 the responses
about the ongoing process were more positive, irregularities were not evident
when asked of community members. They would point out specific successful
examples and of reintegration that would not be recorded in official media, such
as the participation of ex-militants as construction workers during the
construction of the Metro Cable in Santo Domingo. Today those stories have
been erased. It shows that the DDR process while originally successful, has
failed to be sustainable because the political leaders were not vigilant about
making sure the exmilitants were complying with DDR rules and the lack of
compromise in which the government did not publicly acknowledge the DDR
reinserted into the labor pool and into civil life. A major case in point is that 60%
of the metrocable in Comuna 1 and 2 were built by reinsertados but the
company responsible for building it did not want this information to be public
because of the negative image that the reinsertados have of being criminals and
dangerous. The company feared this fact would damage its reputation. As in
the EDU-run Imaginary Workshops in the Comunas in the initial stages of
planning, this company desire to hide its reinsertado source of labor from the
general public reveals ways that an underlying class dynamic complicates and
works against the goals of complete re-integration of these groups into the
middle and upper income sectors of Medellin society.
In my opinion, the fragmentation of the conflict between a multiplicity of gangs
that we see today can be seen as a partial success of the DDR program, but not
one that was expected. It was successful because it dismantled the large power
23 La violencia no es toda /a Historia, historical Memory Project.
24 Marko, Tamera. "Invisible Workers: youth, power & nation-building as negotiations of peace in
Medellin, Colombia." Unpublished manuscript. 2008.
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structure of the paramilitary network. However, this dismantling process failed
to micro-manage the multiplicity of smaller, largely youth-run gangs that the
larger paramilitary organization had absorbed during their attack on the
territory. These gangs (known as combos) are the ones operating today in the
territory and are responsible for the new rise in violence there.
This failure of the DDR process reveals a positive dimension of the city's physical
interventions in the territories, a positive dimension that is perhaps one of the
most important findings in this study. This new gang violence reveals that the
new physical projects established during the PUI, maintain their autonomy from
illegal groups during this resurgence of violence. These physical spaces, in fact,
were safe havens where I performed my interviews in Comuna 1 and 2. They
maintain the legitimate presence of the state with the neighborhood and
continue operating under these circumstances. Furthermore, the public
transportation links (metrocable linked directly to the metro line) are the only
way to bypass the mobility restrictions imposed on the inhabitants by the
fighting groups.
It is clear that in the near future, the strength of the state's presence alone will
not be the final solution. Restrepo who lives in Comuna 6 articulated in poignant
fashion these preconditions that are necessary for the future sustainability of 175
the project:
There should be a new process of negotiation with these
groups, a process that generates opportunities, but not only for
the ones who are armed [but also] for the ones who are not
armed so we don't have this problem again in five years.
6. Infrastructure as Security
I questioned community members about security issues. All community
members responded by either stating directly or inferring ways that the physical
projects increase security in their neighborhood. These interviews provided a
vision of the new projects and their amenities as tools to modify the perception
of security.
The programmatic and design qualities of the new projects created new safe
areas inside the neighborhood that are accessible to all members of the
community where the state and legal security forces are always present. The
new security forces provide a passive authority that is not contested by the
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present armed actors in the neighborhood. Juan Diego Lopera, the Assistant
Director of Planning said,
The public infrastructure- schools, libraries, high schools,
sports facilities, the new police stations- seek to become
places of encounter. When we acquire the land to make this
project we usually found that the people who would use the
public space around these places were the illegal arm groups.
Today these are the places where now the entire community
have events that occur in this place.
The new projects (Parques Bibliotecas, public parks, schools and metro stations)
provided a network, new nodes of save heavens. This happened because each
one of these new investments in infrastructure were accompanied by security
measures to protect those investments. Each metro station in Medellin had the
presence of the national police force. Other types of infrastructure were
equipped with the traditional private security. In the Parque Biblioteca Espana ,
for example, the Caja de Compensacion Comfama, uses the same private
security company to guard all their buildings and they do so also in the Parques
Bibliotecas.
What is special to each one of these cases is that before the insertion of these
projects, these security forces were not present, and if they did they were seen
as repressive strategies and because of that did not create safe areas. One key
example of a repressive security force is in Comuna 13 where a new military
installation was put in place after the Operacion Orion. These forces patrolled
the neighborhood and continue repressive physical and psychological25
techniques of repression over the territory and, thus made permanent the siege
of the area.
This and other fortresses like it have bulletproof walls and windows and blast-
protection devices and holes in the wall where people on the inside can shoot
back at people on the outside. These fortresses, in security terms, are
hermetically sealed and not inviting for the public. The mission of these
2s Like riding in motorcycles around the neighborhood in large groups, similar to the
tactic used by police forces in east L.A. to repress the Black Panthers.
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fortresses is to establish the repressive state presence. In contrast, these new
physical spaces are not fortresses, like most of the traditional police stations
that are located in these periphery neighborhoods. In and around the new
physical spaces, the security forces are minimal and their mission is to protect
the assets in the neighborhood. The security measures in these projects are the
same security measures implemented in any public building or public space
throughout the city. A key value of these security forces is that they are not
seen by community members as a repressive force.
The other important factor of these surveillance-as-safe-havens is that they are
located in environments that encourage loitering. They are places designed for
people to occupy them, but not necessarily with the intention to do a specific
activity. In other words, they are public spaces in the traditional Greek sense.
The real value of this condition is that especially in marginalized neighborhoods
like the ones in Comunas 13, 1 and 2, loitering in public space, such as the street
(more specifically a street corner) is synonymous with criminal activity. Poor
youth gathered on a street corner in Medellin is seen as a sign of youth involved
in a criminal activity and this context of loitering usually inspires repressive
police force.
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Figure 10 Routine enforcement of security on the streets in Medellin. Source: El Universo.
This is in stark contrast to large groups of middle and upper class youth who
loiter in public spaces outside cafes, restaurants and bars and residences and
shopping malls in other neighborhoods throughout the city, especially on Friday
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and Saturday nights. These youth are not seen as criminals, but rather
consumers.26
The metro stations and the Parques Bibliotecas are open every day and for
extended hours beyond the typical 9-to-5 workday. This provides an extensive
and secure flux of activity in these public spaces and even when these spaces
are closed the areas around them have surveillance 24 hours a day. This is why
even regarding moments of new or mutated violence, all the community
interviewees responded to my question about whether the projects had
contributed to lowering violence in their neighborhood, with an affirmative
response. This affirmation came even when community members disagreed
with other policies implemented in their neighborhoods or even when they
were opposed to specific new projects built in their neighborhoods.
Maria Leonisa Gomez, age, resident of Comuna 1 comments about this,
We are really happy now that there are police. It is better that
the mayor has helped us a lot. For me everything has been
really good ... This has also helped to improve a lot of things and
has avoided many other problems. Now you are able to see the
law [police] walking around. Before, the police were not in the
neighborhood and if you would call them, they would be afraid
to come. Now at least you can see them; before we could not
count on them. And if we said anything they would not come,
and if they came everything had already happened and there
was nothing to see.
In January 2010, Medellin saw an increase of violence among small gangs
fighting for territorial commercial power that had opened up by the extradition
of Don Berna," a paramilitary leader in Medellin. Once again gangs divided
these neighborhoods into small territories they could control, sometimes at the
scale of a single block. This made free mobility through the neighborhood
difficult. When interviewing for this thesis project, I conducted many of the
interviews inside public buildings such as the Parques Bibliotecas, and PUI
offices, and/or in the public spaces dominated by these buildings where
interviewees felt that it was safe for them and for me. Sometimes as part of the
interview we would venture beyond the public spaces up to the limits where
interviewees were, by the new armed groups, not allowed to cross.
26 Marko, Tamera. "Invisible Youth."
Hugh, Bronstein. "Colombia's Medellin hit by new wave of drug violence I Reuters." Business &
Financial News, Breaking US & International News I Reuters.com.
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN20434908 (accessed May 6, 2010).
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What this shows is that even where other pacification strategies such as the
DDR fail and create (or allow space for) new bursts of violence, the claimed
public spaces continue offering the safe havens where the state administration
and the community mixed.
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Figure 11 Safe Heaven interpretation based on an interview survey. (White outlined areas represent new
project areas that are also safe heavens) Source: The Author.
7. Projects changing the perception of security through design
The state of many of the schools at the time of the new physical projects
required maintenance or complete reconstruction. Juan Diego Lopera, Assistant
Director of the Planning Department of Medellin, explained the way the state
had traditionally perceived its role in the school installations and the new
philosophy intervention there. He said,
... sometimes it was difficult to distinguish between a school
and a hen house. This was because many educational facilities
in these areas started with the state buying a single house and
placing in it a teacher. So, there was not a consciousness of
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what an educational facility was ... in this administration they
(the Sergio Fajardo team) understood that the public buildings
had to be of good quality so the state could get recognized,
respected [among people in the community] and for this
intervention to generate a sense of pride and belonging.
This response is very similar to how Sergio Fajardo describes the repositioning
of schools. He shows the "before picture" of a school, where a man is urinating
on the outside school wall. Then "the after picture," a modernized, totally
rebuilt school. In his words:
Think about the kid who went to that school, and who now goes
to this one. Think about her mother who left her in that school
and today leaves her in this one. Think about the teacher who
taught there and now does so on the best chalkboard that the
city can offer. Think about the community... we arrive and we
eliminate violence ... the man on the street he does not go there
[to urinate] anymore. And inside we have a traditional project
of improving the quality of education. But the quality of
education starts with the dignity of the space.
Figure 12 Before and after school picture at conference del Miedo a la Esparanza of Sergio Fajardo (Man
Urinating on the street). Source: Sergio Fajardo.
The exercise of modifying the physical space of the criminalized neighborhood is
not only an exercise in changing the internal perception of the community about
themselves. More importantly, it is a way to remove the blanket stigma of
criminal that people outside these neighborhoods place on the people who live
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
inside them. In Medellin, (as in many other cities in the world), belonging to this
type of communities brings an automatic stigma that limit the residents' access
to opportunities, such as jobs in an already difficult national market.
Interviewees narrate how difficult it was to access some jobs when they disclose
in which neighborhood they lived.
The PUI projects, have at some level, eliminated the scope of this perceptual
criminalization. At least 50% percent of the community members interviewed
acknowledge a change in outsiders' perception of the population in general
about their community. They support this claim largely through their increased
access to employment. All interviewees from the community and the planners
and politicians most often mentioned the Parques Bibliotecas as playing a role
in this changing perception.
Camilo Restrepo is the architect of the new pavilion at the Botanical Gardens,
part an urban project called the new north (the north of Medellin is the poorest
area) that revitalized old entertainment and educational infrastructures. About
this urban project he said,
A great paradox of this process is that the neighborhood association of
El Poblado [Comuna 14 is El Poblado, the richest neighborhood in
Medellin where some homes have six-car garages and apartments 181
with a swimming pool for each floor] has lobbied to obtain a meeting
with the Mayor and the planning department because they find it
terrible that this neighborhood does not have a library (a Parque
Biblioteca). The paradox is that this is a neighborhood that has
everything, where there are the most opportunities in the city. Here
there is the desire to have the same infrastructure as that of the
neighborhood that historically has not had anything.
It is this desire to have the same level of opportunities as the poorest
neighborhoods that is striking about this statement. It shows that areas not
usually part of the city as places of reference for coveted infrastructure and
spaces have the potential to make changes in middle and upper-class
perceptions of low-income inhabitants of these neighborhoods. Alejandro
Echeverry, the former EDU Director and the one who coined the term
"urbanismo social" said,
If you understand how the conflicts developed in the territory,
the modification of that territory from the physical point of view
is a really potent strategy but not the only one. That's why I
think that we were right to place the projects where we did,
where we put the Parques Bibliotecas and with which projects
they are connected.
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Echeverry emphasized that while "these projects were made with a competition
open at the national level" and that this competition resulted in high quality
projects, the real "success of the projects is where they are placed and with
what they are connected and what you put next to them. Those are the urban
decisions."
Sirley Natalia Cifuentes, a resident of Comuna 1, also framed these projects has
responsible in some ways for transforming the neighborhood.
After the construction of the physical projects there was an
effect on the amount of violence in the neighborhood, it was a
very large change...The metro cable has improved the
neighborhood a lot.
A resident of another neighborhood, Comuna 13, Luis Horacio Galeano Ruiz said
of the Parques Biblioteca in his community,
That was a spectacular impact, you can see that many of the
kids of the neighborhood use the Parques Bibliotecas and spend
less time on the street. They have access to things that we were
not able to have before like the computers and the interment.
We the least economically favored now have access to the
technologies, that gift that they give us. I would not even know
how to start or turn off a computer. The community has
appropriated that space in a impressive way. You see kids of all
economic levels (estratos) in the Parques Bibliotecas. There is
no discrimination for the way you dress. They treat everyone as
equal. [This provides the] capacity that the kids need to acquire
to get out of the conflict.
I see this unidad [sports facilities, another project] is occupied at
all times. The good thing about that is that there the young kid
or adult has his time occupied instead of being on a corner
looking at people and at what kind of crime he is going to
commit. Eight years ago these areas that did not have any
function... [now] people will do their things in this spaces.
Juan David Carmona, a resident of Comuna 13 believes the key projects that
have transformed his neighborhood especially include the metro cable, PUI, the
PB, and the Parque Biblioteca. He also said that he believes that the fondo EPM
(university grants) and the tiquetes estudiantiles (transportation subsidies for
students) have had a great impact in Comuna 13 specifically and throughout the
entire city in general.
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Several community members also mention the metro cable as transforming
their neighborhoods and daily lives in significant ways. Luis Horacio Galeano
Ruiz says,
The metro cable has been great. Transportation has improved
by 95%. The comuna, the metro cable has been a great strategy
because the image and the physical space around the station
has improved. Also because it has created spaces that are
secure and protected and are not isolated areas, places where
you can gather, but it is also the transportation that is a great
thing.
Juan David Carmona, another community member, said about the food stands
and craft vendors outside the metro cable and lining the walkway up to the
Parque Biblioteca entrance that "the metro cable created an economic
resurgence of community-owned projects around this project. We have not
seen that before. Lopera, the Assistant Director of Planning said,
Before the cable there was not a single bank in Santo Domingo
[Comuna 1 and 2]... You can see how tourism has changed in the
city, the hotel industry in Medellin used to take vacations
[close] during holidays. That says a lot about the [tourist]
industry in the city and that has changed completely now. 183
The other way of measuring successful changes in perception is the inclusion of
the northern territories in the touristic maps that represent the city of Medellin.
Until 2007, all representation of the touristic city maps did not show the entire
urban area. They limit their representations of the city to the historical center
and wealthier areas of Laureles and El Poblado.
4
Figure 13 Tourist maps of Medellin before and after the interventions in red is the comuna 1 and 2 with the
metro cable and the Parque Biblioteca Espaiia mark. Source: www.medellininfo.com and Alcaldia de
Medellin.
.... .. ..... ..
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Since the introduction of these new infrastructures, the north of the city has
become part of this map. This inclusion is because of the impact of the new
scenic transportation system (metro cable) and because of the introduction of
the building infrastructure at a city scale, such as the PB parques bibliotecas that
continue receiving up to 2,000 visitors a day. These hordes of tourists are not
really interested in visiting poverty, as with traditional tours of favelas in Brazil
or the Darhavi "Sum" in India. On the contrary, the tourists are there for the
experience of what to them is this new and strange transportation system that
gives them the opportunity to enjoy stunning views of the city and because they
want to visit the Parques Bibliotecas as architecturally interesting pieces. They
are there in the comuna 1 and 2 to see these citywide infrastructure projects
that cannot be seen in any other areas of the city and that represent the unique
experience of the "transformation process of Medellin."
This indirect exposure that the community receives, not for their lack of
resources as in the case of poverty tourism, but instead in terms of the
resources that they do have and which are desirable and unique, is important. It
makes these communities, once invisible, now visible in the eyes of an entire
community and makes the tourists participants in the productive activities of
the city in general.
The next chapter will explore ways in which the themes found in my interviews
can become lessons learned from Medellin as a Best Practice case study.
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Medellin Case as a "Best Practice"
What are the lessons learned?
This section explores the possibility of applying lessons learned from the
Medellin case as Best Practice to other similar contexts. These contexts
especially focus on cities where longtime informal settlements (in existence
from 10 to 60 years or more) have lacked a consistent state presence, a
situation, which in turn, has enabled other organizations to challenge state
authority over the territory. Lessons learned here might be meaningful, for
example, to the current struggle with informal communities and narcotraffic
wars in cities throughout Mexico.
These are the preconditions that help to identify the territories and community
where this practice might be implemented.
* Extreme poverty. These communities live (often well) under the poverty
line. Because of this they are not able to access to the formal housing
market, which forces them to appropriate and build their environment
illegally.
* Isolation from the state. This condition of illegality generates a situation in
which the informal community lives in a kind of public services limbo that
impedes the state (by negligence or lack of resources) from delivering the
full scope of its services.
* Forced Migration. These communities, often relatively unexpected and in
massive and sudden numbers, arrive to the city but lack the resources and
network connections to access the formal city and to become part of the
formal productive core. Later generations of these migrations will still lack
the possibility of access to those networks because the physical space of the
informal communities to which they come reinforces the economic and
social isolation of such communities.
* The condition of isolation from the state and its public services permits
other actors to challenge the authority of the state. This intensifies levels of
insecurity in the community and in the city at large.
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The "Best Practice" is a way to reclaim the sovereignty of the state over the
territory by modifying the physical conditions of the space and connecting its
territory and their inhabitants to the benefits of the formal productive structure
of the city. By physically modifying the territory, the projects guarantee a
network of formal structure that will make it more difficult for armed illegal
actors to challenge the sovereignty of the state. The projects return what I call
"apparently lost citizenship" of the community affected. They are an attempt to
modify the way these individuals are perceived in the eyes of the overall
community. The integration of the informal city with the productive city and the
provision of all state services open a window of opportunities for the
community to participate democratically and economically in the decision
making process of their community and of the future of the city.
This best practice tries to eliminate the conditions of marginalization through
the implementation of physical projects that are complemented by policies
learned from the Medellin case. Of course marginalization and social inequality
are larger issues at a macro and micro scale that cannot only be removed by the
implementation of a project like this. The resurgence of violence in the last year
(2010) in some of the communities of this case study in Medellin is an example
and warning of the limitations of some of these practices.
Concluding lessons
Here I have created six concluding best practice lessons that I see emerging
from the intersected themes of this study. This is an initial idea for the creation
of a best case practice that can be applied to other contexts.
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* Participation of the community in the process of transformation of
their environment and as a way to create sustainable partnerships and
participative planning.
" Legitimization of the community which removes the illegal conditions
of the environment in which the inhabitants lived and also removes the
repercussions of how this illegal status modifies the way community
members are perceived by the broad community (City and Nation) as
illegal and thereby criminals.
* Institutional and Project Coordination between the different
organizations that operate in the territory. These organizations should
be a combination governmental and non- governmental. Their actions
need to be a collective effort throughout the territory in a concise time
frame such as three to five years.
* Security Strategy involves negotiations with all actors who are harmful
to the community security to create momentum for the possibility of
the introduction of a different kind of security force through the use of
new physical infrastructures. This is a passive strategy because of its
focus on negotiation and invitation from the community to obtain
higher levels of security not just provided outside the community from
the state, but with state police sources within the community itself.
" Presence of the State uses the new projects to introduce a permanent 187
presence of the non-oppressive branches of the state. This is an attempt
to close the gap between the state and the community that leave
spaces for armed actors to challenge state authority in the territory.
* Design as an Agent of Social Change is a tool that makes all
interventions visible and effective. It is the motor that changes the
perceptions of the larger community about the inhabitants of the
marginalized communities where the projects are placed and it is the
tool that guarantees community improvement through providing of a
higher quality environment.
1. Participation in the Process of Transformation
At the PUI, community involvement became a fundamental instrument of
communication and to secure the sustainability of the projects. In Medellin, the
EDU used simple planning participation techniques and while I see them as not
enough, the community in general did not see them as a failure. This happened
because processes like this had not been implemented before by the state and
because this process built on the same communication strategies that NGOs,
that did have a strong presence in the communities, had previously (and
Chapter 6
sometime currently) employed there. The community's sense of agency and
investment in participating with the state and other actors and make decisions
about their community's future was fundamental for the initiation, completion
and sustainability of the projects.
There are two main components of this strategy that are crucial to consider. The
first is the process of the participation in the intervention and the second is a
longer process of participation in which the community actually takes control of
their own future. In Medellin, I saw an initial stage of this reflected in the
Participatory Budget.
Participation in the intervention. Steps necessary to achieve the participation
goals of the project:
* Increase the level of community participation in the territory. The present
state of power that the community possesses in the area of interventions is
that what was effective about the Medellin case is that the type of
participation that existed in the community was increased. It is not that it is
enough, but because nothing had been done before, to do anything seemed
like a giant increase. This relatively low benchmark must be increased
incrementally once the process starts. It is important for the community to
feel that they have achieved more control over their future than they had
before. This moving up the "Ladder of Citizen Participation" 1 Arnstein
(1969) is not only beneficial for the community as they participate more in
the decisions of their future but also distributes the responsibilities for the
result of the project among all actors (State and Community).
* Negotiation with all actors in positions of authority (illegal or otherwise) in
contested spaces is crucial. The community and armed actors alike must
play a fundamental role in the signing of necessary peace contracts
necessary before any project can arrive to the area. This process of
contracts and peace negotiations should serve as the starting point of a
larger pacification process. In the case of Medellin, the non-armed actors
were left out in later stages of the peace (security) negotiations process,
which removed a crucial partner that could have helped to make the
Arnstein, Sherry R. "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," JAIP, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 1969,
pp. 216-224.
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contracts between the state and the armed groups more sustainable. This
isolation of the non-armed actors from the process also created the
perception that only those who challenge the authority of the state
benefited. This creates an incentive to become part of an illegal armed
group. In the case of Medellin, it was the community that first understood
that there were irregularities (breaches in contract) in the Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration DDR process. Making the non-armed
community members participants throughout the process can serve a
system of control and alert about irregularities and a disincentive to re-arm.
* Use of local channels of communication is essential in any planning
process. In the Medellin case, the use of already existing local channels of
communication along with parallel new local channels created a cohesive
network that kept the community informed and aware of all advances of
the project. This communication also removed or at least mitigated the
uncertainty about the intentions of the state toward the community (the
constant fear of eviction of informal settlers). These communication
channels need to be functional before, during and after the intervention.
They serve as a link between the community and the institution of the state
responsible for the modification of the space. After concluding the project,
institutional support for them need to morph into permanent institutions. 189
* Continue a clear participatory process with multiple checks and balances
where the community can execute their leverage as decision makers. Visual
agreements proved to be successful in transferring community input into
project designs. In other words, community members in the "imaginaries
workshops" drew their ideas, which were then collected by the EDU staff
and made into computer renders. Another element in this role is that the
community named the buildings and public spaces after members of their
own communities. In Medellin, as in many Latin American countries,
traditional state infrastructure practices name projects after politicians who
participated in them. For example, the government-built neighborhood
Carlos E. Restrepo in Medellin is named after an exPresident Carlos E.
Restrepo. It is important to point out that in the Fajardo regime's case in
Medellin, the community named the spaces not just after those in positions
of authority from the state or outside NGOs, but also after members and
groups they recognize in their own communities.
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* The Participatory Budget allowed two general goals. One is that the process
of prioritizing and negotiating between sometimes competing community
factions established positive lines of communications that generated a more
cohesive community. The other goal is that it provided funding to local
NGOs that otherwise could not support themselves in a community
prioritized (not state) framework (plan).
This process of collaboration between differing factions over a sustained
long-term process provides the basis for a community-based future plan
that can compete or inform the city wide plan. This strategy is similar to
Paul Davidoff's (1965) "Advocacy Planning."2 Advocacy planning is a theory
that argues not for creating one master plan but for creating multiple plans
by multiple actors throughout the city. These plans then compete with each
other to find the best solution for the city. With the communities using their
funds from the Participatory Budgets to create plans was the starting point
of what might be considered community planning.
The practice of a participatory budget is contradictory in the sense that it is
a highly technocratic planning practice that requires political and technical
expertise to be applied in the territory. Therefore, tools need to be put in
place to make the participative budget more accessible to the general
community-and also less controllable by the interests of the technocrats.
The following changes need to happen for the practice of participatory budget
to be truly participative:
* Accessible to the community at large and not only to large community
organizations
* Instruments of evaluation that control its autonomy from the state
* Third-party administration of the participatory budget that is impartial to
both the state and community.
2. Legitimization of Informal Settlements:
Removal of the Illegality of the informal settlement is crucial to provide the
community not only legal shelter but also to access their rights as citizens. Land
tenure is a pre requisite to any intervention in the area and it is also a way to
control any process of gentrification by upgrading of the neighborhood in ways
that, through cost of living increases, pushes the original community members
2 Davidoff, Paul. Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning. Stein, Jay M. 2004. Classic readings in urban
planning: an introduction. Chicago: APA Planners Press.
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out. Tenure removes the label of illegal from the population and also assures
that all economical benefits of the project go to the community and its
members.
Legitimization of informal settlements is a complex project. Some of the
conditions that need to be achieved to comply with this strategy are:
* Evaluations of the existing conditions, including surveying the level of
tenure as well as the quality and risk of housing units.
* Legalization of tenure requires negotiating with landowners and the
community members to carry out proper legal procedures expedite the
process and issue titles. This is challenging, not only because it requires
negotiations with multiple disagreeing parties, but also re-negotiations of
existing land legislation and land condemnation.
* Determine the areas of high risk to then develop an infrastructure of
stabilization and environmental control in ways that also promote the
proper technologies and practices to mitigate risk.
* Home improvement is fundamental through the granting of land tenure,
and providing technical and economic support to upgrade the housing units
to the level acceptable living conditions.
* Housing relocation is the most sensitive project. Time frames for the
construction and delivery of the units need to allow the community to be 191
relocated before all other projects (such as public buildings, parks) are
concluded. The success of the overall project will measure the efficacy of
these deliveries. Members of the community to be relocated should be
placed in areas as close to their original homes as possible because
members that get relocated to other areas of the city will suffer the sacrifice
of being severed from their roots and community, plus they will not benefit
from the improvements of the coordinated network of interventions
organizations (such as the PUI) bring to their community out of which they
were relocated.
These strategies deal with the legal definitions of illegality based on the status
of tenure. Other strategies are directed toward removing the stigma of illegality
that the city at large applies to members of informal communities.
3. Coordinated Network of Interventions
As exemplified by the PUI, to be able to bring to the territory a massive amount
of numerous projects and revamp the image of an entire neighborhood in a
span of a few years, it is fundamental to include the community members
themselves. These interventions need to come from different governmental and
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non-governmental institutions and should all be coordinated in a way that
fulfills a single objective. To do so it is important that the institution that
oversees the larger project has the agency to do the projects and the autonomy
to coordinate all multiple actors.
Two different strategies need to be accomplished to create this network of
intervention: the institutional coordination and the coherent project.
Institutional coordination is a process in which the state is required to have an
independent entity that has the autonomy and political leverage to negotiate
with all state branches intervening in the territory and also with other partners
like NGOs and other state level organizations and private partners.
This entity must have the knowledge base necessary to plan and implement the
project.
* Acquired local knowledge is fundamental. In the case of Medellin, the EDU
benefited from the incorporation within its institution of multiple groups
who brought with them already acquired knowledge. (For example, a
research group studying the physical projects for informal settlements in
Medellin at the Universidad Pontifica Bolivariana, fieldwork and community
participation of a state organization like the PRIMED). It was this
combination of academic knowledge and the effectiveness of a proved
practice that created the necessary resources and foundation to plan and
implement the project along with the community.
* Institutional independence from bureaucratic responsibilities is necessary
to execute the project.
* Interdisciplinary and inter-institutional collaboration is essential. The
organization coordinated all this needs to communicate with a multiplicity
of diverse individuals and organizations. Their staff needs to reflect that
diversity. One failure that I found in the EDU was that the majority of its
staff was comprised of architects, which narrowed the ability to deal with
other dimensions of the complex environment in which they are working.
* Political Leverage is necessary to be effective when in negotiation with
multiple state and private partners. This institution needs sufficient support
of the political base in government power. Without this political leverage, it
will be difficult to negotiate the complexity of internal power disputes.
The coherent project is a single project that creates a swift positive change in
the conditions of the area of intervention. With this project, the state declares
its commitment to the community that it had neglected. The projects and its
programs represent this commitment; the projects quality guarantees their
acceptance by the community and, in return, the sustainability of the new
relationship between the state and the community. The application of physical
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urban strategies that accompany citywide policies need to achieve a series of
requirements.
* Multiple actions within a single project involve public and private partners
that act throughout the territory of the intervention. This multiplicity of
actors in a single project increases the project's effectiveness and reduces
the potential for redundancy of initiatives.
* Concrete and short time frame is crucial for the project's success requiring
that the planning, design and execution of projects have clearly defined
boundaries of space and time.
* Physical projects should lead all interventions after peace negotiations
because they are the most visible actions of the state and the ones that are
easier to measure for success. This success is necessary to maintain their
momentum and apply all the initiatives.
Open and Sustainable Programs within the projects need to be sustainable
over time and increases that the chances that the space in which the state
has entered does not get challenge by other actors.
4. Security and Public Space 193
The security in marginalized areas needs to be understood in two scales: One
that deals with the community in general and with the armed actors in the
territory specifically and the second eliminates some of the conditions that
make the physical urban space prone being appropriated by these armed illegal
groups. This idea of the importance of physical design in controlling human
behavior is first explained by the studies of Newman (1973) in terms of what he
calls "Defensive Space." 3 In the case of Medellin, not only was there a clear
designation between public and private, as in Newman's theory but also that
the public space lacked the legal frame to work as such. The inexistence of a
state had made the public space a battlefield in which various armed groups
fought over the authority of the state.
Newman, Oscar. 1973. Defensible space; crime prevention through urban design. New
York: Collier Books.
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Negotiation with armed actors
If something can be learned about the failed DDR peace process with the
Autodefensas in Medellin it is that failed negotiations are better than no
negotiations at all. Lives have been saved as shown in the conclusions of Spagat
(2006). The initial success (reduction of violence) of the DDR process created a
space for the swift implementation of a multiplicity of projects and polices that
required a more complex implementation plan if the initial agreements were
not being reached. Based on that perspective, negotiation is a way to open the
door to implementation. When the peace processes seem to have failed and
new armed groups attempt to gain power over the territory, the safe areas that
have been created by the projects serve as strongholds to maintain the link that
had been created between the state and the community.
Based on the Medellin case, a way to improve peace negotiations in this kind of
territory would be for the incentives given to armed actors for (re) entering into
civil society, also need to be extended to include the broader community. They
need to happen at different scales with three types of populations to make it
sustainable: (1) illegal armed actors, (2) populations at risk of being included in
illegal armed groups, and (3) the rest of the civil community. These negotiations
should provide concessions and opportunities to each group based on their
needs.
Urban Physical Security
Security is also obtained by the design of all new public space. Secured new
public spaces reduce the possibilities of armed actors to engage in violence in
and around the spaces. This also increases mobility in and around the new
spaces, in sharp contrast to the mobility in the rest of the community. This
creates safe spaces where all citizens- locals and foreigners-can interact.
a. Public buildings add public space as required by the projects.
These public facilities need to be non-exclusive (open to all) and
to service extended hours. Those two conditions maintain the
vitality of the public realm and confirm that they are open to
the entire community.
b. Fragmented nonaggressive security, through public or private
provision, is also extended to their public spaces. These non-
repressive security forces throughout the territory in a
sustainable way (paid by each new project's budget) will
generate a better sense of security than the usual sporadic and
coordinated military terror strategies usually implemented in
urban areas that have been recognized as violent.
c. Location of new infrastructure must also recognize that the
neighborhood already has a public network structure in which
important places and buildings play a fundamental role in the
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mental, spiritual, economic, and social structure of the
neighborhood. New infrastructure (buildings, roads, public
spaces) needs to be aware of the existing public network
structure's existence and navigate their already intrinsic power
to build on the new infrastructure.
d. Revive negative spaces with new physical structures through
type of use and design. In Medellin, many spaces that were
used for summary executions, because they were areas not
owned and secured, later became the public spaces such as
parks and plazas) the decision about changing these spaces
should come from the participatory planning process with the
community. But the success of the project would arrive with a
high quality design that invites these spaces to be owned and
occupied by the community that before had feared these same
spaces.
5. Permanent Presence of the Non-Aggressive State in the
Territory
It is important that physical non-repressive forms of the state get grounded
permanently in the neighborhood. These are highly symbolic pieces of
infrastructure that demonstrate a contract between the community and the
state. They are a physical link that will maintain the sustainability of those
relationships in the future.
* Physical presence of the state is needed. In the Medellin case some of the
new projects in the territory became physical extensions or branches of the
state that claim permanent presence on the territory.
* Long-term viability is necessary. This new public project needs to be
sustained on a long-term basis.
* To be accessible to all members of the community or be a multiplicity of
structures that, in aggregate encompasses all members of the community.
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6. Design as an Agent of Social Change
The case of Medellin has taught us that good design is the tool that makes all
interventions visible and effective. It is the motor that changes the perceptions
of the larger community regarding the inhabitants of the marginalized
communities where the projects are placed and is the tool to provide an
environment with a higher quality of life.
a. Design as the tool that makes all interventions visible and effective is most
important. Without idea of high quality, all of these efforts and projects by
the state or any other organization would have been invisible. A lower
quality project would have just reaffirmed the second-class citizenship
stigma linked with the inhabitants. In the case of Medellin, 143 schools were
already in place but lacking in quality. The repositioning of some of them
make them visible and improve the livelihood of all the community not only
of the students and teachers. While the quantitative assessment of these
improvements did would be marginal compared with the momentum for
further change which they generated.
b. Design as the motor that changes perception of the quality of the space,
measured in terms of the commitment of the state to the marginalized
community. This also sends a message to the city at large or regional
community, as well as toward the newly perceived acquired citizenship of
the inhabitants of the area.
Enhancement of the community provides a higher quality environment. Good
design is the tool to incrementally improve the quality of the environment in
which the community lives.
* Quality of design can be ensured when the projects are open competition
for all new important projects. This is an easy strategy to obtain quality of
design and to publicize the projects.
* Replace improvised state infrastructure with careful and high quality
planning and design.
* Use of Innovation ideas in good design can be a way to bridge between the
intrinsic difficulties of working in an environment of urban developed
informality.
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Implementation methodology
Based on the previous learned lessons this section explains a tentative sequence
in which those lessons need to be implemented.
a. Identify where to act
* Identify the territory of the city where the state does not have a
legitimate presence.
* Define its boundaries.
* Select those areas with the most needs. Evaluate at multiple scales and
with multiple variables the type of needs in the territory in comparison
to rest of the city.
b. Identify actors in the area of work
* Illegal armed groups. All organizations that challenge the authority of
the state in the marginalized territory.
* Populations at risk, especially youth.
* Marginalized community - all members of the community
* State and all their dependencies that need to work on the territory
* Citywide as a unified project
* Other partners
c. Create leadership for the project 197
Create institutional support for the execution of all future projects and build
a knowledge base. Use the local knowledge already explored and explores
new interacting possibilities.
d. Negotiate truces
e. Concerted Planning process
* Understand the present level of participation and improve on it
* Create a clear and concise planning process that improves the present
level of participation
* Create long-range strategies for future increase in community
participation in decisions about the environment governance.
f. Identification of projects
e Identify risk areas in the present territory and map of project areas
that need to deal with the ambiguity of ownership of public space and
the possibility of challenging state authority by armed actors.
* Identify existing public structure so the new projects can build on
them.
* Create a network of new infrastructure that connects all previously
identified areas.
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g. Control for quality
* Competition
* Innovation
h. Implement as swift as possible and under a clear and achievable schedule.
i. Create sustainability strategies. This consolidates, in the long term, the
presence of the state and their involvement on the future of the area of
study.
Conclusion
This study has six important initial findings:
1. There is an apparent relationship between the conditions of informal
settlements and how they become prone to conflict. Informal settlements'
isolation from (usually) all state institutions makes it easy for other state-
like actors to access and control its territories. The case explored in this
thesis suggests that would be more cost effective to for the state take these
extensive approaches applied "quickly" over the span of even just three
years. This includes legalization of land tenure for members of informal
communities, and provisions of basic and good quality infrastructure. This,
approach, I believe can be applied to other cases in the world.
2. The perception of increased participation with state decisions, especially in
their own communities, makes the community feel included in the
development process.
3. Making coordinated interventions over a reduced amount of time and space 199
produce a cohesive change momentum. This permits addressing t large
failures caused by, in great part, the lack of state presence in informal
settlements.
4. The quality physical interventions make all the other interventions visible.
The lack of high quality physical interventions makes all those efforts
invisible.
5. "Urbanismo Social" is indeed a re-urbanization strategy that intends to
deliver a higher quality of architecture and urban interventions to the city in
general but particularly to the poorest areas of the city traditionally
abandoned by the state. While citizens are involved, and there are many
levels of participation in the Urbanismo Social, it is far removed from the
idea of a bottom-up approach as might be defined in wealthier countries
with high levels of community participation as part of the planning process.
The Urbanismo Social is still a "top down" design approach, performed by
the educated elites guided toward the poor. Nevertheless, this process, in
the context of the city of Medellin is radical. It is radical in the sense that
the government is working directly and intensely with residents of poor
communities building public infrastructure with a higher level of quality
than the state has ever done before.
Condusion
6. State secure public buildings are instrumental in conquering unsafe spaces
for the use of the community. The security that these projects provide, plus
the beneficial programs that they contain, together make the areas where
they are implemented safe for all inhabitants and foreigners. This
combination of non aggressive security and provision of state services in a
high quality envelope provide the legitimizing presence of the state in areas
where its sovereignty has been contested.
Applicability of the case of Medellin to other contexts
The Medellin case provides methodologies that can be applied to two types of
contexts: violent urban conflicts and informal settlements.
Urban violent conflict
In Medellin, the strategies implemented by the administration of Sergio Fajardo.
were performed in the context of a national negotiation of peace process with
the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The policies implemented by the
local administration supply support for those implemented at the national level
and permitted a longer period of apparent stability (around 3 years) until the
accords of the peace process were "broken" and a new and modified situation
violence resurged. What in today in Medellin is called the "la Guerra de
Combos." The space that this truce created permitted the implementation of a
multiplicity of projects.
The Medellin case provided examples of methodologies of negotiation on
situations of urban conflict. Also the Medellin case proves that applying policies
and projects on these truce periods generated positive results even when
violence and conflict reappeared in the urban context. The infrastructural
interventions (public spaces, buildings, transportation stations) generated new
safe spaces in the interior of the communities that maintain the sovereignty of
the state even after new (or modified) aggressors started military actions in the
territory. This network of safe spaces had permitted other institutions and
organizations affiliated or not with the state to maintain their actions in the
conflicted areas. This provided a larger sense of security than the one that
existed before the application of the policies.
Informal settlements.
The Medellin case provides information about how to deal with the complex
situation of informal settlements in the world. Its approach does not center on
the provision of housing as a solution for the informal settlement problems. This
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approach provides a new positive perspective on a topic and one that had
generated the desirable outcomes.
In today's international views of how to deal with the growing population that
lives in informal settlements in the world, the Medellin case provides an
important lesson about the importance of building on the social and physical
capital that these informal communities had. This specific case provides value
on how physical infrastructural projects that focused on the quality of facilities
in which the state provides services to the community produces better
outcomes than traditional resettlement projects that focuses only on housing
infrastructures. The value of quality of intervention over the quantity is in
Medellin the example that can easily be applied to informal communities were
close to a billion of people lived around the world. Thus, this single learned
experience can be the most influential and decisive tool that can be applied
elsewhere in the world and even outside of the realm of the informal
communities to the basic quality of living improvement of any community
around the world.
For Further study
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More detailed interviews with a larger percentage of members of all groups
involved are necessary to confirm the initial findings of this study. A quantitative
series of interviews and documentary research of the territories in a more
detailed scale (such as an entire neighborhood or even block) will provide a
more clear perspective about the real changes that the physical interventions
had on the change in the phenomenology of violence in Medellin. This would
also provide a better understanding of which projects could be more effective
on other contexts.
This study focuses closely on the complex situation within Medellin and places
this city's situation in the national context of Colombia. Further study is
imperative that places this citywide and national context within a global political
and economic context, especially the consumption patterns role in narcotraffic
flows (with the United States being the world's largest consumer of processed
cocaine from Colombia) and other international policies such as Plan Colombia
(which makes Colombia the recipient of the third largest sum of U.S. aid in
history, behind only Egypt and Israel.)
A comparative study of urban conflict areas in other countries and these areas'
relationship with its informal settlement growth are necessary to confirm some
of these initial findings and also to create the basis for a best practice mode to
Con c lu sion
which the Medellin case can be applied. Some initial places that could be
important to compare are Tijuana and Ciudad Juarez in Mexico. These cities are
suffering some of the initial stages of the phenomenology of violence that
Medellin went through in the early 1990s, prompting some people to call
Tijuana and Juarez "the new Medellin."
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Appendix 1: PUI Nororiental most
relevant Physical projects (graphic
description)
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Projecto Urbano Integral PUI Nororiental (Integral Urban Project IUP Northearst)
Plarta loraizacion, obr as ejecutadas lM5
1a Street Puerto Rico / street 106 / parque de la
candelaria
School and Comunity Dinner 1b
CEDEZO
Parque Biblioteca Espaha -
Santo Domingo Savio- Comuna
1 - Giancarlo Mazzanti- Medellin-
transformaci6n de una ciudad
Biblioteca Sto Domingo 3
NParque Metrocable 2 4
4Biblioteca Sto Domingo 3
6 Lavaderos Comunitarios Jardin de los pozos
UParque Pablo VI
1 0Parque de 'a Paz
71
Puente Mirador Andalucia - La Francia 11
1 2 Paseo Andaluca Calle 107
Parque PARQUE DE LA IMAGINACION 1
Villa del socorro
14 Puente La Paz Andalucia - Villa del Socorro
Parque Villa Niza 17
-5 w
18 Vivienda Q. Juan Bobo
Vivienda Q. Juan Bobo 18
19 PARQUE DEPORTIVO Y RECREATIVO GRANIZAL
PUENTE DE GUADUA 20
19a"IItMr 
sv
21 Metro Calbe
Colegio de Calidad Antonio Derka. 22
The politics of peace process in cities in conflict:
Appendix 2: Interviewees
Individuals that were interview in Medellin and that permitted their names to
be recorded as part of this study.
Alejandro Echeverry
Juan Diego Lopera
Luisa Botero
Jose Fernando Jaramillo Giraldo
Camilo Restrepo
Oscar Santanta,
Eliana Restrepo
Lida Lopez Montoya
Carlos Alberto Marin Herrera
Marco Aurelio
Amparo Torres H.
Juan David Carmona
Maria Leonisa Gomez
Luis Horacio Galeano Ruiz
Sirley Natalia Cifuentes,
Luz Marina Saldarriana
Luz Elena marin de Mesa
Oscar Arbelaes
Jake thomas Randall
Mateo Jaramillo Patino
Rocio Vasquez
Stalin de Carlo Pinzon Serpa
Hernando Ramos Sanchez
Ex Director of EDU and Ex Director of Planning Department
Sub director departamento de Planeaci6n Medellin
Architect at the Planning Department
Director PUI Noroccidental
Architect Botanical Gardens
7 years in the EDU 3 different Mayors
Social worker EDU
architect at EDU
architect at EDU
Community member comuna 13
Community Leader comuna 1
Director Corporaci6n siglo XXI comuna 13
neighborhood founders Comuna 1
Comuna 13 san Javier el Socorro lived for 33 years
Community Leader comuna 1
Director Sala mi Barrio, parque biblioteca spain
Founder Santo Domingo Savio Neighborhood
Corporacion siglo XXI comuna 13
Musician and community TV presenter in Comuna 13
community member
had live in the comuna
Community worker at comuna 13
Community Leader
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Acronyms/Abbreviations/Terms
Spanish
AM Area Metropolitana
EDU Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano
-PUI ..... _Proyecto Urbano Integrado
PP j_ IPresupuesto Participativo
PD Plan de Desarrollo
POT Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial
IEnglish ................ *.... ...................*-------- *......  ....
M e tro o lita A rea.... *....... ............  * ..*.........*'"*......... .  .....
Urban..... developm ent... corn*...... -- ..  ..  * ... ....... .. .....
Integrated Urban Project
Participative budget
Development Plan
General Plan
DANE Departamento Administrativo Nacional de
Estadistica
PJL Peace and Justice Law,
DDR Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration
PRIMED Programa Integral de Mejoramiento de Barrios Integral Program for the Informal Settlements
Informales improvement of Medellin
BCN Bloque Cacique Nutibara
CCCC Consejo Consultivo de Comunas y Corregimientos
BID Banco Internacional de Desarrollo nternational Development Bank
ICV Indice de Calidad de Vida
IDH Indice de Desarrollo Humano
DNP Departamento Nacional de Planeacion
AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC)
BNC Bloque Cacique Nutibara
Alto Comisionado para la paz _ High commissioner for peace
CCC-C Consejos Consultivos Comunales y Consultive councils per comunas and
Corregimentales (CCC-C) _orreguirnientos
PNUD Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el UNDP United Nations Development Programme
Desarrollo
ICT Instituto de Credito territorial Institute of territorial credit
NVC Nicleos de Vida Ciudadana
FOVIMED Fondo Municipal cde Vivienda de lnter6s Social ---- 
ISVIMED Instituto Social de Vivienda y Habitat De Medellin
CORVIDE Corporaci6n de Vivienda y Desarrollo de Housing and Social Development Corporation
Medellin of Medellin
.. . .I .... ...-1- -------... ......
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Terms
Estrato soclo-economico
Casas de Compensacion
Familiar
rent seeking
Conuna
S IS BE N
Socio economic strata: is a tool of the Colombian government (Ley 142 de 1994, Articulo
102 ) to classify real estate properties in accordance with the classification of the DANE
that evaluate the real estate unit based on poverty level, public services, location,
indigenous population and others. This classification determines the level of taxation,
the fare of public services (water, energy, phone and gas), access to the free health
services, fares at public universities, poverty alleviation programs etc. In most cases
estratos 1 and 2 get subsidies from the upper estratos 4, 5 and 6. Although an
economical measure based in solidarity principles which is positive, there is a negative
effect of estratificacion with a direct impact in the urban morphology and segregation
of Colombian cities. It has also tended to create stereotypes depending on the
residential area from the citizens and their associated strata level.
FAMILY COMPENSATION FUND, is a Colombian type of government regulated NGO a
Caja de Compensacion is nonprofit company whose objective is social disparity
reduction thru the redistribution of a percentage of the income of all employees of the
country. A caja de compensacion will receive a percentage of all incomes and with that
pool of money provide services of health, education, culture, housing, recreation, social
loans, and job training. Over the Colombian territory there are multiple Cajas de
compensacion that compete with each other for employers and employees
subscriptions. All Colombian employees need by law to be subscribe to a Caja de
Compensacion.
Rent seeking generally implies the extraction of uncompensated value from others
without making any contribution to productivity, such as by gaining control of land and
other pre-existing natural resources, or by imposing burdensome regulations or other
government decisions that may affect consumers or businesses.
Comuna is a territorial distribution of the urban areas of the city of Medellin. Each
comuna is comprised of a number of neighborhoods (5 to10). Contrarie to many news
records comuna is not a synonymous of poor neighborhood of informal settlement as
the case of "favela" or "slum" the city of Medellin has 15 comunas. The comuna
territorial divitionis similar to the French term arondisement a territorial distribution of
the city of Paris. Each comuna has his own Junta Administradora Local (local
administrative group) JAL that represent the territorial division to the municipality.
Is a proxy means test index widely used as a targeting system for social programs in
Colombia. It serves as an indicator of households' economic well-being and is based on
a crosssection sample of Colombian households. The SISBEN index is a function of a set
of variables related to the consumption of durable goods, human capital endowment
and current income. SISBEN was created with the purpose of simplifying, expediting and
reducing the cost of targeting individual beneficiaries of social programs at the various
government levels. The system has been very successful and has generated high
demand both in municipalities and departments, presumably due to its low operation
costs and also to the social benefits being brought to participating communities. SISBEN
has expanded quite rapidly. It is currently used in a wide range of subsidized social
programs, most heavily by those that benefit from health subsidies established by
Colombia's Social Security Law. An Economic Interpretation of Colombia's SISBEN: A
Composite Welfare Index Derived from the Optimal Scaling Algorithm, By Carlos
Eduardo V61ez, Elkin Castano and Ruthanne Deutsch, November, 1998
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